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
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WORD AND PHRASE

WORD AND PHRASE

TRUE AND FALSE USE IN ENGLISH

123736

BY

JOSEPH FITZGERALD, A.M.

CHICAGO
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1901

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PREFATORY NOTE.

IN composing this work the author has aimed always at practical utility rather than interesting or curious information regarding etymologies. Still, whenever the etymology or the history of a word appeared specially worthy of notice, he has not been restrained by fear of going beyond the limits of the practical from tracing its pedigree and recording its fortunes as it acquired new significations of honor or of dishonor. But these excursions are few, and if they offend the candid reader, he will pardon them for the sake of those weaker brethren who like to find the agreeable mixed with the useful even in a work that is naught if not practical. And this is in the true sense a practical manual of English words and their uses. The words treated in it are largely such as suggested themselves to the author during the years that he was assistant editor of the *North American Review* and the *Forum*, specially the latter. No article, except two or three, was published in the *Forum* in its first four or five years that was not

corrected or revised by him before it went to the compositor; and thus was formed a habit of scrutinizing words and phrases in books and other publications and making notes, the outcome of which is the present work.

Four or five years ago the author published in New York "Pitfalls in English," a small volume which has been the nucleus of this and is nearly all incorporated in this, of which it constitutes about one fifth part.

JOSEPH FITZGERALD.

MAMARONECK, N. Y.
August 1, 1901.

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Section I.

INTRODUCTION.

Languages Homogeneous and Heterogeneous.
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English and German.

LANGUAGE is the amber in which a thousand precious and subtle thoughts have been safely imbedded and preserved. It has arrested ten thousand flashes of genius which, unless thus fixed and arrested, might have been as bright, but would also have been as quickly passing and perishing, as the lightning. Words convey the mental treasures of one generation to the generations that follow; and laden with this, their precious freight, they sail safely across gulfs of time in which empires have suffered shipwreck and the languages of common life have sunk into oblivion. And for all these reasons far more and mightier every way is a language than any one of the works which have been composed in it. — TRENCH, *Study of Words*.

WHILE I would open to the humble and the unschooled the freest access to all the rich treasures which English literature embodies, I would inculcate the importance of a careful study of genuine English, and a conscientious scrupulosity in its accurate use, upon all who in any manner occupy the position of Teachers or Leaders of the American mind. — GEORGE P. MARSH, *Lectures on the English Language*.

WORD AND PHRASE:

TRUE AND FALSE USE IN ENGLISH.

Section I.

INTRODUCTION.

LANGUAGES HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS.

1. SOME languages are homogeneous others heterogeneous, the homogeneous being such as consist of a larger or smaller number of root words or radicals native in them and of derivative and compound words formed from those roots; the heterogeneous those whose roots are of various origin, a comparatively small portion being native in the language, the rest being taken from one or many other sources. Of the first class the German language is a very good example, but such also is the Greek and such the Latin: of the other class the English language is the type. With exception of an inconsiderable number of words borrowed from extrane languages, Latin, Greek, and other tongues, the German vocabulary is absolutely pure and homogeneous, and were those borrowed foreign words to be thrown out, the native resources of the German language are sufficient to provide adequate substitutes.

2. English rests on a basis of Anglo-Saxon etymons and its syntax is of native origin; but the words of its vocabulary are very largely of a different origin, coming mainly from the Latin direct or through the Norman-French. But that does not mean that of the words used in discourse one-half or any such large proportion would be of Latin-French origin; for the words of relation (prepositions, conjunctions) and other necessary parts of the machinery of the language being of native origin, the native elements necessarily have the chief rôle to play when the language is in action.

3. Of the two hundred and forty-five words in the foregoing two paragraphs many are repeated several times: hence two hundred and forty-five is not the number of the different words contained in them. Of different words, each counted once only, and such words as Latin, French, etc., excluded, there are ninety-six, and of these exactly one half are of Latin, French, and Greek origin, the other half of Germanic or of Norse origin: these last are "homely" words compared with the others, which are "foreign"; we understand and speak "are," "other," "being," "such," "small," "with," "word," long before the meaning of "language," "vocabulary," "radical," "native," "derivative," "compound," dawns on our intelligence and long before we have any use for them. There is no such distinction between the words constituting the vocabulary of a pure homogeneous language like Greek or German. This being so, it is seen that the acquisition of words, the forming of compound words, and the ascertainment of the meanings of words must be incomparably easier in a

homogeneous than in a heterogeneous language. The comparative ease or difficulty of acquiring the vocabulary of English or German respectively will be considered later on; a subject that finds apt place here is the much more logical and more orderly growth and development of a homogeneous language as regards not only acquisition of new words but acquisition of new meanings by words.

4. In German all the words are of home origin, they are household words indeed, and the precise import of each is understood, whether they stand alone or whether they go to make up sesquipedalian compounds, as well by peasant as by philosopher. Hence in German no one ventures to inject into a word a meaning which its elements do not justify. In English the etymological values of words, whether Anglo-Saxon or Latin, are known and determined, but in most cases for the learned only: hence when new meanings attach to English words, none but the learned is competent to say whether the acquisition of these meanings is legitimate or not. The chain of derivation of German words is seen in each word: the deflections or the developments in meaning can also be seen in the words themselves. Thus in *buch* (book) the German plainly sees *buche*, the beech, and is minded of the beechen boards which were the first books of his forefathers; and when he comes across the compound word *buchsucht* (bibliomania) he has no need of a dictionary to tell him its meaning.

5. The etymological pedigree of every legitimately coined English word may also be said to be plainly inscribed on its front, but the inscription is not always writ in English to be understood of the common

people: it needs explanation for those who are not acquainted with its history in ancient Germanic speech or in Latin or Greek. Even when an ingenious Anglo-Saxonist coins new words of true Old-English gold, his mintage does not pass as language currency: the people cannot discern the gold in his coinage and wilfully prefer base metal to it; even for the educated his new compounds need interpretation: the man is laughed at by all for his "outlandish terms," — for so his truly "homely" and *inlandish* forms of speech are sure to be characterized; his "speechcraft" must be translated grammar, his "airfarer" aeronaut, "mistiming" anachronism, "warpause" or "weaponstay" armistice, "wortlore" botany, "housebreak" burglary, "wonstead" domicile, "skyline" horizon, "siegecraft" poliorcetics. But it is not necessary to go out of the beaten tracks to show that in no language of the civilized world is etymological interpretation so necessary as in English. It is not so necessary in French, for French has preserved the tradition of the Latin etymologies and in some degree even of the Latin syntax. Latin was once a living language in France, used in all the municipalities at least, and spoken in more or less purity by the whole population above the peasant class; but it never was a living language in England, save in a few Roman settlements and garrison towns; and at the Anglo-Saxon invasion it disappeared wholly so that when Augustin arrived all memory of the Roman domination and of Latin speech was lost. Then, when a Latinish tongue came in with the Norman conquerors, its vocabulary indeed was by degrees appropriated by the whole population, but the voca-

bulary only: the etymological tradition and the syntax of Latin or of French never took root in England; and hence the Norman-French words, however allied among themselves through etymology, were for the Saxon people of England like unrelated and independent radicals; consequently those words took on new meanings that often had no ground in the etymology. At the same time the invasion of England by the Normans and their speech threw the Anglo-Saxon etymological system into confusion; and as Anglo-Saxon was henceforth for some generations the language only of churls and peasants and despised by the ruling class and scholars, it became corrupt, and the connection with the ancient Anglo-Saxon was broken, the tradition lost. Thus there were side by side in England two languages that were destined to amalgamate, but both of them severed from the stocks from which they were sprung.

6. The etymology of English words, of whichever origin, was therefore obscured, and the development of the English language proceeded with little regard to the laws of the languages from which it was derived. Still it is only by tracing our words back to their original forms and significations that we can give ourselves a rational account of their import. It is not asserted that only in this way are we enabled to employ our English words with propriety and precision; for some of the best models of pure and proper English are the writings of men acquainted with no language but the mother tongue and the speech of the common people: men who perhaps had read no classic English author and who in their writings builded better than they knew. Is it therefore

useless to acquire knowledge of the etymology of our language, seeing that such knowledge is not necessary for the perfect mastery of its resources for true and precise expression? Not any more useless than it is for a person to put himself under an instructor in the art of playing a musical instrument, though some very remarkable musical performers have been easily self-taught or have even acquired the art apparently without study or effort. The same is to be said of painters, sculptors, orators, and of practicers of every art and craft. And on the other hand some there are who though they have dug every word-root of our language out of the ground in which those roots first grew, cannot write a sentence in passably good English. But from neither of these examples does it follow that a knowledge of English etymologies is of no use, or of little use. For the majority of learners the only way of getting at the true import of words is through their etymological history.

7. So much for our etymological study as a means. As an end, the study of English etymologies is quite as honorable a pursuit and as worthy of strenuous effort as, for instance, the study of entomology, to say the least; but one is not disposed to content himself with the least. Language is a principal department of the science of Man. Speech is inseparably bound up with thought, so that without words thought is impossible and inconceivable. While we study the etymological monuments of our language we are pursuing a strictly scientific investigation, unless, indeed, in our researches we spurn the methods and principles of scientific research.

THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE.

8. The science of language, or of languages, is not inferior in interest or importance to any other natural science whatever; for this is also, in the strict sense, a natural science. Language belongs to the domain of nature as truly and as wholly as botany or geology or physics, and it is an essential part of the study of man, which is proverbially the proper study of mankind. And language is the indispensable instrument of all the sciences; without language astronomy or chemistry would be as impossible as grammar. As a science, language is strictly comparable to botany; its functions are closely analogous to those of botany: like botany, it is in great part a descriptive and classificative science; but, like botany, it is also in a measure an experimental science; and it is preeminently a practical science. With a very few changes of terms, a description of the object of botany applies to the science of language; and if we can truly say that the object of botany is not merely to distinguish, name, and classify the vegetable productions of the globe, so the object of our science is not merely to distinguish, name, and classify the data of language. The science of language embraces a consideration of the external forms of words: their anatomical structure, however minute; their embryogeny and phyllogeny; the functions they perform; their arrangement and classification; their history in former epochs; and the uses to which they are subservient. We have been using, with inconsiderable changes, the "Encyclopædia Britannica's" definition of the field of botany, and every

word of it holds good of the science of language. And if we use the term "science of language" in the largest sense, comprehending language in general, we find these further observations of the "Encyclopædia Britannica" upon botany quite equally true of our science. Let the words stand as they are written about botany: "It examines *the plant* in its earliest development when it appears as *a single cell*, and follows it through all its stages till it attains maturity. It takes a comprehensive view of all the *plants* which cover the earth, from the *minutest lichen or moss* to the most gigantic productions of the tropics. It marks the relations which subsist between *all members* of the vegetable world, and traces the mode in which the *most despised weeds* contribute to the growth of the mighty denizens of the forest."

9. Language, it is true, is conventional, but it is none the less natural: our language conventions have their causes in the constitution of the human mind, hence in nature; their causes are therefore natural causes; as such these conventions are an object of science, — natural science. The Constitution of the United States is also a convention, but it, too, is an object of science; as such, its foundations are traced back to the forests of Germany and Scandinavia in the dawn of history. In language, as in all things, there is a reason for whatever exists, and that reason it is the office of science to discover. The words we use to-day, or most of them, were in use before civilization began, and their significations in the primeval time determined for the larger part their significations for ever; so that when we name the very latest discovery of science, or the newest

invention in mechanics, we speak words that of old were in use among barbarians to whom writing would have seemed art magic. An entirely new-made word is very rare; when we need a name for a new idea, a new concept, we take an old word and give it an added signification, or we compound two or more ancient words.

10. In thus compounding old words and giving to them new significations, we seem to ourselves to act arbitrarily; but law governs even our whims and our violations of law. It is Calvin's paradox, almost universally repudiated in religious philosophy in these times, but almost universally accepted as truth in the schools of natural science. It is the business of philology not only to define the laws of normal development, and to say what is use of words and what abuse; it is no less its function to trace departures from right to their causes or laws; for in language, as in botany, there are normal growths, and there are sports and all manner of divergences from the generic and specific types. In botany it is as interesting to investigate the laws of sports as to determine the law of types; indeed, as a mere intellectual exercise it must be more interesting, as involving research of a greater number and variety of contributing causes.

11. Hence in the study of language we aim not only to trace the legitimate pedigree of words and significations, but also the illegitimate; even a jargon may be matter of very fruitful study. In science nothing is to be despised. For science even dirt is but matter out of place. Science despises nothing, however minute, however lowly, however monstrous or abnormal. Bacteriology and ptomainology might be

profoundly interesting studies, even quite apart from their application to prevention and treatment of disease; in like manner the study of words might afford keen intellectual enjoyment without any reference to one's own use of words. Yet the study of the life histories of words is very commonly regarded as tending to make one finical and priggish, pedantical. That may well be the case with one who gets hold of a few scattered notions of the meaning of this science; here a little learning is a dangerous thing; but as no man is more tolerant of the human weaknesses of his brethren than the saint, so no one is less a prig and a pedant than the true scholar.

12. It is mere good sense and not priggishness to aim at the highest precision in the use of the mother tongue. Our only access to knowledge is through language; our strongest tie to our fellow-men now living, our only tie to the generations that are gone before, is language, our language. If we have an erroneous comprehension of our native speech, in which all our thinking, all our reasoning is done, we err inevitably in our conclusions, which is a rather serious matter, and yet not at all of infrequent occurrence. Want of precision in the terms of a syllogism vitiates the conclusion, and misunderstanding of the terms has precisely the same effect. And not only in our reasoning processes, strictly so called, is this result produced: it is impossible to take in the true meaning of a written passage or of a spoken discourse without clear understanding of the terms employed. Very awkward revelations of supposedly well-educated men's ignorance of the purport of plain English words and phrases are daily made in the law courts when

juries are selected. There is good ground for believing that even after selection has been made and the unfittest rejected, the jurors accepted do in many cases fail to understand the arguments of counsel or the charge of the court, through ignorance of the meaning of terms neither abstruse nor technical. (See Appendix I.)

13. The very general repugnance for reading anything more solid than the daily newspaper is due mostly to unacquaintance with the meanings of words rather than to unwontedness of the thoughts conveyed, or inherent difficulty of the subject-matters. Reading gives people headache, or they drop to sleep over a book: the reason in most cases is that the reader has but indifferent knowledge of the language of the book. Hand to the same man — let it be a merchant — the day's prices-current, or a year's prices-current, and he will peruse that to the end with avidity and without weariness; but give him a history of prices, or a treatise on the theory of price, and the book will be dropped before half an hour is past; the man actually cannot follow the thought of the author; he has not sufficient acquaintance with his mother tongue for that; he is a mercantile man in soul and mind as well as in daily occupation. This thing is easily tested by experiment, and what is here written is given on the authority of both observation and experiment.

14. It is true that we learn the mother tongue in childhood; but only so much of it as answers the needs of the child: he who learns of it no more than the child learns will remain in mental stature a child. Language does not come by nature, but of

communication of mind with mind, and especially of mind with books. Says Professor George P. Marsh: "The groundwork of English indeed can be, and best is, learned at the domestic fireside — a school for which there is no adequate substitute; but the knowledge there acquired is not, as in homogeneous languages, a root out of which will spontaneously grow the flowers and the fruits which adorn and enrich the speech of man. English has been so much affected by extraneous, alien, and discordant influences, so much mixed with foreign ingredients, so much overloaded with adventitious appendages, that it is, to most of those who speak it, in a considerable degree, a conventional and arbitrary symbolism. . . . English is not a language which teaches itself by mere unreflecting usage. It can be mastered in all its wealth, in all its power, only by conscious, persistent labor." — *Lectures on the English Language*, p. 9.

15. The rewards of the study of a language and, be it said, of our English language in particular, it would be impossible to state more forcibly than they are stated by Coleridge: "A language will often be wiser, not merely than the vulgar, but even than the wisest of those who speak it. [Coleridge might have given in proof of this the one little word *ought* — which is *owe* — as presenting the foundation of moral law in such shape as to demand from philosophers a straightforward answer to the question, Owe it to what? instead of weaving cobwebs of theory spun out of their brains.] Being like amber in its efficacy to circulate the electric spirit of truth, it is also like amber in embalming and preserving the relics of ancient wisdom, although one is not seldom puzzled to deci-

pher its contents. Sometimes it locks up truths which were once well known but which in the course of ages have passed out of sight and been forgotten. In other cases it holds the germs of truths of which, though they were never plainly discerned, the genius of its framers caught a glimpse in a happy moment of divination. A meditative man cannot refrain from wonder when he digs down to the deep thought lying at the root of many a metaphysical term employed for the designation of spiritual things, even of those with regard to which professing philosophers have blundered grossly; and often it would seem as though rays of truth which were still below the intellectual horizon had dawned upon the imagination as it was looking up to heaven. Hence those who feel an inward call to teach and enlighten their countrymen should deem it an important part of their duty to draw out the stores of thought which are already latent in the native language, to purify it from the corruptions which Time brings upon all things and from which language has no exemption, and to endeavor to give distinctness and precision to whatever in it is confused or obscure or dimly seen." — *Guesses at Truth*, First Series, p. 295.

16. The study of the words of the mother tongue is a labor, but a labor that is lightened and sweetened at every turn by the joy of discovery, as the student comes every moment upon riches unweened; and for many a one " the first discovery of the fact that words are living powers, are the vesture, yea, even the body which thoughts weave for themselves, has been like the dropping of scales from his eyes, like the acquiring of another sense or the introduction into a new

world; he is never able to cease wondering at the moral marvels that surround him on every side, and ever reveal themselves more and more to his gaze."—TRENCH, *Study of Words*, p. 2.

17. There is a sense in which words are but counters for the wise, while they are the money of the fools: with equal truth it may be said that coins are but counters for the wise: but whether as coins or counters, words must have a fixed nominal value at least, and that value is ascertained only by the study of words: else whether as coins or counters words will serve us ill in social commerce. William Swinton, in his delightful *Rambles among Words*, quotes from Bishop Hutchinson a striking passage on the power and function of words: "We doubt not but many wise men have too mean an opinion of the power of words, and take too little care about them; for though the words of a fool are little, the words of a wise man are wonderful. Words are the judges of our thoughts, the landmarks of all interests, and the wheels of our human world are turned by them. They move interests that are greater than mountains, and many a time have subdued kingdoms. Riches and poverty, love and hatred, and even life and death, are in the power of the tongue; and when their effects are least, they are still the character of the mind and abilities of him who speaks them; and when they are just and natural, though plain and unaffected, they carry charms that are superior to the beauty of the fairest face; while the improper use of them shows ignorance of words that are understood by others, they lessen the man and make the picture as mean as sign painting."

18. Says Richard Grant White, addressing James R. Lowell, — and we may adopt his words for our own: "I have as little faith as I believe you have in the worth of a schoolbred language. Strong, clear, healthy, living speech springs, like most strong, living things, from the soil and grows according to the law of life within its seed. But pruning and training may do something for a nursery-bred weakling, and even for that which springs up unbidden and grows with native vigor into sturdy shapeliness." — *Words and their Uses*, Dedication.

19. Grant White's allusion to gardening is very apt. It happily defines the scope and purpose of such a book as this, — both to prune the wayward growths and to train them in an advantageous direction, as by the vine-dresser's hand. If the pruning and training are done with skill and with knowledge of the habit of the plant, then while the plant's vices are curbed, its innate virtues are given free play. It is a noble vine-stock, our mother tongue; but it has such vigorous life in it that it tends to over-luxuriance of growth, and needs to be constantly dressed and tended.

AN IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT: LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY.

20. In language, as in social and political life, two principles, two forces, are ever contending with each other for supremacy, — the Commons and the Aristocracy, Number and Privilege. There are in language, as in government, Liberty and Authority; and however the case may stand in the abstract, in

the concrete right is nowhere on either side wholly. Without Authority there is chaos; without Liberty there is suppression of natural development. Fortunately the Democrat in politics may be an Aristocrat in the domain of language, and conversely; for it would be a misfortune indeed were the radical and the conservative forces of social life to stand in the same hostile array in language. Some of the aristocrats of scholarship, as they might be called, among philologers — men who, because of their attainments, are justly regarded as authorities, among them Dr. Latham — have stood for anarchism in language; for Latham, in language, whatever is is right, — *vox populi vox Dei;* the people are the supreme judges, and from their decrees is no appeal. If that were the law, or, rather, no-law, of language, and no authority of philologers nor of classic writers were recognized or respected, the mother tongue as used to-day might in a generation or two be unintelligible without the aid of glossaries. On the other side are the purists, who would have the language put under the absolute rule of an academy, without appeal from its decisions. This was attempted in France, with results that have been very differently estimated by competent scholars. On one side was Ernest Renan, master of the perfect French style; and he credits the Academy with making the French language a consummate instrument of literary expression. On the other side, a critic hardly less competent to judge, Lanfrey, charges the Academy with degrading the national genius and the national tongue, impairing its masculine qualities, its originality, its spontaneity, its vigor, its natural grace, though he admits that it has given

to it a flexibility, a brilliancy, and a polish which it never possessed before.

21. The time of such academies is past: the time of all Authority seems to be past, save such authority as can show its warrant in natural law. In language there can be no rule save by the consent, *i. e.*, the voluntary acquiescence, of the ruled, their acceptance of the models set before them by the classic writers of their language. But there is no reason to fear the coming of chaos in our language; and, indeed, now less reason incomparably than ever before, for never were the works of great writers so accessible to the people as now, and the works of such writers are the standard of right usage. Their weighty authority will ever be felt, and it will check vagaries of speech. Thus in language is Democracy reconciled with Aristocracy, Freedom with Authority; the Best (*aristoi*) bear rule by consent of the ruled, not by privilege. This is a regulated Struggle for Life; in a regulated struggle for life the fittest to survive will be not the weeds but the good grain.

ENGLISH AND GERMAN VOCABULARIES COMPARED.

22. In a very authoritative work on the Russian people, their manners, morals, and characteristics, it is gravely asserted that Russians may any day be heard disputing among themselves over such propositions as, That a stone let drop from the hand will fall to earth, or, That at the earth's poles there is perpetual ice: all this with the same confidence of each disputant that he alone is right that we see in other

lands when propositions more debatable are discussed. The first of the two propositions might of course be demonstrated on the spot experimentally; but the Russian mind prefers to decide all questions whatsoever on authority or on high metaphysical grounds, and experiment has no place in that field. The story is more than half true, told of ourselves. Who is there that has not heard the question debated, — taking part in the debate himself perhaps, — whether English is easier or harder to learn than other language, German, for example? The Russian *moozhiks* are still thrashing the straw of controversies settled for all the rest of the world before the *moozhik* came into existence, and capable of determination now even by themselves as quick as wink. Our own debate over the relative easiness or difficulty of English as compared with German is also carried on over a question decided a long time ago and capable of determination again to the satisfaction of the least instructed person by a very simple experiment.

23. Let the question of ease or difficulty in this case have regard only to the vocabularies of the two languages, prescinding from the question of ease or difficulty in learning idioms, pronunciation, orthography, etc. That language, then, is easiest whose vocabulary requires least time to acquire. Here is the title of a celebrated German book: *Menschenhass und Reue*, that is, Misanthropy and Repentance. Speak to any German child of four or five years the words *Menschenhass* and *Reue*, and most certainly he will understand, and not only understand, but will tell you in words what the first word means, and almost as certainly what is meant by the second. Pronounce

the two words Misanthropy and Repentance in the hearing of an average Anglic (English-speaking) child of five years, and if he is found to understand them, you have something little short of a prodigy. Why is this? Because the German child already possesses the two elements of *Menschenhass*, namely, *Mensch*, human being, and *Hass*, hate; and *Reue*, which is the same as our English verb "rue," is as familiar a word to him as "glad" or "sorry" is to an Anglic child. But Repentance! The child knows nothing about that word at all, nor will he for many a year; for it is a word belonging primarily, in English, to the vocabulary of religious emotion, and understanding of it presupposes some notion of the meaning of sin; true, its use is not restricted to the expression of sorrow for sin, but its primary meaning in our language clings to it through all its fortunes. The German child, then, learns the words *Mensch*, *Hass*, *Reue*, as the Anglic child learns "father," "mother," "bread"; and when *Mensch* and *Hass* are compounded to form *Menschenhass*, the compound is of course readily understood; but the elements of the compound word "misanthropy" (Greek *miso*, to hate, *anthropos*, man) are not given to one in ten thousand Anglics, either in babyhood, youth, or age; there is nothing in it that is native English, nor is there anything that is English in the word "repentance."

24. The child of German parents early learns the meaning of *Haus*, house, and knowing so much has no difficulty in understanding *Häuslich*, domestic, nor the word *Hausfriede*, domestic peace, and a host of other compounds relating to the house: but the infant learning to speak English, to get as many

terms as its little German coequal, must, in addition to "house," learn the meaning of "domestic." Even so big a word as "independent," *unabhängig*, is readily understood by a German child: the German child that would have to be taught the etymological sense of *unabhängig* would be an exceptionally dull one; the Anglic child of four or five years who should grasp, untaught, the meaning of "independent" and its etymology would be an example of precocious intelligence. The word "independent" is compounded of three elements, none of them native English, *in* equal to un, *de* equal to from, *pend* meaning hang; *unabhängig* has also three elements, but all of them German. The idea expressed by our word "obsolescent" would be readily conveyed to the mind of a German child of five years; nor would he need a teacher to advise him of the difference between "obsolescent" and "obsolete," between *veraltend* and *veraltet*. The most ignorant German peasant necessarily understands, untaught, the words *Unsterblichkeit*, immortality, *Unverletzbarkeit*, inviolability, *menschenfreundlich*, philanthropic, *Sprachkunde*, linguistic, etc. And not less is the advantage of the German over the Anglic in the employment of words. The wholly untutored German peasant, if the idea (not the word but the notion) of "linguistic" were given him, would at once name it as correctly as any scholar: what English-speaking man, of even high classical education, could do as much? From these examples — and they are typical — one may reasonably infer that mastery of the vocabulary of the English tongue is, at the very lowest estimate, twice as difficult as mastery of the German. See Appendix I.

Section II.

DEGRADATION OF WORDS.

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1. DEGRADATION of words is inevitable; for however sacred, however noble may have been their original significations and associations, in time, through familiarity, they suffer the fate which is proverbial. Besides, the analogies of ideas will lead us to inject into the words we use concepts which to us appear to have any close relation to the original signification. When the word Inspiration came into our language it had one signification only, direct communication of the mind and will of God. In time we learned to speak of the poet's inspiration; and indeed there is analogy between the fine frenzy of the poet and the enthusiasm of the god-possessed man. Here the degradation of the term Inspiration is natural and it is venial; it gives no shock even to the most religious mind, and betrays no lowering of one's idea of divine inspiration. But other instances of the degradation of words and phrases that ought never to be turned to profane uses will be found in this section, some of them calculated to shock religious minds. And it is curious to remark how often the degradation reaches its final stage in the mart or on the bourse. Is this evolution peculiar to English or is it seen equally in other languages?

2. If the mercantile tastes and pursuits of the English affect the language in this way, then other tastes and pursuits of other peoples must similiarly affect their languages. That this is true of the Italians and their language is effectively shown by Marsh when he says: "A bold and manly and generous and truthful people would certainly not choose to say *umiliare una supplica*, to humiliate a supplication, for, to present a memorial; to style the strength which awes, and the finesse which deceives, alike, *onestà*, honesty or respectability; to speak of taking human life by poison, not as a crime, but simply as a mode of facilitating death, *ajutare la morte;* to employ *pellegrino*, foreign, for admirable; to apply to a small garden and a cottage the title of *un podere*, a power; to call every house with a large door, *un palazzo*, a palace; a brass earring, *una gioja*, a joy; a present of a bodkin, *un regalo*, a royal munificence; an alteration in a picture, *un pentimento*, a repentance; a man of honor, *un uomo di garbo*, a well-dressed man; or a message sent by a footman to his tailor, through a scullion, *una ambasciata*." — *Lectures on the English Language*, p. 224. See Appendix III.

3. The degradation of the word Sacrifice (noun and verb) is worthy of the first place in this list of words degraded. The process of degradation is easily traced in the sequence of the word's meanings in a dictionary: 1. Immolation, offering to God, for atonement, thanksgiving or the like, a victim slain at the altar; also the victim itself. 2. In the figurative sense, foregoing inferior goods for the sake of higher, as when one renounces the world and its gauds to save his soul. 3. Renouncing one good for another, which

may be inferior: "I sacrificed vanity for the sake of politeness." 4. Any self-denial or hardship voluntarily undertaken: parents sacrifice their own interest to that of their children. 5. Finally, the foregoing of a possible profit, as when a drygoods man sacrifices five-cent pocket-handkerchiefs by cutting the price to four cents: this is always called A Great Sacrifice, the sacrifice by eminence, as it were. Now when we consider that among the Pagan Romans from whom we get the word Sacrifice (noun *sacrificium*, verb *sacrifico*) neither that nor any allied word, as *immolo*, to immolate, *victima* and *hostia*, the victim of sacrifice, was ever profaned in popular usage, so far as the extant Latin literature enables us to judge; it is a singular thing that in the English language the most familiar and most frequent use of the word Sacrifice is in the sense of a selling or disposing of goods at a price less than they cost. And yet the English-speaking nations have for many centuries been taught to regard all their highest interests in time and eternity as hanging on one act of Sacrifice. Is this transformation a mere accident? But there is no such thing as accident in nature: nothing without its cause; and language, even the English language, is a part of nature.

4. Influence was originally a term of astrology or of astronomy, for the two words are etymologically equivalent, and in fact until modern times were used interchangeably; the *astrologos* was for the Greeks *astronomos* also, and *astronomia* was *astrologia*. Sir Walter Raleigh writes astrologer when he means astronomer. Kepler, while working out the problems of astronomy, earned his daily bread by astrology,

composing almanacs in which the data for astrological calculations were given: he had a personal belief in the planetary influences. The idea of starry and planetary Influence is as ancient as man himself, but the word Influence (*influentia*) appears first in mediæval Latin. As the religion of poetry is a feigned paganism, with invocation of gods, goddesses, muses, and a dramatic cast of nymphs, dryads, gnomes, and other fictitious beings, so, down to comparatively recent times, the astronomical system of poetry was largely astrological, the astronomy of myth. In the English poets, as in the poets of all countries, there is always, as noted by Trench, "more or less allusion to invisible illapses of power, skyey, planetary effects, supposed to be exercised by the heavenly luminaries upon the dispositions and the lives of men." He further notes that in Shakspere Influence is never used save in the sense of the astrologer. Milton makes a strikingly beautiful use of the word in a metaphorical sense:

> "Store of ladies, whose bright eyes
> Rain sweet influence."

The Judicious Hooker has given us a fine example of the legitimate use of the word: "God hath his influence into the very essence of things," where the idea, though differing widely from that of the astrologer, is still entirely consistent with the astrological view. But it is probable that Hooker had not in mind the astrological concept at all when he said Influence: he would probably have coined the word to express his thought of the inflow of the divine creating and conserving power into the material universe, if it had not been already in the language. Closely allied

to the astrological Influence, or identical with it, is Influenza, the same word in Italian, denoting a malady caused either by malign planetary influence or by obscure atmospheric conditions. From these meanings to others more remote from the notions of astrologers, as when we say "he is under the influence of liquor," each successive step is justified by some sort of analogy. At the end of the genetic line is "Inflooence," synonym of the homely Pull. And there an end: the degradation of the word can no farther go.

5. Contemplate is a monument of a dead religion and an exploded science and art — the ancient Roman religion and the science and art of augury. In the best days of the Roman commonwealth the Romans were firm believers in augury and in auspicy (*auspicium*), or the science and art of forecasting events or ascertaining the will of the gods by observation of signs or omens given by the flight of birds and their cries, or discoverable by inspection of the liver, lights, and heart of the victims of sacrifice, or otherwise. Indeed of the Roman people might far more truly be said than of the Athenians, "In all things I perceive that ye are somewhat superstitious"; and the alternative reading of the phrase would have fitted the Romans better still — "too religious." In the language of Roman augury the verb *contemplor*, whence Contemplate, meant primarily to define a *templum* on all sides. *Templum*, whence our word temple, signified, in the language of augury, a space of the heavens defined by the augur with his staff: birds giving signs within that circumscribed space, or other ominal phenomena within the same, gave

augurial omens: those outside of those limits were not noted. The form of words in which the augur defined the limits was sacramental, so to speak, prescribed in the sacred books of the college of augurs: from this he was forbidden, under the most awful sanctions of religion, to depart by one hair's breadth; and like sanctions protected the integrity of the augurial ritual throughout all its prescriptions. If the augur made the slightest error in defining the *templum* or in enunciating the solemn formula (expressed in the archaic Latin of Numa), or in any minutest point of the procedure, his fault might bring down the wrath of the gods on the Roman people. Hence the act expressed by *contemplor* was performed with anxiously scrupulous care; and when *contemplor* came into the common speech of people it retained, and to this day in its English form still retains, much of the gravity attaching to it as a term of the sacred art of augury. But in English it seems to have acquired at least one signification of which there is no trace in the Roman use of the word — that of purpose or intention: "Do you contemplate joining the Progressive Euchre Club?" In one of the great dictionaries this signification of purpose or intent is attributed to the verb and to its noun Contemplation; but has it the sanction of use by writers of correct English? Both in its true signification and in sound, Contemplation is a fine word; so, too, is Contemplate. The derivative word Contemplative is used to signify one of the grand divisions of the human inhabitants of earth, of the population of the human hive — the "contemplative," as distinguished from the "active" life, typified by the New Testament characters Mary and Martha.

6. Auspices is another word which recalls the religion of Ancient Rome. It is a word in good standing, eminently respectable, yet it is *vox et praeterea nihil;* for long before it came into English it was emptied of all meaning. There was a time in the most flourishing period of republican Rome, when a scruple as to the validity of auspices in the taking of which the ritual prescriptions were not duly observed in their whole tenor, sufficed to bring about the abdication of the consuls P. Scipio Nasica and C. Figulus. Cicero recounts this memorable instance of Roman religiousness; but in Cicero's own time the thing signified by the word Auspices (*auspicia*) and the official curators of the auspices (*augurs*) were without credit among enlightened men, so that an augur could not keep a sober countenance when he greeted one of his colleagues: auspices and the art of auspicating and the official *auspex* himself were "played out." Nevertheless, though eviscerated and exanimate, the outer shell of the institution of augury lived on and lives to-day, appearing in questionable shape on solemn occasions. Grand social "functions," charity dances, prize fights, religious revivals are carried on under auspices, and thanksgiving turkey is eaten by newsboys under auspices. — With Auspices the correlative term Augur came into English: it is a word in all its forms and derivatives empty of meaning, like Auspices, yet living on, noble figures of words both of them, in Inaugurate, Inauguration: truly *winded* words, *anemodea epe.* Without Inauguration what should we do for a president of the United States? But are those words mere ghosts, having no substance? If so, what are we to think of

the sanity and sobriety of the London "staff-correspondent" of one of the foremost journals of America and the world, who in the great good-will of the subjects of a new king toward that king's wife, see "a good augury for the new reign"?

7. Exorbitant is from a late-Latin verb *exorbito*, to go out of the track. Lactantius, about A. D. 300, has *stellis a praestitutis itineribus exorbitare non licet*, the stars may not exorbitate from the appointed courses: it was a fine, a striking metaphor then: in time the expression became familiar and the notion of quitting the ruts (*orbita*, rut or wheel-track) was obscured. English writers have employed the word Exorbitant to express ideas to which it is well adapted, as when one author speaks of "the exorbitant commotions of the waters of the globe"; finer still is the expression of Jeremy Taylor, "causes exorbitant," *i. e.* out of the ordinary course and not provided for by the laws. But in the dictionaries such meanings are, as was to be expected, branded obsolete or obsolescent and out of date. Remains alone in fully approved use the meaning of excessive, demanding too high a money price.

8. The word Function (*functio*) had no place in the terminology of the ancient Roman religion: but it was still a word of some dignity: in our language it has suffered degradation. *Functio* is the noun which denotes the action expressed by the verb *fungor*, and the verb means to busy oneself with work, or duty, or office, that is, with serious affairs; thus *munere fungi* is to perform one's duty, to discharge the obligations of one's office: "to do," not to "perform," or "go through the forms." The ancient Romans

were wont to say *morte fungi* as a periphrasis of *mori* (to die): it is as though one were to say "to be quits with death," or to have done with death, as we still say of one who retires from office that he is *functus officio*. The Roman called death *inevitabilis functio*, the duty from which there is no escape: it is *functio mortalium*, the duty of all mortals. The word Function lost, in our language, little of its dignity till a very few years ago, and of this degradation, so recent is it, no mention is made in at least one of the great modern dictionaries, first published in 1888: but in the French, Italian, and other Latinish languages the equivalent forms *fonction*, *funzione*, etc., had already been in current use to signify ceremonials of church or court or high society, of more than ordinary showiness. *Facilis descensus:* now every social "party" is a Function. A newspaper, under the head Important Functions in its day's chronicle has these five entries: Program of a dinner and dance; a dinner; another dinner; a dance; a meeting of the Thursday Evening Club. In another newspaper of the same date we read of a Democratic Function, a banquet of politicians. Again we read of "a few enthusiasts making up a small function after the horse-show." But some hope remains that the word will yet be redeemed: the church will redeem it, nay, has already begun to redeem it. The heading of a newspaper article published in January, 1901, reads: "Boxing at Church Functions" — the functions, to wit, of one of the most "aristocratic" churches in New York.

9. That the word Enthusiasm should speedily suffer degradation even in the language from which it comes was inevitable. In English it can hardly be

said to have fallen to a lower estate than it held in Greek. Etymologically and theoretically Enthusiasm, *enthusiasmos*, is equivalent to divine possession, the word being formed from *entheos*, contracted to *enthus*, meaning possessed by a god, controlled or actuated by a divine power. Such a theory of divine possession could not long withstand the attack of Greek rationalism, and hence the idea of divine possession of the person of the enthusiast was for the Greeks a "vulgar error," scouted by all enlightened men. Of course it was rejected by our ancestors in mediæval times: how could they believe that God would take possession of the persons and faculties of heathens? So they rejected the theory of divine possession, but set up in its stead the theory of demonic possession; and that theory is still far from being "a creed outworn." Yet these our forefathers did not degrade the word Enthusiasm to the sense of demonic possession: it came down to us moderns with the same meaning it had for enlightened men in the most ancient times: it denotes a mental state close akin to fanaticism and unreason; but, like all the passions of man, Enthusiasm is a force not to be despised, but on the contrary to be turned to account by the wise. Cold reason is a sluggish force for reformation of society in any sense: passion must reinforce it or nothing can be effected. A religious revival can be produced only through enthusiasm; only by enthusiasm can any great social reform be brought about. One man's reason, or unreason (it matters little which), balances another man's reason, though this be as clear as the sun in the heavens. Reason and unreason are ever thus balanced. But nothing is more

common than to see enthusiasm on one side of a question and indifference on the other: the balance of the probabilities of success is always on the side backed by enthusiasm. This is well understood by the wise, and the wise have made the production of enthusiasm one of the great industries of our time. But the language was till a few years ago unprovided with a word to express the act of producing enthusiasm. When electricity came a form of verb, electrify, was struck off to express the action of the electric current. So we have magnetize, hypnotize, sensitize. But how express the action of the spell-binder on his audiences? The answer is in the verb Enthuse. It is the fittest word conceivable to denote the idea; and the fittest survives.

10. Fatal, from Latin Fatum, fate, destiny, signifies proceeding from fate, inevitable, destined; influencing destiny; foreboding death or destruction. These definitions of Fatal are given in one of the great modern English dictionaries under one head and, it may be added, under one rubric; they are marked rare, obsolescent, or obsolete. Then follow two other definitions, but the two are really one and amount to "deadly," "mortal." With this information about the import of Fatal, what meaning do we get out of this sentence: "Holding such views, it was almost fatal that he should be the reverse of friendly to B." If we take Fatal in the sense of fated, inevitable, we have one meaning: but we have a very different meaning if we read it in the sense of "deadly." The question is a practical one, for the sentence is taken from the editorial page of a latter day newspaper, not from the writings of an author in Queen Anne's time.

It is not possible to infer from the context which of the two meanings was in the mind of the author. Were the sentence to be read to a person and his understanding of it elicited, a sort of test would be had of his conversancy with the true significations of words in classic English literature. If he was tolerably well-read in that literature, he would almost certainly read the word in the "obsolete" sense: and he would find the same meaning in it if he were conversant with Latin and the Latinish languages. On the other hand, if his knowledge of English came from reading inferior authors, he must needs take the word to mean "deadly," and so would surely miss the meaning. In French Fatal has all the same significations as in English; but in French the meanings given above in the first place, instead of being rare, or obsolescent or obsolete, are still the dominant meanings; if our sentence were translated into French it would not be ambiguous at all. In classic Latin prose *fatalis* nowhere has the meaning of deadly, lethal.

11. Detest, Execrate, Abominate are all three from the religious terminology of the ancient Romans. *Detestor* (the verb to detest) means primarily to call the gods to witness the curse one pronounces against another. *Exsecror* (to execrate) is to pray the gods that another be shut out from all sacred things, from participation in the sacrifices and from all commerce with the supernal powers: it intends an effect much like that of a papal interdict or the greater excommunication. *Abominor* (to abominate) was not primarily a word of cursing but rather of benediction: it prays that an omen of evil may be averted; but

when a hated person was regarded as an ill omen, then the prayer of *abominatio* in regard of him was truly a curse. There is little difference of import in English between these three words or between their derivates Detestable, Execrable, Abominable; but they have lost all their imprecational force. Execrate would seem to be perhaps the strongest; it is the only word of the three that implies any outward manifestation of the inward feeling of aversion to the person hated: Execration must have expression in words, else the passion that moves it is Detestation or Abomination. All these words, in their original etymological sense, but more particularly Detest and Execrate, are monuments of a time when Religion was a very serious thing. When in *those* "ages of faith" a decree of Execration (or Excommunication) was pronounced against a man, it never occurred to him to say he was bored: his livelihood, his very life was imperilled.

12. Conversation, simply as a vocable, is a noble word: it is sonorous, it is melodious; as a term expressive of a notion which has no other word in English to express it adequately, we must regret deeply that it is obsolete. For obsolete it is and dead, and not only dead but condemned: its true and etymological meaning squeezed out of it, and the grand frame of it tenanted by a jabbering Thing. Conversation now means talk, small talk, chatter: that is the meaning of the word which natural selection has chosen for survival; therefore it is fittest. What the original meaning of this fine word is or was we may glimpse in one of the obsolete meanings of Conversant, viz., associating or keeping company, living in

intimacy with. What, then, is the etymological sense of Conversation? It means living and moving and having your being in this or that circle of society, among philosophers, thinkers, artists, or among merchants, manufacturers, craftsmen, laborers; or, like Socrates, among men of every walk in life. A man might be dumb, never opening his mouth, and yet most truly have Conversation with all of these. Conversation occurs some twenty times in King James's Bible and always in the true etymological sense or a sense fully justified by analogy, but never in the sense of talking, though talking is indeed a part of Conversation. The root meaning of the Greek word translated in the Authorized Version of the New Testament by Conversation is turning oneself about in a place, dwelling in a place or being occupied in a thing, and its exact Latin equivalent is *conversari*, with the same meaning: hence to converse with people is to have intercourse with them, social or other relations with them, to be in their company, and the like. When the Apostle Paul writes (II. Cor. i. 12), "in simplicity we have had our conversation in the world," the meaning is that his behavior, his conduct, was that of a man candid and sincere; and in the Revised Version, instead of "have had our conversation," we read, "we behaved." At II. Peter ii. 7, the Authorized has "the filthy conversation of the wicked," but the Revised, "the lascivious life" — a pretty free translation, rendered necessary by the ambiguity inherent in the word Conversation: Bloomfield in paraphrasing the passage uses the expression "profligate behavior;" the Rheims version is "lewd conversation." In King James's days, and for some time after, Conversation

and its derivates, as conversant, conversing, were used almost exclusively in the sense of the Latin *conversari:* for example, in a report made by an informer on the doings and sayings of the Irish rebel chiefs, O'Neil and O'Donel, we are told that certain suspected persons were "conversant and very great with them;" thirty or forty years later Milton writes: "who shall regulate the mixed conversation of our youth, male and female together?" and Milton's reader, Thomas Elwell, after recovery from the smallpox, lived for a time secluded "for the airing myself that I might be more fit for conversation." The German language has a word in sense precisely equal to *Conversatio*, it is *Umgang*, literally meaning going about, and hence intercourse, communication, society; but it is never restricted to the sense of talking. The title of a rather notable German work is *Umgang mit Menschen*, where *Umgang* is precisely equal to the Greek *anastrophe* and the Latin *conversatio:* the rendering of that title into English presents a more difficult problem than the rendering of the New Testament passages. Let the reader try what he can do with it. He will find the difficulty of the problem increased by the loss which the English language has suffered through disuse of the word which was our equivalent for the German *Mensch* (See Section XI. § 9).

13. The sad impairment of the grandeur and force of English speech by the vogue of vulgarisms and ignorantisms is nowhere more strikingly shown than in the vulgarization of the word Awful: "I am awful glad that sauerkraut came." Not once perhaps in ten thousand times that it is uttered does occasion call for a stronger qualificative adverb than "very."

With such use of the word by everybody it requires an effort to employ and understand it only in its true meaning; the vulgarization obtrudes itself when we read Milton's lines:

> "Abasht the devil stood
> And felt how awful goodness is, and saw
> Virtue in her shape how lovely;"

or this: "The awful severity of Plato toward the poets in his Republic;" or, "Nature's awful throes."

14. The proposition made in 1872 by Professor John Tyndall for an experimental inquiry by the "prayer-gauge" to determine the efficacy of prayer, was in effect an attempt to decide whether when we say "his health is precarious," we use the word Precarious in its etymological or only in its figurative sense. Etymologically, Precarious (Latin, *precarius*, from *preces*, prayers) means dependent on prayer, liable to stand or fall as prayer or request is heeded or slighted. First the word meant in Latin "obtained by prayer or entreaty."[1] If we employ the word in this sense, then we might say of the daily provision for the children of George Müller's orphanage in London, which for a long term of years was as unfailing as sunrise, that it was "precarious," being sent in answer to prayer. A secondary meaning of the word in Latin was "dependent on the will of another," that will being movable by entreaty: in this sense, too, the support of the Müller orphanage was "precarious." But not less in Latin and the languages derived

[1] It is true the word precarious came into our language as denotation of a certain condition of land-tenure — a tenure terminable at the will of the landlord — and not in the religious sense: but that fact does not affect the argument in the text.

from it, than in English, Precarious has ever been equivalent to "held by a doubtful tenure," "risky," and in English when we say that a sick person is in a precarious state, we mean that recovery is very doubtful. Müller would surely have deemed it an impiety, the unpardonable sin, to say of his enterprise that its support was in this sense precarious. Tyndall's offer of the prayer-gauge test was rejected as a proposition to tempt God.

15. Cunning has etymologically no other significations than those of knowledge, faculty; for "all mysteries and all knowledge," Wiclif has "alle mysteries and al kynning;" radically it is identified with know, ken, knowledge, and with the German verb *kennen*, to know, also with the German verb *koennen*, seen in our verb "can." Thus this word Cunning meant originally all that we call science, and all that we call art, or artisanship, or skill, or craft in the etymological, *i. e.*, the true sense of "craft." In the beginning of the degenerescence of the word Cunning the Authorized Version of the Bible planted it in a phrase of solemn imprecation which, being in common use and a household word among us unto this day, ought to have preserved to the term its true meaning: "Let my right hand forget her cunning." That is the only instance of the use of the word Cunning in that version as a noun: it is used as an adjective twelve times, and invariably in a good sense: knowing, skilful, as, "cunning artificer;" or, wrought with skill, as, "cunning works in gold." One use of the adjective is worthy of special note, viz., "cunning craftiness" (Eph. iv. 14), where an adjective and a noun are employed to express the meaning of the

single Greek noun *panurgia*. Now, like our nouns Cunning and Craft, *panurgia* denotes skill, but a high degree of skill, consummate skill, literally, "ability to do anything;" but it seems to have been used in classic antiquity nearly always in the bad sense of knavery, villainy. Rabelais names a knavish, tricksy character Panurge. The Revised Version, in translating *panurgia*, throws out the adjective Cunning of the Authorized, but retains the noun Craftiness: it was tautological, for the adjective denotes precisely the same thing as the noun, and the phrase is equal to "crafty craftiness." In the common speech of men contemporaries of King James's company of translators, the word Cunning had already begun to assume its bad meanings of artful, tricky, as an adjective, and of trickiness as a noun; but the translators had regard to ancient standards rather than to the contemporary usage, and their work had an archaic flavor even in their own day. Besides, their office was, not to produce an entirely new translation, but to follow the text of an earlier version, that of the Bishops' Bible, "as little altered as the truth of the original will permit;" they were also directed to have regard to five other versions anterior to the Bishops' Bible; and all these were strongly influenced by Wiclif's Bible (fourteenth century).

16. Not less curious than the degradation of Cunning is the like degradation of the words used above to indicate its "bad" meanings — Artful, Sly, Crafty, and we may add to these Artifice and Subtlety, every one of which originally designated good qualities only. What is Artful, but skilled in art or artisanship? What is Artifice, but work of art or skill? Craft is

etymologically a synonym of ability. Sly is dexterous, skilful. Subtle, with its double Subtile, is from Latin *subtilis*, and means primarily woven fine, exquisitely wrought. In none of these words is the idea of deceit or fraud implicated: the oblique meanings they have assumed, or rather that like parasites have attached themselves to them, and exhausted their vital force, are proofs more convincing than the most elaborate demonstration, of a tendency in poor human nature to use the advantages conferred by nature, or acquired by education, as a means of imposing on the simplicity of less gifted neighbors; though it must be confessed also that the envy of the less gifted had much to do in affixing those sinister meanings to words expressive of skill and ability.

17. In Latin, whence the word Licence comes, we find the same conflict between its several meanings that we see in English. What is lawful is by the very force of the term licit: licit in English, as *licitum* in Latin, is the synonym of lawful. The Latin verb meaning "it is lawful" is *licet;* from that verb comes the noun meaning lawfulness, viz., *licentia*, and *licentia* is the original of our word Licence. But though etymologically *licentia* or licence means lawfulness, legality, it early assumed, even in Latin, the meaning of dissoluteness, or, as we say, licentiousness: thus lawfulness became lawlessness. Licence is used both in the good and the bad sense in English authors, but the bad sense predominates: indeed it may be said that in English only the bad sense remains, except in the case of authorities granting permits (usually called licenses) to practise a pro-

fession or carry on a business, as inn-keeper or tobacconist; the use of License in the sense in which the word is used in Acts xxi. 40, where we find license to speak, changed in the Revised Version to leave to speak, is now obsolete. Quite as curious as the coexistence of two not only contradictory, but contrary and incompatible meanings in one word, is the phenomenon we notice in License or Licence as authorization of an act, profession, or business. Licence in this sense denotes the act of a superior when he gives the needed authorization, and also the paper or writing which certifies that he gave such authorization. But now the business or profession or act authorized by the licence may be one commonly regarded as good and meritorious, as preaching the Christian religion: for that work men are not simply "commissioned" but "licensed" and they are therefore called Licentiates: the licenceship or licentiate is also an academic degree of schools of divinity. But another kind of licence is that permitting, under conditions, the sale of intoxicating liquors; and even in prim old England, in garrison towns, licenses are issued, allowing persons to ply another trade more obnoxious still to the censure of morals.

18. Exploit (v.) is an instance of an honorable word reduced to denotation of questionable or distinctly dishonorable acts. The high and noble meaning is still retained unimpaired in the noun — a great and heroic deed. But the verb denotes the acts of the big thimble-rigger, the promoter of wildcat schemes, and "salted" gold mines or diamond fields: "The Egyptian nation is exploited by a ring of financiers."

19. The word Spirit has had curious fortunes. Primarily, Spirit, Latin *spiritus*, means breath of air, current of air, the breath; then, breath of life, the vital principle, the soul; disembodied soul, ghost, sprite (which is but another spelling of spirit); courage; essence; alcohol, gin, rum, whiskey (which is from the Gaelic word *uisce-beatha* (*usquebagh*), meaning water of life, or *eau de vie*).

20. Academy has fared ill in our language. It is a far cry from ancient Athens and the gymnasium of Akademos, where Plato lectured, to one of our modern towns with its boxing academies, academies of cutting and fitting coats and gowns, academies of manicure, academies to teach the art and mystery of compounding gin cocktails and other mixed drinks.

21. The dehonestation of words relating to the common people is a trite subject, still it must not be denied representation here. The law of language concerned in the degradation of this class of words would seem to be this: that whatever words are used to designate mere human nature, undistinguished by birth, privilege, or fortune, tend slumward. In the following list, after each word is given, first, its original or etymological signification, then the meaning it acquires in the process of its degradation.

Churl: lowborn person, a servant, a serf: a rough surly fellow. Adjective, churlish: rude, surly. Carl, the same word differently spelt, has the same meaning as churl.

Popular: pertaining to the people: plebeian, common, vulgar.

Populace: a word coined from Latin *populus*, the

people, to express contempt for "all persons not distinguished by rank, profession, or education."

Vulgar, from Latin *vulgus:* pertaining to the mass of the population, or to the common people: boorish, low, coarse, gross.

Ignoble: not of noble birth: mean, base, despicable.

Lewd, originally about equal to "laic," of the laity (its original is seen in the German word *leute*), and that is no doubt of common origin with the Greek word *laos*, people, whence lay, laity): lascivious, licentious, profligate, unchaste.

Rustic: a countryman: rude, rough, awkward.

Vagabond: one who wanders about, having no set place of abode, hence, a tramp (such a person was Oliver Goldsmith, such too was ——): a rogue, an idle, worthless fellow.

Villain: a serf: a person extremely depraved. Says Bishop Barrow, *temp.* Queen Elizabeth, in one of his sermons: "Foul speech is termed villainy as being proper for rustic boors . . . who having their minds conversant in meanest affairs, do vent their sorry passions in such strains."

Ruffian has no etymological relation to the "lower classes": nevertheless to be called a ruffian, the doer of ruffianly deeds must belong to those classes.

Ragamuffin, in pleasant allusion to the tattered togs of a poor wretch, means "a mean, paltry fellow."

Knave, etymologically the same as German *knabe*, boy: rogue; false, deceitful, tricky fellow. In German *knabe* has not such odious significations, nor does it, as the French *garçon* often does, denote one who leads an irregular, disipated life, "sowing wild oats." The Irish word *garsún*, *gossún*, etymologically the

same as the French word, has no suggestion of depravity. In early usage knave meant boy in English, witness John Wiclif, whose version of the Bible has, "if it is a knave child, sle ye him," which in the Authorized Version reads," if it be a son, then ye shall kill him." In Piers Plowman, knave is servant, just as in South Africa the black laborer of whatever age is called boy.

22. Clown is in all probability from the Latin *colonus*, farmer, husbandman (*colo*, to till), also colonist, farmers being the settlers of lands conquered and depopulated by the Roman armies. Of course Clown has had the same fortunes in our language as all other words relating to the substratum (the foundation, to wit) of society. Nevertheless the Clown or peasant has been regarded sometimes by English poets with sympathy and respect; thus Cowper —

> "The clown, the child of nature without guile,
> Blest with an infant's ignorance of all
> But his own simple pleasures."

But for the comic poets and all the wits, the Clown is ever the butt of ridicule: he is the jackpudding of farce and the buffoon whose one end in the mimic life of the stage is to afford subject of sidesplitting laughter. What exquisite wit, what generous humor, in some of the words compounded of Clown: "Clown's treacle," garlic, "Clown's All-heal." This latter plant, dictionarians inform us, was so called because of the "clownish answer" given by a peasant to a botanical gallipots. It appears that Gallipots, finding "a very poore man" who had suffered in the leg a cut to the bone, offered "to heale the same for charitie."

But the peasant "refused, saying that I could not heale it so well as himself." And the man did heal it himself by application of a certain weed. To that weed the botanist gave the name. But where is the "clownishness" of the poor man's answer? It was a Manly answer.

23. A Wretch is etymologically a wreck. Being a wreck, he is wrack, comparable to the unconsidered bladderwort washed up on the shore of the ocean; something or somebody utterly worthless; a despicable character, mean, base, and vile. Here we see reflected in etymology the process of the struggle for existence and the perishing of the unfit. And after we have compressed the awfulest tragedy of human life into a word, we turn about and babble of the "wretched" weather, and at the card-table of a "wretched" hand.

24. No word of the many that come up for notice in these etymological excursions is more worthy of study than the word Idiot. Its origin and history must be recounted in detail, to show from what beginnings in the Greek language this word, in its current meaning, has sprung, or rather to show to what amazing lengths the Greek word *Idiotes* has been stretched. First, then, the Greek word *idios* (Latin equivalent, *proprius*) means one's own, not another's, and hence private and personal, not public and common: in this sense, one's business by which he wins livelihood is *idios*, his own affair; and a man who is busied with his own affairs, and is not a servant of the public or the state, is *idios*, a private citizen: the opposite of *idios* in this sense is *politikos*, equivalent to Latin *publicus*, a public man. In Attic usage, the

phrase *ta idia* (plural article and adjective) expresses, without a possessive pronoun, what we mean when we say, my affairs, your affairs, his or her affairs, etc. Whatever is peculiar to any region or clime is *idios* to it; a man's name is *idios* to him; our mother tongue is *idios* to us, a property or peculiarity of ours, *idioma*, whence the English word idiom, which, however, is hardly used ever in as broad a sense as the Greek word: for us the mother tongue is not an idiom, though for the Spaniard his speech is his *idioma*. The speech of the common people, the speech of common life, is *idios*, proper, true, or "straight," distinguished from the more or less artificial language of poets; hence *idioi logoi* means prose as distinguished from poetry,—what the Latins called *sermo pedester*, "unmounted speech," or speech afoot. The special terms of an art or trade, its technical terms, are *idios* to it.

25. Now, that is all that *idios* ever expressed in Greek, and that is all that can be expressed in Greek by any word, not a compound, formed from *idios*. Among the derivates of *idios* is *idiotes*, whence our Idiot. But before we come to Idiot it will be worth while to look at a few of the very many nouns, verbs, and adjectives having their origin in *idios*. A trireme, or warship, equipped at private expense, was said to be *idiostolos:* the *stolos* is the same element which we have in *apostolos*, apostle, and signifies "sent." *Idioma* is not alone the language proper to a people, and not alone the language of ordinary conversation; it is also property, whatever is one's own. In Christian theology the doctrine of the Incarnation involves a question of *communicatio idiomatum*, called by the

Greeks *antidosis tōn idiomatōn*; that is, "mutual interchange of properties" between the two natures in Christ.

26. And now take *Idiotes* itself, which, as Idiot, is the occasional cause of this excursus in Hellenic etymology, and these are all its meanings as compiled in Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon: 1. Private person, one in private station, not engaged in public affairs; private soldier; plebeian. 2. One who does not belong to any of the professions, one not an expert, one who, as we say, is a layman, as compared to the professional man. The phrase ran *iatros kai idiotes*, physician and layman: here the schoolboy, *enfant terrible*, might give the medico a shock by rendering *idiotes* after the manner of Greek as she is traduced, doctor and *idiot*. We have also *poietes kai idiotes*, poet and prosaist. 3. The next step is to "ignorant," "ill-informed," as opposed to "educated," "trained"; also, "awkward," "clumsy," as opposed to *asketes*, one practised in gymnastic: here we see the original meaning of our word "ascetic." 4. Finally, one's fellow-countrymen are for him *idiotai* (plural of *idiotes*), and the natives of any country are its *idiotai*. So ends the list, and still no glimpse of our Idiot.

27. Nor shall we fare differently if we examine the derivates of *idiotes* itself; *e.g.*, *idiotikos*, our "idiotic," and yet not our idiotic, for it has a different meaning, viz., belonging to the private man, also, rude, clumsy, and, in particular,—this must be very comforting to undergraduates in the universities,—unpractised in gymnastics! To treat the body *idiotikōs*, like an *idiotes*, that is, idiotically, is to neglect

gymnastic exercises, and, of course, base-ball and foot-ball. And who says this? Socrates, in Xenophon's "Recollections." — *Idiotes*, with many of its derivates and compounds, passed into Latin, but our Idiot never got foothold in the language of the ancient Romans. In French, the word, with its derivates, seems to have about the same history as in our own language: Idiot in English is properly translated *idiot* in French. This was not to be expected, for the reason already given. (Section I. § 5.) The etymological tradition of Greek and Latin has been as a rule well preserved in the French.

28. And now for the history of Idiot in our own speech: it shall be given in the definitions of the word and the examples of usage that are found in Cassell's "Encyclopædic Dictionary," supplemented by examples compiled by Webster. The meanings of Idiot in English are or have been: —

1. A private person, as distinguished from one holding public office, civil or ecclesiastical. "Humility is a duty in great ones as well as in idiots." — Jeremy Taylor (died 1667). "Saint Austin affirmed that the plain places of Scripture are sufficient to all laics, and all idiots or private persons." — The same. (This sense is obsolete.)

2. One of the common people, an uneducated or unlearned person. Webster's definition is better: An unlearned, ignorant, or foolish person, as distinguished from the educated. — "This allegation . . . that pictures are the scripture of idiots and simple people." — Huntley, in Cassell. — "Christ was received of idiots, of the vulgar people, and of the simpler sort." — Blount (died 1693), in Webster.

3. A human being of weak or deficient understanding, and so forth; with this passage from Blackstone (died 1780): "An idiot or natural fool is one that hath no understanding from his nativity." To the same effect, Webster quotes from Shakspere:

> "Life is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury
> Signifying nothing."

But Shakspere's Idiot answers better to the next and last definition given by Cassell:

4. A stupid, silly person; a fool. This meaning is so generally understood to attach to the word that Cassell deems it superfluous to quote any literary authority for it.

29. And thus did it come to pass that "the man who attends to his own business," gives his name to "the natural born fool." But we may yet revert, as the Darwinists say, to the primordial or ancestral meaning of the word, and then men will be divided into two classes, Politikoi and Idiotai, Politicians and Idiots. Some pessimists think the two classes exist in very definite form even now: and they think furthermore that Idiots in the English sense is the true, natural, and proper designation of the second class.

30. Dunce, meaning a thickheaded, stupid person, is a transformation of the name of one of the very acutest intellects among the mediæval schoolmen, John Duns Scotus. His sobriquet Doctor Subtilis, master of subtle ratiocination, won in the University of Paris in the flourishing period of scholasticism, the latter end of the thirteenth century, is sufficient

evidence that in him was no blockheadism, even were his voluminous writings, philosophical and theological, not extant to prove him the peer of any metaphysician that ever lived. But at the revival of learning in the fifteenth century, and in the rise of the Protestant Reformation in the beginning of the sixteenth, the words of the mediæval scholastics were decried and derided, and Duns Scotus as representative of all that was considered most contemptible in Scholasticism was the principal butt of the sarcasms of Erasmus, Reuchlin, Ulrich von Hutten, and other champions of the new learning and the new theology, with the result which is seen in our dictionaries.

31. Injured innocence. This phrase, now used only in a sarcastic sense, was at one time employed to designate one of the most hateful forms of wrong: it never ought to have been degraded to become the cant phrase that it is. It is deplorable to find the expression of sweet human sympathy or honest indignation converted into a devilish jeer. The license of small wits is daily polluting the well of English. See in the Appendix the indignant remarks of Professor Marsh on the dishonoring of such phrases as this and the one that follows this.

32. To sweat blood is an extremely forcible, or rather it is an extremely forced metaphor, if the state intended to be signified by it falls short of the uttermost agonies of a human being. The phrase "sweat blood" was taken out of secular language many centuries ago, and to-day no man, be he believer or agnostic or atheist, if only he is a gentleman, will ever think of using it profanely. But the process of degradation has overtaken that word from

Gethsemane, and in a newspaper the reporter of the doings of Wall Street tells of "the business interest sweating blood." A Comanche Indian, had he ever heard of the Agony in the Garden, would be ashamed to say that.

Section III.

METAPHORS IN FAMILIAR WORDS.
FALSE ETYMOLOGICAL LIGHTS.
MERE ETYMOLOGIES.

Section III.

METAPHORS. FALSE LIGHTS. MERE ETYMOLOGIES.

METAPHORS IN FAMILIAR WORDS.

1. METAPHORS in words are the rule: words used in the strict literal, etymological sense are the exception; for as soon as a word is coined or adopted or adapted to signify a given concept, straightway we begin to use it for designation of concepts and objects in any way analogous, and the process of enlarging the word's extension is usually metaphorical. Bombast was once the name of the cotton plant, and the same name attached to the fibre or cottonwool. In the sixteenth century bombast was employed as padover of garments, and a man would sometimes have as much as six pounds of bombast in his doublet. Straightway the word was employed metaphorically to signify any contrivance for giving rotundity to the expression of commonplace thought, and was forgotten as the name of the cotton plant. The history of such a word possesses simply the interest of curiosity; but often the metaphor discovered in a word is so forceful and graphic that when it stands revealed, after the wrappage of dead language is stripped off, the effect is a delightful surprise: in such

metaphors we sometimes obtain glimpses of a remote past by which we learn more of man's authentic history than from the pages of chroniclers. Nevertheless it is well that the history of such metaphors is very often lost or obscured, just as it is well that we are not endowed with microscopic vision or extreme sensibility of any kind: had a man microscopic eyes, they would report to his consciousness goings-on in his rich old Stilton that might not be to his taste. Somewhere some author, treating of the causes which sully the purity of our mother tongue, or which impair its forcefulness, writes that such causes "mar and stunt its kindly growth," that is, the kindly or natural growth and development of the language. Is it not a sort of mercy that he had a choice between the words tongue and language: for who could bear to think of marring and stunting the tongue — unless indeed he knew whose tongue was to be stunted. Yet "tongue" is in "language" also, but that etymological fact is not present always to consciousness.

2. Shadowing. The officer of police who follows in the tracks of a person under suspicion of [illegible] is said to shadow him; and justly, for like the [illegible] shadow the officer goes with him and is inseparable from him: it is an apt metaphor. But how senseless is the application of this fine metaphorical expression to the surveillance a policeman keeps over a house supposed, for example, to harbor a fugitive from justice: yet you shall in demi-literature read of a house "shadowed" by a detective, though the shadow is perhaps ensconced in an attic over the way. Such shadowing is as inconsistent with the laws of language as it is with the laws of physics.

Of a truth, there is none that considereth in not heart.

3. The Hungarian patriot Kossuth has been ignorantly credited with striking off the apt phrase Sinews of War, to wit, money; but he simply recalled, like many before him, Cicero's apophthegm *nervi belli pecunia*. The trope originated with Cicero; of that there is no doubt; a century later it was for Vespasian's lieutenant Mucianus a commonplace; and though it was but an incidental remark of Cicero's, and not laid down as a maxim of statesmanship, it expressed a truth still more evident in this age of great public debts, than in times when war was made to pay its own expenses. If the phrase were to be new-coined to-day, we perhaps would put in place of "money," public credit. A phrase fashioned on the model of Cicero's is, "The sinews of missionary enterprise;" and this too has its parallel in Cicero's expression, "*Vectigalia nervi rei publicae*," taxes are the sinews of a commonwealth. The phrase "sinews of missionary enterprise" occurs in an article in a magazine, upon the teaching of the Andover school regarding the question of the "salvability" of heathen men who have not heard of the Christian gospel. If the heathen can be saved without that gospel, there might be less readiness of zealous young men and women to forsake home and kindred, and to face dangers and privations in heathen lands to save souls by their preaching and ministry. One might suppose that in saying that the Andover school's teaching tended "to cut the sinews of missionary enterprise," the opponents of the school meant simply to assert that it tended to

metar
pen the ardor of aspirants to the missionary vocation. But no: by "sinews of missionary enterprise" was meant precisely what Kossuth meant and what Cicero meant by "sinews of war." It is only in a reign of commercialism that such a phrase, in such a meaning, could occur to a religious-minded man in discussing a question touching the dread alternative, as missionary societies must regard it, of Heaven or Hell for countless millions of our fellowmen.

4. The metaphor in Vestige is worthy of notice. The word is from the Latin *vestigium*, footprint, track. Vestige is often used improperly, and hence ineffectually, to signify remnant. Thus Burke, speaking of the Terrorists of the French Revolution, asks "What vestiges of liberty or property have they left?" The only footprint any one can leave is his own. Vestige is used with precision and hence with effect by Wordsworth in the lines,

> "And countless generations of mankind
> Depart and leave no vestige where they trod:"

here Vestige is used metaphorically, expressing not the very footprints of the generations that passed away, but all tokens of their presence: bridges, aqueducts, colonnades, tunnelled mountains, palaces, cabins, though fallen to ruin and levelled to the horizon line, are still footprints of man upon the earth.—Investigate, from the same Latin word, means literally to track, to trace footprints; but it is hardly used in the literal sense. The form Vestigate is, of course, marked obsolete, but it is a genuine English word, and worthy of all acceptance. A celebrated book well merited

its happy title "Vestiges of Creation:" it is not antiquated in any of its main lines of argument by Darwin's later and more famous work, "Origin of Species."

5. There is a fine metaphor involved in the word Attend and its derivates. It is from the Latin *attendo*, to stretch out toward, and it was quite usual in Latin to use the full expression *animum attendo*, to stretch the mind out toward. Modern physiology demonstrates the aptness of the ancient metaphor; even in the faintest act or purpose of Attention the nerves going out from the brain to the whole superfices of the body, and specially those distributed to the facial muscles, are in action: they are tense, on the stretch; and it can be demonstrated that each act of Attention is accompanied by congestion, however slight, of blood at the surface. In the sentence, "The mayor was summoned to attend the king," "attend" means not merely to come into the presence of the king, but that being in the presence he shall mentally be "at attention" for the king's commands. Attention requires a holding the perceptive and receptive faculties fixed on the object of attention; if this is so the command "Attend and listen," would seem to be tautological.

6. Etymologically, Animadvert is a double of Attend, or rather of the more ample expression *animum attendo:* it means to turn the mind toward; but that literal meaning hardly attaches to it now in English. In Latin *animadverto*, or *animum adverto* early assumed the meaning of reproving and of inflicting punishment, even the death penalty. In English, too, Animadvert means to blame, notice with disapproval,

condemn. Formerly it was also used to signify the infliction of penalties.

7. Honeycombing, in the literal sense of the word, is a familiar notion: there would seem to be no need of counsel regarding the employment of the term in figurative senses. But the metaphorical Honeycombs of the language of conversation and of demi-literature are structures so marvellously contrived that to omit notice of them would be to overlook one of the most interesting developments of language: yet one knows not how to deal with them, seeing that they have no type nor prototype nor antitype anywhere in nature, nor in supernature nor subternature either, so far as those regions have yet been explored. Here are three specimens of these preternatural Honeycombs: three only, though hundreds might be presented, for demi-literature is Honeycombed with them: "Long Island is honeycombed with people who cannot read or write." "The streets are honeycombed with poles and wires." The expectation may not be disappointed that some day we shall hear of streets Honeycombed with heaps of sweepings: as yet we have got only so far as "congested with filth." Such Honeycombs are a menace to the wellbeing of the people: but there are localities left which contain but few inhabitants that cannot read and write, and not all streets in all towns are Honeycombed with poles and wires: so, for those evils there is balm in Gilead; but what can we do about the Honeycombing of the whole of this fair land, mentioned in the following clipping from a newspaper: "Women going about the country carrying MSS. from which to speak; they have honeycombed the country."

8. The etymological meaning of Connive is seen in the Latin verb *Conniveo*, to bring the eyelids together, as in falling asleep: it does not express merely the instantaneous shutting and opening of the eyes, like our word wink; for that act there are two or three other words in Latin. For the remarkable expression "the times of this ignorance God winked at" the Revised Version of the New Testament has "God overlooked," which is a true rendering of the Greek original. A curious circumstance is that the Rheims Version has "winked at," though the Vulgate uses the verb *despicio*, which is about equivalent to overlook. To wink at is not as accurate an expression as *conniveo*, to denote the act of one who pretends not to see what is going on, as in the passage just quoted: how could a wink shut out the sight of the doings of man in the ages of ignorance? God must have closed his eyes and kept them closed; and that is what is meant by *conniveo* and by our word Connive. An ignorantism in the employment of the verb Connive is to confound its meaning with that of "conspire," as when one says, "The foreman connived with the laborers to defraud the company."

9. The word Wheedle would seem to be akin to German *wedeln*, to wag, to fan; the Anglo-Saxon *vadhol*, wagging, is by Professor Whitney coupled with German *wedel*, a fan, brush, tail; wheedling therefore seems to mean etymologically fawning, as of a dog, and its Latin equivalent is the verb *adulor*, the etymology of which is undetermined, but the meaning of which is the same as that of wheedle. Both are capital words to express the idea of coaxing and cajolery; but the advantage is plainly on the side of the Ger-

manic trope. Not the least point of this advantage is that wheedle does "a perfect work" — it both employs the means and gains the end; while *adulor* (whence adulation) simply employs the means. And adulation defeats its own end nearly always, as the common phrase "sickening adulation" proves: but who ever said wheedling was emetic? The wheedler wheedles the money he wants out of the wheedlee's purse: the adulator fawns and prostrates himself; but his very attitude invites contempt.

FALSE ETYMOLOGICAL LIGHTS.

10. Here are a few words and phrases that show false lights to the incautious or the ignorant etymologizer, thus luring him into shallows, or rather into deeps where he comes to grief. These specimens of false etymologies have an historical interest, for they are samples of the work of etymologists in the pre-scientific era of linguistics; down to the present age even the learned assigned to words derivations equal in absurdity to any suggested to the unlettered by such words as "nag," "egg on," etc. Plato's "Cratylus," in which the science of language as cultivated by the ancients reached its highest point, is full of etymologies that hit as wide of the mark as any that come under notice here, and that are hardly less absurd than the proverbial derivation of *lucus* from *non lucere:* a sacred thicket (*lucus*) gets its name from the word meaning light (*lux, luce, lucet,* etc.), because the dense foliage excludes light: we give to such a thicket the name Lightsome because it is so dark!

11. Adust holds out a false light. It might easily pass for a native compound of the order of adrift, afloat, aboard, athwart, along, abed, adrip, with "dusty," for its etymological signification; but it is nothing of the kind; it is no Anglo-Saxon word at all, but Latin, being *adustus*, burnt, scorched, from *aduro*, to set on fire. Milton sings of air adust, and though it is the air over the Libyan deserts, he has not in mind the dust whirlwinds of the Sahara, but the heated atmosphere itself:

> "And vapor as the Libyan air adust,
> Began to parch the temperate clime."

12. Etymologically, Tinsel has nothing to do with the metal tin. It is a transformation of the Latin *scintilla*, through the French *étincelle*, both meaning a spark of fire or a sparkle. The original meaning of tinsel is a sort of cloth shot with threads of silver or gold.

13. The word Broil, of which Embroil is a compound form, has no etymological kinship with the verb broil, to roast over hot coals. It comes into English from French, and there has the form *brouiller*, a verb meaning to jumble, mix confusedly, tangle. A broil is a wrangle. To embroil is to put in a snarl, to tangle, to confuse, to involve in a quarrel or tangle of conflicting opinions. Embroilment is in Italian *imbroglio*.

14. The false light held out by Wiseacre must have puzzled many a rustic etymologist. The word is etymologically one with the German *Weissager*; both might be rendered wisesayer, and both were originally used to denote the wise man or wiseman, equivalent

to philosopher. Usually in primitive times the wise-man was recognized as a soothsayer, a term which was held in honor: its etymological meaning is truth-sayer. We find Pythagoras described as "a myghtye wysacre," by Leland the antiquary (d. 1552).

15. The Weeds in which the widow is attired, and the weeds that infest the farmer's fields have no etymological relation to each other. Both weeds are Anglo-Saxon, the "plant out of its place," being *weod* or *wiod*, and the vesture *waede*, akin to the verb wind (to swathe, swaddle) and to the German *Gewand* (garment, clothing), from *winden*, to wind. As late as Queen Elizabeth's time *wede* (singular) was used to express clothing or garment; Shakspere uses weeds — "woman's weeds" — in the same sense; and Milton calls the habit or attire of the black friars "the weeds of Dominic."

16. Ascetic being identical in sound with Acetic, is often confounded with that word, and Ascetic thus comes to have the denotation of sourness, moroseness. Ascetic means, etymologically, one who uses physical exercise, as in a gymnasium, to develop the muscles; then, analogically, one who exercises himself in or practises the counsels of Christian perfection to develop the graces of the interior life. If the Ascetic is to be qualified by any term taken from the nomenclature of chemistry, it should be rather tannic than acetic: for though he is austere by necessity of his religious profession, he is by the same profession bounden to be gentle and kindly to his fellowmen; and as matter of fact the sternest ascetics have ever shown themselves quick of sympathy for the unfortunate and the erring.

17. Egg, the verb, "egg on," suggests a ludicrous etymology. But egg in the sense of urging, and edge would seem to be the same word, the hard palatal of egg being softened in edge, precisely as we have German *Brücke*, Scotch *brigg*, English bridge. Allied words in German are *Ecke*, edge, corner, angle. With these are allied the Greek *ake*, a point, edge, and the Latin *acuo* to sharpen, *acus*, needle, *acies*, edge, point (edge of sword, point of spear). The meaning of the verb egg is primarily to goad, to prick; and in Icelandic is a verb *eggjan* having that meaning.

18. Nag, the verb, is etymologically the same word as gnaw, used in a figurative sense. A word of the same form signifies a sorry horse that needs much urging with whip or stick and continual objurgation to make him go; and in default of a more likely etymology, the verb nag was referred to this noun. The German *nagen* is the exact equivalent of gnaw; like gnaw it means to nibble, to bite away by degrees, but it has not the meaning of our verb nag, ceaseless fault-finding, pestering.

19. When one sees Porcupine spelt porkpine in some old author, one will perhaps suspect a vulgar error comparable to that seen in sparrowgrass, watergrass, runagate, pickereel. But the "pork" in that form is not the result of a vulgar error: "pork," or what is the same thing on the hoof, pig, is in the word most legitimately through all the various spellings. The widest departure from the spelling required by etymology is seen in the last syllable. Though Porcupine is made up of two Latin words, *porcus*, pig, and *spina*, thorn, spike, the compound word was unknown to the ancient Romans,

who gave to the animal its Greek name ***hystrix***. (They would hardly have fashioned such a word as ***porcupinus***, or ***porcuspinus***, which for them must have meant, not spiny pig, but pig-spine, pig-thorn, or the like. The Greeks, however, made at least one compound word like ***porcupinus***, viz. hippopotamus, which rightly denotes, not river-horse, but horse-river.)[1] If the Normans in England had for the porcupine the same name as the modern French, ***porc-épic***, the Saxon English might have rendered this "porkypig," but we have no evidence that they did. More probably, the Normans said ***porc-espic***, and from that comes one of the forms found in ancient English authors, porke-spick. Other curious spellings of porcupine are: poorke-point, poork-pin, pork-pen, porpentine, porpint. The German name of the animal is perfection, *Stachelschwein*, but even a better English one is possible, sticklepig. The Swedish word is ***pinsvin***, the "pin" meaning thorn, spine.

20. Demean lures with a false light the etymologizer who sees in the second syllable the word "mean" and reads it in the sense of low, abject, vulgar. But "mean" in Demean has no relation at all to high or low, but only to "carriage" or behavior.

21. Nerve, Latin *nervus*, meant till a comparatively recent date in English, as it meant for the ancients, not one of the fibres which form the means of communication between the brain and the several parts and organs of the body, but only sinew or tendon.

[1] The form *ἱπποπόταμος* is found in Greek authors: but Herodotus, the first Greek author to mention the animal, calls it riverine horse, *ἵππος ποτάμιος*. Herodotus's chestnut horse was *not* a horse-chestnut.

Accordingly, most of the older derivates of nerve and *nervus* have only or chiefly the latter connotation. "His nervous feet" (Wordsworth) means muscular or sinewy feet; a "nervous style," vigorous. In writings more than a hundred years old the modern meaning of nervous is hardly found; no writer of a century ago would think of using such a phrase as "a nervous, timid creature;" it would be as self-contradictory as "a man of sheepish, leonine aspect." As a term of rhetoric, nervous denotes forcefulness, vigor: "nervous, sententious style."

22. The expression "poor but honest" will not imply a libel on the lower classes, if only we will read Honest in the sense the word bore when the phrase was first used. Honest then meant "respectable," possessing moral and social worth. But since that time the comprehension of the word has been greatly lessened, and now Honesty means only fairness in dealing. To say that one was "born of poor but respectable parents" is very different from saying "parents who though poor were not rogues." The expression "an honest woman," meaning chaste, is antiquated, but it is for us a memorial of the original sense of honest: for here, as in the other case, honest denotes reputation and social standing: an "honest woman" is a woman of fair fame. And the address "my honest man" does not credit the man addressed with pecuniary honesty but with fair title to respect. The reduction of Honesty in English to the almost sole designation of pecuniary fairness is significant.

MERE ETYMOLOGIES.

23. Commerce is still for us just what it was for the Latins the day the word *commercium* was coined — exchange of goods or wares. This etymological meaning was very early bent to a figurative sense, and we find in the best Latin authors, as Plautus, Cicero, Livy, Ovid, Tacitus, phrases like "commerce of speech," meaning conversation, in the now usual restricted sense. This figurative meaning is natural and obvious, and it was inevitable, for the analogy between exchange of goods and exchange of ideas is very close. In English, though the metaphorical meaning has always held a place, it hardly attaches to the word Commerce in general usage, and one expects to find it marked "obsolete" in dictionaries; but that note has not yet been affixed to it.

24. The word Equip, with its derivate equipage, must always have suggested to etymologizers "equipped" with small Latin and less Greek a derivation from *equus* and *hippos*. But Equip has no etymological relation to horse, whether Grecian or Latin: it is of Norse or Germanic origin, and coradical with ship, the captain of which is "skipper," and with the Icelandic verb *skipa*, to arrange, set in order, put in shipshape. The general meaning of equip and equipment is, supplying with needful stores and apparatus, as for a voyage or a campaign; stocking a ship with goods for exchange and provision of stores of all kinds; furnishing an army with engines, arms, ammunition, rations, etc. There is a manifest tendency to make equip synonymous and interchangeable with provide, supply, furnish, endow, and one meets with such

phrases as "a burglar equipped with dark lantern," "a firebug equipped with kerosene and matches." The word equip has some little native and ancestral dignity; its derivate, equipage, may be said to be, like the Gig made immortal by Thomas Carlyle, the embodiment and the outward and visible sign of high respectability —

> "Our palaces, our ladies, and our pomp
> Of equipage."

This derivate, equipage, has in modern use been divested of all its early significations, and is restricted to denotation of fastuous equine display.

25. Ambuscade is exactly equivalent in etymology to bushwhacking: the very word "bush" exists in both, though in ambuscade it has the Romanic form *busco* or *bosco*, but in Bushwhacking the Teutontic form bush or *busch*. Ambuscade is defined to be "a military device," a stratagem of honorable warfare; and the same definition is given of ambush. Bushwhacking or bushwhackery gets a very different kind of definition.

26. Between the three meanings of Sconce, viz., holder for a candle, redoubt, and skull, there appears little of analogy; yet one word expresses all three and several more; nor is this a case of two or more different radicals, from as many different languages, being spelt with the same letters in English, as in bill (beak), bill (a writing), bull (male bovine), bull (papal document), gin (a liquor), gin (a trap). Sconce is derived from *sconsa*, corrupt form of Low-Latin *absconsa* (hidden) and meant, first, a screen, shelter, especially shelter from wind, and so a box or lantern to shield a

lighted torch or candle; then a fence, and, in military language, a redoubt; then a helmet to protect the head; finally the head itself, the skull, and its contents, the brains. Passing into German, *sconsa* became *Schanze*, redoubt, breastwork. It is still used in English in the sense of a candleholder and as a comic word for head or skull; the other uses are obsolete. The verb Ensconce always implies concealment, usually with the intent to avoid danger; but there is a fine metaphor in "ensconced in his little home" — shielded there as by a bulwark against the slings of fortune.

27. Calumny, since the word entered our language, has not varied in meaning, has gained nothing, lost nothing. It means false accusation: its Latin original, *calumnia*, had certain technical meanings as a term of law, but these never came into English. There is, however, another word in English, a variant of Calumny, which has taken on the most surprising meanings: that word is Challenge. Here is the genealogical tree of Challenge: Latin, *calumnior*, to caluminate, charge falsely; Italian, *calognare;* old Spanish, *calonjar;* old French, *calenger, chalonger;* English forms, calangen, chalangen, challenge. And the meanings of Challenge (v.) given in Cassell's Dictionary, presumably in chronological sequence, are: To blame; claim as a right or due; invite to a duel; invite to a controversy; call in question the accuracy of a statement; call to the performance of a duty or promise. Here is a chain, or at least links of a chain; a few intermediate links seem to be missing.

28. Rase and Raze (verbs), pronounced alike though spelt differently, are one word, from the Latin verb *rado* (past participle, *rasus*), to scrape. Razor

has the same origin: in which fact we have a measure of the vainglory of the male human biped in primordial times before razor-knives were invented; for the female anatomy suffers not so much from tight-laced stays and baby-sized shoes as those primitive dandies must have suffered from the scrapers of flint or perhaps the pumice rubbers wherewith they subdued the scraggy stubble of their beard.

29. Count, title of nobility, is the Latin *comes* (plural *comites*), companion (of the Emperor); the style dates from the time of Constantine. It thus meant, in that age, courtier. Afterward the *comites* or counts became great lords, owners of large estates and principalities (*comitatus*, countships or counties).

30. Whisker. To whisk is to sweep or to brush lightly and rapidly: a feather duster might very properly be called a whisker; but the name whisker or whiskers has been appropriated to a part of the hairy growth on the face of man. For a long time whisker signified, not the long beard on the sides of the face, but that on the upper lip, the mustachio (not so correctly mustachios, plural). For the hairy vesture of the upper lip (in Greek *mystax* or *mustax*, stem *mystak*), whisker is an eminently fit name, indicating its resemblance to a brush, one brush, not two, and hence it was whisker not whiskers. But its use to designate the moustache has long been obsolete, and whiskers now denote only the long beard of the side-face. In Shakspere the beard of the upper lip is mustachio, afterward very usually mustachios, but these forms were afterward superseded by moustache, spelt and pronounced Frenchly, and moustaches. The present spelling is usually mustache, and there is

a tendency to throw the accent on the first syllable and to shorten the a of the second. It would have been a very curious thing if before the sixteenth century, when *mustachio* came in, so notable a feature of man's visage as the beard of the upper lip had been without a name in the English language: not a thing unprecedented, however; for, as far as can be judged from the Latin vocabulary as compiled from the writings of ancient Roman authors, there was no distinctive term in Latin for either moustache or whiskers.

31. The origin of nice is very lowly; for Nice — though it is not Nice to tell it — is from the Latin *nescius*, the meaning of which, in that dead language, being hidden from many Nice people, they get at it easily through the French adjective *nice*, which is interpreted simple, silly. In English, too, it was for long a synonym of silly; *e. g.*, in the Rhyming Chronicle of Robert of Gloucester (thirteenth century) we learn of a personage who

> "was nice and knowthe no wisdom."

But between this primitive meaning and the series of meanings now attaching to the word, viz., fastidious, minutely precise, weak, effeminate, etc., relating to human character, and subtle or subtile, relating to minute distinctions in things, a great gulf yawns, which it is proposed to bridge with a word "nesh," said to exist in some county dialects in England and meaning soft, tender. This work "nesh" is supposed to have influenced Nice, given it a new meaning by "induction," to use a term proper to electricity and magnetism, but which has good right to a place also in the technology of language. But even though

we grant the derivation from the supposititious word nesh, still nice is burdened with memories of ancient associations which weaken its title to gentility. Marco Polo, as translated by Pinkerton, says of the gentlemen of Armenia that once they were "stout men and good soldiers," but they are now become "effeminate and nice, giving themselves up to drunkenness and riot."

32. Indolence, in English and French, and the same word in different forms in the other languages derived from the Latin, are from *indolentia*, a word very awkwardly coined by Cicero to express *apathia*, a term of Grecian philosophy which we shorten to Apathy and degrade to meanings never given to it by the ancients. *Apathia* means etymologically passionlessness, and in the Stoic philosophy complete control of the passions and emotions (*a*, neg., and *pathea*, shortened *pathē*, passions, emotions; related to the verb *pascho*). Cicero had in his own language the verb *patior*, exact equivalent of *pascho*. He had also in his own language the noun *patientia*, and from this and the negative particle *in*, comes *impatientia*, the exact etymological equivalent of *apathia*. Why not take that word? Because *impatientia* was already a word in the Latin language signifying the opposite of the Stoic term; it meant impatience, unwillingness or inability to endure: in short, weakness, effeminacy, not Stoical fortitude. He therefore coined the new word, *indolentia*, every whit as inconsistent with Stoic doctrine as *impatientia*. Be this as it may, from Latin the word passed into the modern languages, and with it the participial form of a hypothetical Latin verb *indoleo*; and so we have Indolence and

Indolent, against both of which, understood as Cicero understood the one and would have understood the other had he called its hypothetical Latin form, *indolens*, into existence, our dictionarians set the customary note of obsoleteness. Even the use of indolent in the terminology of medicine is thus noted; so that the medico who says "indolent ulcer" is guilty of an attempt at resurrecting the dead, or at least buried, corpse of a word. The meaning of indolent in the phrase "indolent ulcer" is "not giving pain": but that sense is obsolete. The sense of indolent which is not obsolete is that of "lazy": and perhaps "indolent," as applied to the lazy man, is etymologically exact; certainly *non dolet* he! He takes life easy; it is the industrious man that bears the burden of the day and the heats.

33. Whether Shakespere coined the word Questionable may be open to dispute; whether he did or no, it is a right good word as understood by him. But suppose Shakepere had written in a detached sentence neither preceded nor followed by any explanatory phrase the words, "he came in questionable shape," and that no other writer had used the word in any sense, what meaning would the dictionarians have assigned it? Doubtless the meaning it now has in common speech, "disputable," "ambiguous," "doubtful," and not the "obsolete" meaning given it by Shakspere. Nevertheless, Shakspere's meaning is the true etymological meaning; the word is formed from "question," a verb in Shakspere's day and by him used for a verb as we use it. There is no valid reason for eschewing the use of questionable in the meaning given it by Shakspere, whenever it

can be employed in that sense without ambiguity. Suppose a lawyer says to a witness he is about to examine, and who has tried to avoid the summons to appear in court: "Now, sir, that you are here and questionable," would not that be a perfectly legitimate use of the word; and would not the word in such a case be the fittest and properest possible, despite the dictionarians' note of obsoletion?

34. Starve is the same word as the German *sterben*, to die, and long had that meaning: in local dialects of English it still means to die. Chaucer has "he starf for our redemption," "starf" being the past tense indefinite of the verb sterve or sterven; this "starf" is identical with the same tense of the German verb *sterben*, which is *starb*. The interchange of b and v is very common, for example, German, *habe*, English, *have*, Latin, *habere*, French, *avoir*, Sebastopol, Sevastopol. There is still in the word starve a remnant of its once wider meaning, in the phrase "starving for cold." Starve is used by Shakspere sometimes in the active sense; "the air hath starved the roses in her cheeks," killed them; in this sense Milton has

> "To starve in ice their soft ethereal warmth."

35. Gratis is a fine word, which we take without change from the Latin. But inasmuch as it is Latin still, it calls for translation into vernacular words, and the usual translation is "for nothing." The German language has also adopted the Latin word for its own, and its vernacular equivalent is *unentgeltlich*, meaning "without recompense." But neither the English expression nor the German gives any

suggestion of the positive kindly motive signified by Gratis: the word is nearly equivalent to the phrase "for love," "out of kindness": *gratis* is a form of the word *gratia*, whence grace, graciousness, in the best sense of those words. Surely that which is given "for love" and "out of kindness" is not given "for nothing," and in such giving the idea of recompense has no place even as a thought to be shut out. The cognate word gratuitous, with its adverb gratuitously in such phrases as gratuitous inference, gratuitously alleged, means "without ground."

36. Extravagant is not yet quite narrowed down to the exclusive meaning of wasteful, spendthrifty, but there is a tendency thither. Classical Latin had no verb *extravagor*, but it contained the two elements, *extra*, outside, beyond, and *vagor*, to wander, to stray, from which comes our word extravagant; from *vagor* itself are our words vagabond, vagary, and, by a rather usual corruption, vagrant; by a like corruption the Anglo-Saxon *bryd-guma* (in German *Bräutigam*) became bridegroom. There is little doubt that extravagant had its origin in the title *Extravagantes* given to certain papal decretals that were compiled in the fifteenth century, after the publication of the three collections of decretals which down to that time constituted the second part of the *Corpus Juris Canonici*, or body of the canon law; these later decretals lay outside of, or travelled beyond the *corpus juris*, and hence their name. Good authors have used the noun extravagance in the sense of digression from a matter under discussion, *e. g.*, "I have troubled you with this extravagance: I shall recall myself into the road again." And Shakspere

employs the adjective in the literal sense of wandering away:

> "The extravagant and erring spirit hies
> To his confine."

37. Passenger is passager, one who passes, and so messenger is messager, and scavenger, scavager, the letter n inserted, as r is inserted in vagrant, in response to some unexplainable demand for euphony in a past age of the language. It is curious that passenger, a word which both in that form and in its original shape, passager, meant in common use precisely what it means etymologically, namely, wayfarer, passer-by, has now quite lost that signification. To be a passenger now-a-days, a person must be faring in coach, omnibus, hack, railway carriage, steamboat, lift or elevator, diving-bell, balloon, or aeroplane, or other car, vehicle, or what-not; but he is not a passenger if he rides in his own carriage or is borne in his own yacht, nor are those who fare with him in these, passengers: to be passengers, it would seem to be necessary that they be carried in a public vehicle.

38. Whoever first wrote Circumambient must have fancied that he knew Latin better than the Latins. The Latins were content with the form *ambio*, without the *circum:* and they were in the right, for the signification of *circum*, round or about, is already in the shorter word, and that not in sense only, but in the actual bodily form of the three letters *amb;* therefore to add *circum* to ambient is as unnecessary and as tautological as to prefix *circum* to "circulate." *Ambio*, the verb, is a compound of *ambi*, round about, and *eo*, to go; and ambient means surrounding, encircling: the ambient air, not, the circumambient air.

39. The word Curious has for its primary meaning in English, as *curiosus* in Latin (from *cura*, care, pains), the sense of painstaking; then that of painstaking specially in research, hence the noun curiosity, inquisitiveness; and finally it denotes the quality supposed to belong to all objects of search, viz., novelty, rarity; this last sense does not attach to the Latin word *curiosus*. The first meaning of curious, that is, painstaking, careful, is tending to obsoletion. Speaking of English style, Caxton, the first English-born printer, sets "curious terms" over against "rude," meaning by curious, far-fetched, — drawn from Latin, for example, or from French, and not homely. In a sense something like this, Petronius Arbiter uses *curiosus* in his well-known characterization of Horace's poetic art: *curiosa felicitas*, exquisite felicity of invention and expression. In the sense of inquisitive, curious is scarcely used in English now except predicatively: that verse of Pope

"The curious search of Euryclea's eye,"

is liable to be misunderstood and taken to mean, not keen search, but odd, strange; and if one were to say, "Euryclea's curious eye," the expression would be regarded as denoting some abnormal character of Euryclea's visual organs. Even used predicatively, curious, unless it is followed by a word expressing the object of curiosity, as, curious to know, to learn, curious about one thing or another, is ambiguous; John is curious, may mean, John has odd ways, or John has curiosity.

40. Sore, as a noun, seems to mean primarily wound and ulcer; figuratively, pain bodily and men-

tal (grief). As an adjective, sore means painful, causing bodily or mental pain. As an adverb, sore means painfully, violently, strongly; and from the Latin, *gravis*, heavy, we have another adverb *grievously*, with the same meaning; from *gravis* comes the English word *grief*. Thus are pain and grief in some degree made one in English, but in Latin the one word *dolor* expresses both concepts. A striking proof of the power of language over thought is seen when a Latin writer, as Cicero, expounds the Stoic philosophy. He is quick to discover the use of one word, *ponos*, in Greek, to express both pain and labor, (*dolor* and *labor*), but he is quite unconscious of the parallel use in Latin of the word *dolor* to express both physical pain and grief or sorrow.

41. Obtain means primarily to hold, maintain. Intransitively, in this sense it means, "to hold the ground," to be in possession, as, "the belief obtains." This use is idiomatic in Latin no less than in English. Secondarily, obtain means to get possession, and this is now almost the sole meaning in general use, the only remnant of the primary meaning being such as we see in the phrase cited above. Etymologically, obtain (*obtineo*) is a compound of the preposition *ob*, toward or against, and *teneo*, to hold, and its meaning is to hold a thing for one's own as against all others; and when we say, "the opinion obtains," we mean that it holds its ground, holds on, persists, or prevails.

42. Remit (*re*, again or back, *mitto*, to send) means to send back a thing to where it was before: but that meaning of the word is obsolete. In commercial correspondence, checks or drafts are remitted

to the creditor in payment of his bill; and Adam Smith speaks of the rents of plantations over sea being remitted to the landlords in England; as though that rent or its equivalent had gone first from London to Jamaica or Trinidad and come back in the form of sugar or rum. When one does truly send back a thing to the place whence it came, he does not "remit" it, but "returns" it: hence we have "return" envelopes, not "remit" envelopes. And when a draft on a bank, given to a merchant in payment for goods, is in the strict etymological sense of Remit, sent back to the person who drew it, the merchant does not write, "I remit to you your check" of such a date, "payment having been refused at the bank;" but he writes," I return," or "I send back." A rather curious thing is seen in the Authorized Version of the New Testament at John xx. 23, where remit is used twice in the sense forgive — at least that sense is to be inferred because the selfsame Greek word which is there rendered remit, is everywhere else in that version (about thirty-five times) translated forgive: and in the whole Bible, forgive with its derivates occurs about a hundred times, but remit only once, and its derivates only ten times: in four cases of the ten, euphony required "remission" rather than "forgiveness" because of the preposition "for" preceding the noun; "for forgiveness" would offend the dullest ears. The choice of remit, remitted, instead of forgive, forgiven, by King James's company of translators surely was not without a reason; they made that choice though the rejected words had for more than half a century stood in the prayer-book. What was the reason of the change? Was the Saxon

word forgive too "Romish"? The Revised Version restores "forgive" and "forgiven."

43. Etymologically, Calculation signifies the use of pebbles (*calculi*) as counters; and both in itself and its derivates it never stands, in correct usage, for anything but arithmetical operations or for processes of reasoning analogous to the processes of arithmetic. Hence it is a vulgarism (an intentional vulgarism when Swift uses the word in the abusive sense in one of his pamphlets), to say of a severe winter, for example, that it is "calculated" to destroy disease-germs; or of a famine in Persia, that it is "calculated" to stimulate the export of breadstuffs from Russia.

44. Aspire and its derivates, aspirate, aspiration, aspirator, and the rest, are from the Latin verb *adspiro* or *aspiro*, to breathe toward. The runner pants as he strives to reach the goal, and is said to pant after the object of his striving, and this is expressed by *aspiro*. It will be noticed that in English the notion of aspiring supposes the end of aspiration to be always something high, and that aspiring is soaring. This idea of soaring is not at all associated with aspiration in Latin. When the Roman aspired to a place of power in the state, he figured the object of his desire, not as an eminence to be attained by climbing, but as a goal in a race track.

45. In our word Squirrel still remains, disguised and travestied, the singularly poetic name given by the Greeks to that blithe little creature: *skiuros*, shadow-tail (*skia*, shadow, *ura*, tail).

46. In the phrase High Seas, "high" plainly has a different signification from what it has, or at least is commonly understood to have, in the phrase "high

water" or high tide. In the phrase High Seas, high means deep, not deep in comparison with the Euxine, for example, or the Baltic, but deep in comparison with the waters that lave the coasts — the Mediterranean coasts, be it remembered, for of that sea, the Mediterranean, was the phrase *Mare Altum* understood by the ancients. But why High Sea and not Deep Sea? We do not say high-sea fishery, but deep-sea fishery. We and our languages came too late into the world to give a name to the High Seas. The name they have is the Roman name, and it must be understood as the Romans understood it; as regards one of the two words, it is in itself almost as unintelligible to us as though it were written *altum*, instead of high. For the Latins, though they had *altus* and *profundus* (deep), to say nothing of other words for "high" and "deep," height meant height no matter what ground it was estimated from. A diver at the bottom of the sea will estimate the column of water above his head to be so many feet high; his trusty in the boat at the surface will estimate the number of feet of water between him and the diver at so many: and for him that will express the depth. Wherever the estimate is made, be it at the bottom or at the surface, at foot of mountain or at peak, the terms of measurement are for the Latins terms of *altitudo*. Saint Paul's exclamation, "O the depth (*bathos* in Greek) of the riches both of the wisdom," etc., is in the Latin Vulgate, *O altitudo divitiarum*, etc. It is curious to note that in the best estate of Latinity the noun for depth, *profunditas*, formed from the adjective *profundus*, was not in use, *altitudo* supplying its place; or they employed *profundum*, neu-

ter of the adjective *profundus*. Curious too is the fact that though *altus* and *altitudo* were thus taken in preference to *profundus* to express depth, it is absolutely certain that *altus* is the past participle of the verb *alo*, to nourish, to make grow, in height especially, though of course also in other dimensions.

47. Uncouth is the negative of couth, a word once in our language, but now obsolete. Couth means known: hence, the meaning of uncouth is, primarily, unknown, unwonted, and hence, like outlandish, odd, queer, awkward, clumsy, etc. (Cf. the contrary usage in Italian. Section II. § 2.) But it is only in rather late modern usage that it takes these ungracious meanings. A byword current in the fourteenth century, "uncouthe, unkist," is preserved for us by Chaucer: here it is the man who is a stranger that is denied the kiss, not the awkward clown; in Spenser uncouth is used both in the true etymological sense and also in the sense now usual of odd, deformed. The Scotch word unco is the same as uncouth, but its meaning is not simply unknown, unfamiliar, but in some way notable; as an adverb unco means rather more than "very." In general uncouth or unco in the Scotch dialect has the denotation of excellence and not at all of awkwardness or clumsiness. Unco guid is hardly in use save as a satiric phrase meaning pharisaical, self-righteous.

48. The word Antic has had a similar fortune; but Antic, after a long period of disgrace, rose again to honor, indeed to higher honor than it enjoyed in its original estate. Antic is from the Latin *antiquus*, old, old-time; hence old-fashioned and odd, queer, grotesque: grandfather's old turnip of a watch, grand-

mother's big poke of a bonnet and her crazy old spinning wheel were not reckoned among the family halidoms, but were relegated to the garret; their costumes might be donned on the occasion of some mock pageant by the merry-andrew or other antic. Time passed, and a craze for bric-a-brac sprang up and the antic trumpery — cracked old crockery, crazy easy chairs, rusty, clumsy andirons — acquired a value that would have made the original owners stare: the rubbish was no longer antic but antique; and the possession of a colonial grandmother's soap-kettle became a title to nobility.

49. Restive is of Latin lineage, and is legitimately formed from the stem *rest* of the Latin verb *resto*, to stay back, stop behind, and also to make a stand, resist. In its two meanings of remainder and repose, the word Rest is traced to the Latin *resto*, and to the German *Rast*, repose. But Restive, being Latinish both in its root element and in its adjective termination, has properly only such meaning as its Latin origin justifies, and that is, obstinate, stubborn: said of a horse, it means balky; said of a man, it means obstinate. But some writers see in Restive the Germanic root word meaning repose, and take the adjective to be a hybrid mixed of Latin and Teutonic, and meaning at rest, not active. Not content with this, common usage has made of Restive a true case of *lucus a non lucendo;* and thus Restive, from rest, *Rast* (repose, quiet), is made to signify a state of restlessness, recalcitrancy. When a word has this fortune in any language, prudence dictates that it should be forthwith thrown out of the vocabulary.

50. Intoxicate (v.) meant originally to poison.

The *tox* in the word is from Greek *toxon*, bow; the plural form of which signified also arrows: from this, *toxikon*, arrow-poison; therefore toxicated, or intoxicated, or rather the word expressing the same notion in the Greek language, first meant wounded by a poisoned arrow and exhibiting the fever, delirium, and other symptoms consequent. The man who knows no Greek and no Latin, and for whom the laws of etymology have no meaning, will say toxicate and toxicated; and when scholarly reporters put into writing for print his language, they are careful to make his words read 'toxicate and 'toxicated, showing that they themselves know all about those ancient languages and English orthography too. But the man had no thought of eliding the syllable "in": his word was toxicate; and it is a good enough word for any man, being good Greek-Latin-English, which *In*toxicate is not. The ignorant man's word is better than the scholar's.

51. Colleague is one of the very few words of Latin origin which have not suffered any degradation of meaning in their new environment: it still possesses all the dignity it had in Latin as *collega*, and has even thrown off some of the lower significations it had in Latin. In Rome, associates in a public office, as the consulship, tribuneship, augurship, were colleagues of one another; the members of an association of publicans or farmers of the revenues were not colleagues of one another, but *socii*. In English, colleague is never said but of associates in an honorable office or occupation. Crabb distinguishes thus between Colleague and Partner: "Colleague is used only with regard to community of office; part-

ner is generally used with regard to community of interest."

52. Wayward is awayward, *i. e.*, turned away from the due direction; perverse (of Latin origin) is its synonym, but perhaps implies rather more blameworthiness than wayward. Froward, which is fromward, is also a synonym of wayward. Toward is the direct opposite of both. The phrase "What is toward?" is frequent in Carlyle, meaning, "What is coming?"

53. Emery is from the Greek *smyris*, having come to us from the lips of people who could not at all, or only with difficulty, pronounce the combination *sm* at the beginning of a word. This inability would seem to be common enough; a glance at the titles in a Spanish dictionary under the letter S will prove it superabundantly: a pretty full vocabulary of Spanish words beginning with the letter *s* will hardly show one single word (not technical and of recent introduction) beginning with *sm*, *sp*, *sn*. If words of Latin or Greek origin which in Latin or Greek begin with *sm* or *sp* are sought in a Spanish dictionary, the search will best be made under the letter E, where Greek *smaragdon* will be found as *esmeralda;* in our own language it becomes *emerald;* so in Spanish, Low-Latin *sperantia* becomes *esperanza*. Neither Latin nor Greek has any word beginning with *sn;* neither has French or German, though German has *schn*. And as there are nations that cannot well enunciate initial *sm*, *sp*, etc., so there are nations that specially affect such combinations, using them where, in the literary speech, the word begins with the simple *m* or *p*, as the case may be; *e.g.*, *myrrha* becomes *smyrna*.

54. Disembodied is a type of a large class of words in the formation of which the plain laws of correct word-building would seem to be set at naught. Embody is a word rationally constructed, though the *em* ought by right to be *im:* it means literally to invest with a body, to put on a body. In composition *dis* is the opposite of the *em* (*en* or *in*) of embody, endear, invest. Then why should not the opposite of Embody be Disbody? The word Disbody is already in the language; but in the dictionaries it has, of course, set against it a sign to indicate obsoletion, or obsolescence. That sign should be disregarded and the word allowed free currency, to the driving out of Disembody. To get Disembody we must first invest with a body and then do away that vesture. What an absurdity! Disembody, we have said, is a type of a large class. Similar monstrosities are: Disembark, disembarrass, disembayed, disembellish (one is tolerant of the note of obsoleteness set against such a word as that), disembogue, disembowel, disembower, disembrangle, disembroil, and others in *disem-;* then disenable, disenamor, disenchain, disenchant, disencourage, disencumber, disendow, disenfranchise, disengage, and very many more,—some of them discredited by the dictionarians, but the greater number admitted without a hint of censure.

55. Sciolist is a handy term, especially when you wish to belittle the arguments of your opponent in a dispute; it is nearly as effective as heretic, utopist, visionary, materialist, atheist, and much better than ignoramus: it hath a keener edge and a sharper point. It is much affected by the champions of the doctrine of scripture inspiration when they deal with

the conclusions of modern science. As *sciolus*, it is a legitimately formed Latin word, and is good Latin, though no extant Latin author of the old time uses it: it is the diminutive and depreciative form of *scius*, knowing, and means one that knows little, who has that dangerous thing, a little learning.

56. Insinuate and Insinuation, from the Latin *sinus*, a bend, curve, and the corresponding verb *sinuo*, are commonly used only in the metaphorical sense of winning favor by craft, or of making charges indirectly which one is unwilling to make openly and directly. Nevertheless, in the best literary usage, both the verb and the noun retain unimpaired their literal sense: to clear a coiled tube or pipe of obstruction, a flexible wire is insinuated into it, and the wire insinuates itself into the tube. The intransitive use of insinuate, in the sense of moving forward in a tortuous way (and this both literally and figuratively), appears to have been dropped even in the literary language; but how much finer is "Some do wind and insinuate into the favor of the hearers," than "insinuate themselves." The sentence is from Holland's "Plutarch's Lives"; but either the Greek author or the translator, or both, write tautologically, for "wind" has no shade of meaning here that is not signified by insinuate.

57. The word Imbecility is hardly used in contemporary English to denote bodily infirmity, but only mental and moral. In earlier English, as also in Latin, whence it comes, the noun imbecility (*imbecillitas*) and the adjective imbecile (*imbecillus*) denote physical as well as mental and moral weakness. Imbecile was also formerly used as a verb, and is still so

used, but with altered spelling and transposition of the accent. The steps from the original form *imbecillus* to embezzle are: imbecille, imbezill, imbezzle, embezzle. The change of meaning in the verb took place thus: imbecill, to weaken; then to waste, squander an estate, so weakening it; to take from a treasure, or the like, entrusted to one's keeping, so impairing it; finally, to appropriate fraudulently. The ancient grammarians confidently derived *imbecillus* from *in*, upon, and *bacillum*, diminutive of *baculum*, a staff; so that the meaning of the word would be leaning on a staff, hence infirm. This derivation is not accepted by modern philologers. In passing it may be noted that the *bacillus* (plural, *bacilli*) of the bacteriologist is literally a little stick or staff; and that *bacterium* (plural, *bacteria*) is a Greek word (*bacterion*) of the same meaning.

Section IV.

TERMS OF THE HOUSEHOLD AND BUSINESS.

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1. THAT the etymological meanings of words of Latin and Greek origin should be disregarded by the unlearned, and shocking solecisms of meaning so be brought into the language, is what was to be expected; but that the origins of household words, words that must have been daily and hourly in use among the common people, should have become obscured or been lost, is unaccountable. Hence an etymological history even of such words is as necessary as of words from recondite sources.

2. The word and the idea of home possess a sacred character for English-speaking folk: the greater wonder, then, that the derivative homely, as commonly employed, means plain, rude, vulgar, uncultured; as though at home people were seen in their true character; abroad they put on the varnish of good manners and civil speech, even as they put on their outer garments. The noun homeliness has had a like fortune; for homeliness is commonly understood as meaning lack of refinement or polish.[1] This degradation and depravation — it were not too much to

[1] Compare the remark of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu: "What though custom, for which good reasons may be assigned, has made the words *husband* and *wife* ridiculous." *Letters*, vol. iv. p. 64. Lond. 1776.

say this desecration — necessitated the coining of a new word, homelike, to express the concepts once most fitly and unambiguously expressed by homely. Homely was once a word held in high honor, so that men were wont to speak even of the Creator and their Saviour as homely with them. For example, Mother Juliana, the recluse of Norwich (contemporary with Chaucer and Wiclif), in her "Revelations,"[1] marvels that He (her Saviour) "who is so reverend and dredful will be so homelie with a sinfull creature;" and speaks of "God's marvellous homeliness:" "He that is highest . . . is lowest and homliest and courtesiest."

3. Garden, Garth, and Yard have one origin and all signify or imply enclosure, as with a hedge or a palisade. Close akin to them is the German *Garten;* and of common origin with these are the Greek *chortos*, the Latin *hortus*, and even the French *cour*, our court or courtyard. The surname Applegarth means apple orchard. Town had originally much the same meaning as garth — enclosure; and in the Scotch dialect town, toun, or toon means farm: the word is allied to the German *Zaun*, fence, enclosure. Hence the surname Appleton is etymologically equivalent to Applegarth; and that is undoubtedly the original form of the name Applegate. In view of the etymology here traced, by which Garden is found to be equivalent to "place enclosed," the expression "a garden enclosed" (Solomon's Song iv. 12) is

[1] "Sixteen Revelations of Divine Love, made to a Devout Servant of our Lord, called Mother Juliana, an Anchorite of Norwich, who lived in the Days of King Edward Third." Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1864.

pleonastic: or rather would be very clearly pleonastic save for the " mercy " which obscures for us in innumerable cases the radical meanings of common words. Garden possesses a high philological interest; in one form or another it exists in all the languages called Indo-European or Aryan, and therefore plainly existed in the original speech from which those tongues are derived. As we have seen, it exists in Greek, Latin, German: it is found also in Welsh, *gardd*, Gaelic, *garrdha* (pronounced *garra*, whence *garry*, *e.g.*, *garryowen*, Owen's garden), Icelandic, *gardhr*, Russ, *gorod* (as in the name of the town Novgorod), and in the Norse and Scandinavian languages.

4. The names of food material in the crude and in the prepared state — animals on the hoof, and their meat after the butcher has done his office on them; farm products as harvested and then put through processes designed to make them ready for use as food: such names, of Saxon or Norman origin respectively, have often been used to illustrate the working of the good old rule that they shall take who have the power and they shall keep who can. When the Normans conquered England, the land and its inhabitants became the property of the conquerors. The language is full of monuments which tell which race did the work, tilled the fields, produced the food and the wealth, and which race enjoyed the fruits of all the labor.

5. The Saxon churl tended the herds and the flocks of his master and was privileged to call them in his own barbarous tongue herds and flocks. His lord, had he occasion to name such aggregations of domes-

the animals would use such terms as *troupe*, *troupeau*; but he suffered the serf to call them as he pleased. The caretakers of the flocks and herds were shepherds, or herdsmen, or swineherds, Saxon words, as were also the names of the animals they tended for their lord, — ox, bull, cow, steer, calf, sheep, lamb, goat, swine, boar, sow. But now came the butcher, whose office was to take the first step in converting this live-stock into food-material for my lord's table. The Saxon churls had in their uncouth tongue words to express the office of the slaughterer, and they called him something like flesher, but my lord called him butcher (Norman), and butcher he is unto this day. My lord's provisioner would take for my lord's larder the choice cuts of the slaughtered animals, and indeed all the meat or flesh (Saxon), leaving the offal (Saxon), the hide (Saxon), the horns (Saxon), hoofs (Saxon), hairs (Saxon), liver and lights (Saxon), as the perquisites of the serf. The flesh of the slaughtered steer or ox or cow (all Saxon) was beef (Norman) for my lord's table (Norman: the serf's table was board, Saxon); and the swine (Saxon) yielded pork, lard, farcement (all Norman), for my lord's sausages (Norman). The calf (Saxon) drest, yielded veal (Norman); but unaccountably lamb (Saxon) remained still lamb when served to my lord. The deer (Saxon) that broke into the serf's hedged field (Saxon) and trod down his crop, browsing on his crout (Saxon) or colewort (Saxon) or cabbage, whatever barbarous name he gave his principal garden vegetable, was venison (Norman), when killed and drest for my lord's good cheer. The word flitch (Saxon) shows what was the serf's chiefest and choicest item of meat sup-

ply: flitch, a side of pig salted and cured. The hog's jowl (Saxon) would seem to have been the serf's perquisite. Partridge and pheasant (both Norman) were caviare to the churl: as they are still caviare to the general of Britain; the goose (Saxon) and the duck (Saxon) and all domesticated fowl (Saxon) might furnish forth his board occasionally; he was permitted to call them fowl; for his betters they were poultry (Norman).

6. The peasant may have the knucklebones (Saxon): my lord prefers the surloin, fabled in the glorious days of the restored monarchy to have been knighted by King Charles II., son of Charles I., saint and martyr, and to have been dubbed Sir Loin: even the ordinary loin that claims no privilege of nobility is Norman. Cutlet is Norman too. *Obiter:* cutlet is not from cut; it is *costelette*, *côtelette*, rib from the loin. Baron of beef is of course Norman; the Saxon churl who should so much as dream of seeing a Baron of Beef on his own plebeian board would be guilty of little short of *lèse majesté* or at least of sedition. Why the Saxon name for fish was permitted to stand who shall tell? But when it came to naming the species of fish for the table, the supremacy of the Normans as owners of the lands and waters was made plain: salmon, sturgeon, trout, cod, pike, pickerel, and many a name more, show to which race belonged the wealth of the seas and streams: who eats names.

7. The wheat (Saxon) grown by the churl might be ground into meal (Saxon) for the serf; but my lord preferred to have his bread made of flour (Norman). My lord left the husks (Saxon) and the bran

of wheat to the churl for his bread and to feed my lord's cattle and swine. My lord condescended not to notice the rye (Saxon) crops of his serf; so the Saxon name of that cereal stood, as did also barley and oats (both Saxon); my lord's horse condescended to receive his chief provender (Norman) under its Saxon name; it is good strong filling for churl or charger. The bean (Saxon) was grown for the serf; but the pea, when it is green and tender, furnishes a dish fit for a lord, and it appropriately assumes the Norman-French name (pease, pise, Latin, *pisum*).

8. Attire, Dress. In the word Attire is seen the same root as in the German, *Zieren*, viz., *Zier*, ornament, decoration, adorning; but it comes into English, not from the original German source, immediately, but mediately through Old French. Hence, Attire means primarily not clothing as such, but personal adornment, as in hairdressing, arraying in jewels, etc., and in sumptuous apparel. The Old French verb *attirer* or *atirer*, equivalent to the German *Zieren* (which itself is equal to *Tieren*, as *Zweig*, is equal to twig, or *zwei* to two) does not exist in modern French, being displaced by the verb *attirer*, of the same spelling, but of a different etymology, and meaning to attract, allure. By what we may perhaps regard as a sort of instinctive harking back to the Anglo-Saxon, the English language lopped from sundry forms of the Norman-French word attire the first syllable, leaving *tire*, equivalent to the German *Zier*, *Zieren;* but most of these "repatriated" words went out of use again and are obsolete. Among them was tire, a headdress, and the verb tire, used commonly to express dressing

the hair or head (the noun tire always means head-dress in the English Bible); tireman, a valet, tire-woman, and tiring-room: memorials these of this ancient usage. Dress, verb and noun, also means, etymologically, not clothing (*i. e.* wrapping in cloth, swathing or winding in cloth), but putting in order, making straight or even; it is from the Latin *directus*, straight; dress, in the vocabulary of the drill-sergeant, expresses the original and etymological force of the word with precision. In Hebrew story, as interpreted in our language, dress is prior to clothing, as indeed dress (adornment) precedes vesture in the evolution of culture in aboriginal tribes. In the story of primeval man, as told in Genesis (ii. 15) Adam dresses the garden before he or Eve had thought or need of clothes: doubtless both he and she did "tire" or attire themselves, and so did "dress" themselves; but as long as they tended that garden, their personal tiring and dressing was like the dressing of the garden, an adorning, not a hiding or veiling. And it is curious to note that the very next time this verb Dress occurs in the Bible narrative (Gen. xviii. 7) it signifies neither adorning nor covering with clothes, but pulling out and stripping off, as when the butcher dresses a slaughtered calf, or the housewife dresses a fowl. Nowhere in the Authorized Version is dress, or dressing, used to signify clothing, or even attire or ornamental clothing: always it stands for making neat, as a garden, keeping it trim: it is used in this sense four times; of washing the feet once; and five times of the butcher's office. In view of this authoritative use of the word Dress, and its derivate dresser, in the English Bible, the gown of a woman, which is

her principal garment, and as such the chief part of personal ornamentation, justly takes the name of Dress by eminence; dress for robe or gown is not a vulgarism, nor an ignorantism: it may be an Americanism, but it is none the less a legitimate Anglism, to wit, an Anglic idiom. Dress says more than gown, and says it better than the French word robe.

9. Furniture, in the current speech, now denotes only movable articles of use or ornament in a house, or designed for a house. Originally, and till a comparatively recent period, not only the movable but the permanent fittings and ornaments of a house were called furniture. And not only those things, but personal outfit of clothing, jewelry, arms, etc., was furniture: the trappings of a horse were also the horse's furniture. Furnishing still retains much of these ancient significations in the chapman's phrase "gents' furnishing goods." The ancient signification also lingers, but is vanishing, in the phrase Furnishments for war — war material; also in such phrases as "that furnished occasion for strife." There is a strong tendency in conversational use to employ the verb Furnish to the exclusion of other terms not less apt and often more expressive; it is one of the words which are overworked: in this respect it has the same fortune as the word Equip (see Section III. § 24). Why should one say, "The hotel clerk furnished me with the key to my room," or "furnished me with blotting paper"?

10. Spice is from the Latin *species*, one of the meanings of which is seen in our English word of the same form. But the use of the word species in

English is comparatively modern; species first entered our language in the form espece or spece, and in time became spice, still retaining the meaning it had in Latin, kind or sort, specific character. In that sense Chaucer employs it: "A man con shrive him of his sinnes with the spices and circumstances" of them; again, "the spices of penance ben three." The miscellaneous products which make up a grocer's stock were also called spices, and the grocer was a spicer and his business spicery, just as he is still in French *épicier* and his trade *épicerie;* and in German grocery is *Spezerei*, in Italian *spezeria*, and so on. But in time spice came to be used as designation of a particular class of grocery wares, aromatic substances, as cloves, cinnamon; just as another form of the same word acquired the meaning of coin, and later was restricted to the signification of gold and silver coin. Here the prime etymological meaning of species may opportunely be noted — outward appearance, what meets the eye. Hence, the usual meaning of specious, making a fair show — fair but false. The word specious, however, once had also a less invidious meaning — that of beautiful: "as pleasing to the smell as specious to the eye;" this was the primary meaning of *speciosus* in Latin: hence, in the Vulgate the Beautiful Gate of the Temple is *porta speciosa.*

11. Stove is the German *Stube*, a room, and the word for a long time had only the meaning of "room or place artificially heated," as a bathroom, or hothouse. One unacquainted with this import of the word is likely to suspect a grave misprint when he reads, as in Fuller's "Holy State," of a certain Frenchman paying a visit to Philip Melanchthon,

Martin Luther's lieutenant, and finding the theologian "in his stove with one hand dandling a child in the swaddling clouts, and the other holding a book and reading it;" where not less miraculous will appear the versatility of the Reformer's hand, which at once holds a book and reads it, than his and the baby's being able to endure the heat of the interior of a stove. When the word stove is found in any author writing prior to the year say 1800, the presumption is that it is used to designate a fire-heated room, not a fire-box.

12. Brew (v.) meant originally to cook by boiling; etymologically Brew no more than cook designates the preparing malt liquors: a pot of coffee is brewed as well as a hogshead of beer. Our word Cook doubtless is from the Latin verb *coquo*, through the Norman-French, though we should have had it even if Wilhelmus Conquistor had never set foot on English soil, for it is in the Germanic tongues, and native there. Both in Latin and German the word (*coquo*, *kochen*) probably means to boil: the primary meaning of *kochen* is certainly to boil, both in the transitive and the intransitive sense; the primary sense of *coquo* is not so clearly to boil. Our word concoct is compounded of *con*, together, or thoroughly, and *coctus*, past participle of *coquo*; in Latin *concoquo*, the verb, has not at all the meaning of preparing a compound of sundry ingredients, which would seem to be the more usual meaning of concoct. The most usual meanings of the Latin verb are to digest in the stomach, and to cause to grow ripe or mature, as the sun ripens fruit. These meanings formerly attached to the English word; now they are obsolete significa-

tions. But without a knowledge of them one misses much of the beauty or even of the sense of poetic compositions, and ancient authors are not understood. This passage, for example, from a sixteenth century writer is unintelligible for one who sees in Concoct only the meaning prepare or contrive: "He was a man of a feeble stomach, unable to concoct any great fortune," *i. e.* could not draw good out of it, as a weak stomach, deficient in gastric juice, is unable to draw nourishment out of the food introduced into it. Bacon affords an example of the use of Concoct in the sense of bringing (or coming) to maturity: "Fruits are half a year in concocting."

13. The meaning of Besom is not whirlwind nor any atmospheric disturbance. Many readers will wonder why this proposition is laid down so didactico-pragmatically; perhaps when the reason is given they will wonder more. That proposition is designed specially for the instruction of able editors. A notable English author, in an essay written for a monthly literary publication of highest standing, had occasion to mention the homely incident of a servantmaid, "besom in hand," sweeping the pavement of a court-yard. "What!" broke out the learned editor of "The Blank;" "Besom in hand: sweeping the yard with a Whirlwind." That editor had lived upward of five and fifty years, some twenty-five or more of them spent in the editorial profession, and in its higher walks, too; but he did not know that "the meaning of Besom is not whirlwind, nor any atmospheric disturbance." As his compeers in equal or inferior editorial stations — higher are none — must not be supposed to know more than that literary giant,

our didactico-pragmatical proposition is respectfully directed at them: ordinary readers are not expected to peruse this paragraph; its teaching is too abstruse for their or'nery intellects; it is intended for the teachers of the people.

14. Toe has the same origin as the German *Zehe*, and *zehe* is the same word as *zehn*, which is our ten, the z (ts) represented by t. This is surely noteworthy — that the number ten should seem to take its name from the toes, not the fingers. But the fact is otherwise. There can be no doubt that the decimal notation everywhere had its rise in the custom of checking off numbers on the digits of the hands; and of course the digits of the feet were employed for the same purpose, though less frequently, by men who customarily went unshod. Of course, too, the two sets of digits would have in common a name signifying ten, and the digits of the hands would probably be distinguished by a special name from those of the feet; yet not necessarily so; in Latin, for example, *digitus* is at once finger and toe; if distinction is necessary, then a word meaning hand (*manus*) or foot (*pes*) is added: *digitus pedis*, *digitus manus*; *pollex pedis*, the great toe; *pollex manus*, the thumb. In German, for some reason, and in our own language, too, the word for digit (*Zehe*, toe) became appropriated to the digits of the feet, and a new name was coined for the digits of the hands, the expressive name, *Finger*, graspers, seizers, from a verb like the modern German *fangen*, to catch, seize, which is analogous to the English word fang. The Latin word for finger or toe, *digitus*, is from *decem*, ten; and the equivalent term in Greek, *daktylos*, *dactylus*, is from *deka*, ten. The

fruit of the date palm was called by the Greeks *daktylos*, finger, whence our name for the fruit and the tree, Date. Another meaning of *daktylos* is dactyl, a poetic foot of three syllables, a long and two shorts (_ ⏑ ⏑).

15. Pupil, from the Latin *pupillus* (masc.) *pupilla* (fem.), diminutives of *pupus*, *pupa*, boy and girl respectively, has its two meanings of "young person, boy or girl, under care of a tutor," and "circular opening of the iris," in Latin as in English. The pupil of the eye is in Latin *pupula* or *pupilla*, the "little girl" in the eye; and the Greek name of the pupil of the eye, *kore*, has a like meaning. From *kore* is the name Cora. Among the derivates of *pupus* in English are pup, puppy, puppet, and pupa, an insect in its third stage of development.

16. Togs and toggery, and the verb to Tog are classed as slang by lexicographers, and a ludicrous origin is assigned to them. No ancient authority is quoted for the use of these words, but they may have always existed in local dialects. They almost certainly have a common origin with the German *Zeug*, cloth, clothing, dress.

17. Wean (v.) is from the Anglo-Saxon *awenian*, to disaccustom (from *a*, priv. and *wenian*, to accustom), corresponding to the German *entwöhnen*, to wean, allied to *entwohnen*, to become unused or unusual. Wean is closely akin to wont (as in "use and wont"), which is the obsolete old English verb won (German *wohnen*), to dwell, to grow used. Wont (adj.) is equivalent to woned, past participle of the obsolete verb won or wone. Won, in the sense of dwell, is used by Spenser, who affected archaisms.

18. When fire was customarily obtained by striking a flint with a steel, the phrase "to strike a light" was used in a very literal sense; can the same be said when a lucifer match is used to strike a light? The match is not struck against anything or with anything, only rubbed: yet inasmuch as the verb strike is one with the German verb *streichen*, to rub, and with our English verb to stroke, a light is "struck" quite as literally when a match is stroked on sandpaper as when a flint is hit with steel.

19. Tinder once had in English its verb "to tind," to kindle. Wiclif (fourteenth century) has "ne men teendith not a lanterne" for "neither do men light a candle." Spenser also uses tind for kindle, or light. Tind is of the same origin as the German *zünden*, where z answers to our t, as it does in *zwei*, two, and *zu*, to; in Norwegian the word is *tind*, and in Swedish *tända*. The adjective tindery, coined apparently by Fanny Burney, is too good a word to be ousted from its place in the language: "I love nobody for nothing: I am not so tindery."

20. Team, in usage, seems to denote at least two animals. Some years ago a court in one of our States adjudged a horse and wagon to constitute a Team. That judgment may stand firm in law; but it has no weight in the forum of grammar. A Team may be made up of two or more horses, oxen, mules, or other draft animals; nor does the denomination of "yoke" take oxen out of this class; and there are other groups of animals which are also denominated teams; thus a flock of wild ducks is a team: then there may be a team of cricketers, or a team of workmen engaged in carrying through all the stages from

raw material to finished product, an article of manufacture. The word Team when used of draft animals is by some etymologists traced to the same source as the German *Zaum*, bridle; but this derivation Professor Whitney rejects. As applied to a flock of ducks (young ducks), or to a train of swans, the word is probably the Anglo-Saxon *teám*, family, progeny, which word is seen also in teem, teeming.

21. Probably most English-speaking persons would say that in the phrase "to tease the housewife's wool," meaning to pull apart or separate the fibres, the verb tease is used metaphorically; but that in

> "Thus always teasing others, always teased,
> His only pleasure is to be displeased,"

it has its etymological signification. On the contrary, the primitive meaning of the word is to pluck, to pull apart. Doubtless the instrument used for raising the nap on woollen cloth, the burr of Dipsacus (the teasel) had its present name long before the verb got the figurative meaning of vexing, annoying.

22. Welter is now hardly used except in the phrases, "weltering in his blood," "weltering in filth;" and the noun welter passes for the equivalent of mire, slime, filth. But etymologically Welter has no denotation of filth, any more than the word reeking, which is nearly always used in the sense of emitting stench or offensive odors, whereas it means only smoking, or emitting vaporous exhalations. Welter means simply to roll, to tumble about. It is co-radical with the German *wälzen*, which has the same meanings. From *wälzen* comes the name of a manner of dancing —if dancing it is—the waltz, *quasi* welter-dance or

wallow-dance; or if that mode of forming a compound of verb and noun is not according to the laws of English etymology, then the wallowing dance. Wiclif's translation of the passage in Matthew's gospel which tells of the rolling a stone into the entrance of Jesus' sepulchre has: "He walewide (wallowed) a gret stoon to the dore of the biriel and went away." It happens that in King James's Bible the verb wallow, which occurs there seven times, in every instance save one has added to it the words "in ashes," "in mire," or the like: hence, doubtless, the association of wallow with filth.

23. Deal as used at the card-table, and deal in the phrase "a great deal" are one word. It is of the same origin as the German *Teil* (or theil), verb *teilen*, to part, to divide. Hence "to deal" is to divide into parts or portions; and when the cards are dealt portions are distributed to the players. Dealing in the shopkeeper's sense has the same origin; it denotes retailing, cutting or dividing into small portions for sale: a dealer therefore is a retailer; a merchant in large business, wholesale trade, is not a dealer in the true sense of the word. On the "field of honor," in single combat, one combatant does not properly "deal" blows or thrusts to the other; he gives them all to him. It is different in the field of general combat; in the mellay the warrior deals his blows impartially to (on) all the foes that come within his reach, to each one *quantum sufficit*, or at least as many as he can bestow. In strictness of speech the phrase "he writes a deal" is not the same as "he writes a great deal." When we say "he writes a deal" or better in the ancient style "some deal," we should be understood to

say "he does some writing;" when we say "he writes a great deal," much writing is of course both meant and expressed. The first time that "a deal" was said instead of "a great deal" the expression was a solecism: it is now approved by usage; but still it is a faulty phrase, and it is to be rejected whatever authority it may have in usage. Crabb the synonymist gravely says, "Deal always denotes something great": not so, as the almost invariable custom of adding "great" to it when "something great" is meant, clearly proves.

24. Tear, *Zähre, lacrima, dakryon, larme:* these five vocables, English, German, Latin, Greek, French, respectively, do not, at the first glance, seem to possess many elements in common; and yet they are all variant forms of one original word, whatever that may have been in the primordial mother-tongue — fecund mother — whence those five are descended; and in the ancient Aryan language of India, the Sanskrit, is found another representative of that original word. The difference between Tear and *Zähre* is mainly in the first mute consonant; in one word it is t, in the other ts (z). But we have already had occasion to note many instances of commutation of t and z, as in toe, *Zehe*, two, *zwei*, twig, *Zweig*. Now notice the h in the middle of the German word. That h is a memento of a guttural or palatal element which was once sounded in the German word; it really has no use save as a memento, like the g in paradigm or the s in isle, that in its room was once a consonant which in time was dropped out. What sort of a consonant that was we confidently infer from the Greek and Latin forms: it was a guttural or pala-

tal element, like the c or k in *lacrima, dakryon.* In *lacrima* and *dakryon* the palatal is "in evidence;" in the French *larme,* the k-sound letter is missed as in German and English *Zähre* and tear, but it was at one time typographical style to print *larme, lârme,* with circumflex accent or the caret over the a to denote syncope of a letter. Thus, of the five words, the English alone gives no sign of the presence in it of a guttural or palatal element at any time: but one of the collateral early sources of English, viz., the Gothic, has the g confessed, *tagr:* the Welsh, too, who lived alongside the English retained and still retain the hard g of the ancient Kymric word for tear, *dagr.*

25. There remains between English tear and Greek *dakry* or *dakryon* the difference between t and d; but nothing is more common than the interchange of d and t. We may write confessed but we pronounce, if we pronounce aright, confest; German *Brod* is pronounced *brot;* German *Brett* is our *board;* German *Tier* is English deer: therefore t in tear is equivalent to d in *dakry.* But how shall we explain the l of *lacrima* and *larme* taking the place which in the other forms is held by a dental? The interchange of t and l is infrequent, even very rare; nevertheless we have examples of it. For instance the Homeric hero Odysseus is for the Latins Ulysses; in earliest Latin, *lingua* (whence our word language) was *dingua;* again, the early Latins said *olor,* which afterward became *odor:* thus is *lacrima* reconciled with *dakryon.* The consonants of the stem of the word, tr, zr, dkr, lcr, lr, being found to agree in all the forms, the vowel signs present no difficulty. The ea of tear and the ä of zähre show no greater divergence from the

vowel a of the other three forms than is found wherever a word is common to several languages.

26. Etymologists pursue this interesting vocable tear into several other of the so-called Aryan languages and find it in nearly all. The pious care of our early ancestors for that little word ought to be the subject matter of a chapter at least in a history of primitive man. As we read its story in the monuments of etymology the familiar verse of the Mantuan occurs to us —

"Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt."

These our remote ancestors, when they were under one patriarchy, spoke one language. In that language some vocable possessing the same lingual elements as tear denoted "that drop of limpid fluid;" and though some of the many divisions and subdivisions of that household or of that horde forgot in the lapse of ages the primordial name for Man, Woman, Son, Land, Water, Sky, etc., they all or nearly all in their wanderings clung to that little word. For Joy, Gladness, Fulness; for Health and Plague, for Hunger and Cold, for their deepest Passions and Emotions, for God and Heaven and Hell, they contrived new names: so too for Treasure, Gold, Silver; but they retained the ancestral name for Tears, and most of them the ancestral word for Heart also.

27. Recounting, in the sense of counting again, is a home-made word, made up from Norman-French or Latin elements; but in the sense of repeating or narrating, of telling a story, it is adapted by us from the French *raconter*. From that French verb is formed the noun *raconteur*, which has almost become an

English word. And such a word is needed, for the English etymological counterparts of *raconter* and *raconteur*, as storyteller, storytelling, and the like, have in common use a denotation of fictitious narrative. In a tractate attributed to Wiclif, Eusebius, Bede, and Haymo, church historians, are called "most preved of accounteris or talkeris," where accounter answers to *raconteur*.

28. Tally, though it is an instrument in telling or calculating, is of a different etymology from tell (to count), or German *Zahl*, number. Tally is the French *taille*, notch, incision, and its verb in French is *tailler*, the same from which we have "tailor," which originally signified cutter (of cloth). A tally was a stick in which nicks were cut as a means of keeping accounts between buyer and seller; both parties had each a tally, and the one tally controlled the other, was a countercheck on the other; for they were both nicked at the same time and in the presence of both parties. The nicks or notches were scores, a word of the same meaning; and for convenience in counting every twentieth score or notch would be made longer, or broader or deeper than the rest; this twentieth notch was the great score, or "the score" by eminence. So too when the tally was kept by twelves, each twelve was a dozen, and twelve dozen made the gross dozen, shortened to gross. "Four score years," and similar expressions are survivals from the times when accounts were commonly kept by tally. That form of speech, long antiquated in English, is still in current use in French; and not only so, but it has precisely the same place in the French numeration table as eighty or ninety in ours. In

French, eighty and numbers from that to ninety-nine are named by scores: eighty is four-score, eighty-one, four-score-one, ninety, four-score-ten, ninety-nine, four-score-ten-nine; so that ninety-ninth cannot be expressed in French save at this portentous length: *Quatre-vingt-dix-neuvième*, six full syllables and two half-syllables. A cheer for the 99th regiment would have to take this shape: *Vive le quatre-vingt-dix-neuvième.*

29. Tell has the same origin as the German *Zahl*, number, and its verb *zahlen*, to count, to number, and it still retains its signification of calculating —

> "And some grow rich by telling lies,
> And some by telling money."

Votes in some parliamentary bodies are told (counted) and those who tell the votes are tellers. The teller in a bank got his title from telling money. Telling the beads means, etymologically, not pronouncing the prayer formula at each bead, but checking the prayers off, by passing the beads of the rosary one by one between the thumb and forefinger, as the formula is repeated time after time. "Tell the stars if thou art able," means counting the stars, not naming them.

30. Count, like tell, has two meanings, of number or reckoning, and of narrating: the latter meaning survives only in the noun Count as a law term, *e.g.*, the counts of an indictment, which are statements of facts sustaining charges; but the original and etymological meaning of count is to compute. The word comes from the Latin *computo*, to reckon, through French *conter* (old form *compter*): the elements *mp*

are still seen in our antiquated forms accompt, accomptant; and that old form had an influence on the spelling of controller, making it comptroller, as the word is to this day spelt in the latest charter (to date 1901) of the city of New York: but controller has no etymological relation to compute, count, or *compter*. Control is counter-roll or contra-roll, which means a check to keep tally or a duplicate register. If A sells to B twenty loads of hay, B's tally of loads delivered is a counter-roll to A's tally, and "controls" it. The original meaning of counter as part of the furniture of a place of merchandising, is not the table on which goods are laid for show or for delivery to the customer, but the table or board on which money is laid and counted. In French, the parallel word *comptoir* means counter or bar; but it also means counting-house or counting-room; and finally it means "factory," as that term is applied to European commercial establishments in the Orient; in this sense it is about equivalent to agency.

31. Metal is from the Greek *metallon*, the etymology of which is not ascertained; the word means in Greek pit or cave and, secondarily, ore; finally purified ore or metal. But a quarry is also *metallon:* hence we come very near to the primitive meaning of the word, when we give to broken stone used in roadmaking the name metal.

32. The word Carpenter is from the Latin *capentarius*, wagon-maker, wainwright, wheelwright, that word itself being derived from *carpentum*, wagon. It is very curious that so necessary a craftsman as the artisan called Carpenter should have to borrow his designation from a different trade. His designation

in French and other Latinish languages is also derived from *carpentarius*. The Latins had no one word to designate a carpenter, and with them *carpentarius* was never employed in the sense of carpenter. The German name is a fit one—*Zimmermann*, literally timberman.

33. When the painter calls his chief instrument pencil, he is entirely within his right, and is employing the same word, *penicillus* which his predecessors in art employed centuries before the lead-pencil (so called though it is neither a pencil, *i.e.*, a brush, nor of lead) was invented. The word *penicillus* is a diminutive of *peniculus*, which is itself a diminutive of another Latin word that has found its way into English, but has there a very different meaning. The graphite pencil succeeded to the lead marker formerly used in ruling lines on paper for manuscript.

34. Shamble means originally a trestle, stool, bench, or table, and in time came to be used only or principally to designate the board on which goods were exposed for sale in market places. Later the word shambles was used to designate specifically butchers'-stalls, and finally slaughter-houses or slaughter places, as battlefields. We say, "a shambles," as we say "an ironworks." As there are butchers' meat shambles, so there are, or were, fish-shambles (or fishambles); and though perhaps fish-amble does not appear in literature, nor even is to be found in great dictionaries, the use of the term in the past is historically certified by the name Fishamble street given to streets in sundry cities.

35. What we call Store is by the English called Shop, and for them the storekeeper is shopkeeper.

But the grocer's, the clothier's or the saddler's sale-room is essentially a storing-place: there he keeps his stock of goods. The room or booth in which the shoemaker makes or the cobbler mends shoes is properly called a shop: shop is the place of manufacture, not of sale.

36. Etymologically, "making by hand" and "manufacture" are equivalent terms; but actually they have come to have contradictory meanings: a hand-made shoe is a shoe in the making of which human labor, using a few simple tools, is employed; a "manufactured" shoe is produced chiefly by machinery. The word manufacture is formed from the Latin *manus*, hand, and *facio*, to make, whence *factura*, a making, also the thing made. From *facio* comes *factum*, made, and this with *manus* gives *manufactum*, made by hand, manufact or manufactured in the true and literal sense. "Manufact" was once used in the sense of manufacture or manufacturing, *e. g.* "to encourage the woollen manufact." Until the eighteenth century, even in England, spinning and weaving, manufacture of iron and brass wares, and sundry other industries were carried on by the artisans and their sons and daughters in their own homes or shops, and there were no "factories." When the factory system arose, the workers in the factories were still known as "manufacturers," while their employers, owners of the factories, were the drapers, ironmongers, saddlers, etc., of the London guilds. But the term manufacturer passed insensibly over to the masters, or *entrepreneurs*, and then the real manufacturers or handworkers became simply "hands" or "operatives." The change in the denotation of manufacturer is like

the change that came over the word mason about the same time. Men are "manufacturers" who never did any manual labor; men are "masons" who never handled mallet or chisel or trowel except in a Freemasons' lodge.

37. When a maker or manufacturer of articles of attire for men styles himself clothier and tailor, he is not employing two words to express one notion. Clothier means clothmaker, also dealer in cloth, woollen cloth (draper or drapier); but the tailor is not by force of the term a purveyor of cloth: he is a cutter (*tailleur*) of cloth, and usually is also a putter together of the parts which constitute a garment — a seamster. The German word for tailor, *Schneider*, also means cutter: in German a cutter for tailors is pleonastically styled *schneidender Schneider*, literally cutting cutter.

38. Trade in all its senses is a word derived from tread, and tread is of the same origin as the German *treten*, to set down the foot, to step. A poet of Elizabeth Tudor's time uses trade for something like right of way: "A common trade to passe through Priam's house." Spenser employs trade in the sense of footprint: "Hath tracted (tracked) forth some salvage beastes trade." Then it came to signify habitude and custom, in the sense of frequent resort to a place, as for the sake of buying and selling: out of these would come the meaning of selling, merchandising, doing business. The customary occupation of a man, whether as a maker or a seller of wares, is his trade; but in strictness the seller, not the maker, is the tradesman: to him is the trade, the resorting of customers. Though in present American usage an

artisan is a tradesman, while the shopkeeper is not, the reverse, with exceptions, is the rule in England. The chief exception to be noted in English usage is the designation of associations of artisans, as trade-unions. When John Ruskin turned to the artisans of England for a hearing, he addressed his letters in "Fors Clavigera," not to the "tradesmen" or the trades, but to the "workmen and laborers." Ruskin's etymological conscience was very exacting, and it would not permit him to address as tradesmen, that is, chafferers or chapmen, those whose business was higher, production not trade. — In consonance with the etymology of trade, the winds which blow steadily in one direction, ever treading, as it were, the same path, are called trade winds. The origin of the word traffic is undetermined, but like trade it signifies going to and fro, as well as buying and selling.

39. The Latin word *factor*, maker, is in English used in a figurative sense only. Except in arithmetic and algebra or in analogous uses, factor is not a "maker" at all, but an agent, substitute, or representative. In mathematics, the factors are the quantities which being multiplied or added together "make" the product or sum. This term has been usefully imported out of mathematics into problems of every kind, *e. g.*, into what is called political economy, as when we say, "Land and labor are the factors of wealth:" they make or produce wealth. The employment of the term factor in commerce to denote an agent employed by merchants to transact business for them in distant places, *e. g.* in foreign countries, especially Oriental countries and the coasts of Africa, naturally led to the designation of the establishments

conducted by such agents as Factories. The "Forts" of the Hudson Bay Company are Factories in this sense. The only thing "made" in such "factories" is money. The French term for such agencies is *comptoir*, counter, or counting-house.

40. Usury and interest were one same thing in ancient times, both among the Geeeks and Romans and among the people of Israel. Whatever premium was paid simply for the use of money, was for the Jews, Usury: "Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother, usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent upon usury," That would make rent upon a hired house usury in so far as the rent exceeded fair compensation for wear and tear. In our time interest, which is a euphemism for usury, is the sinews of business, commerce, and manufacture, and the chief cornerstone of the social edifice; and he that lendeth upon Usury to his brother is, provided he make very much money by his practices, esteemed as of the most honor-worthy men in the community.

Section V.

TERMS OF LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND THE PROFESSIONS.

WORDS OF BOOKLAND.

PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, THE PROFESSIONS.

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WORDS OF BOOKLAND.

1. WORDS in our language which relate to Books and Writing, and especially words reminiscent of the earliest methods, processes, and materials of books and writing, should possess for us in this age of marvellous development of the printer's art, and the wide diffusion of literature, a quite special interest. A few such words are entered in this section, with other few having relation to the life and labor of the man of letters.

2. Auctor, whence Author, was a word of vast comprehension in Latin. It comes from the verb *augeo*, which originally meant to produce, create, and such is the primary signification of *auctor;* so that *rerum omnium auctor*, Author of all things, is literally, etymologically, Creator of all things. While the noun *auctor* retained this signification of creating, making, the verb *augeo* in classic Latin was restricted to the signification of increasing: from it comes Auctumnus, the season of increase or abundance. In Latin the founder of a family or house was its *auctor;* the sculptor of a statue is *auctor;* so is the writer of a book; in a special sense he who narrates or reports

a story or an occurrence is *auctor*, an authority. But *auctor* was never so identified with writer of books as to have that meaning when standing alone. If the question were asked, What is B? the answer *auctor est*, he is an *auctor*, would have no definite meaning, it would be as unmeaning as "he is a maker."

3. Critic is from the Greek verb *krino*, in which is found a radical signifying discrimination: among the principal meanings of *krino* is judging. Etymologically, therefore, Critic denotes one whose function is to judge a work, and to discover its merits and defects. Criterion is from the same Greek source and means a standard by which a work is judged. The standard is set up perpendicular, inclining neither to the right hand nor to the left; and that is the proper attitude of the Critic also: he has the same eye for excellences as for defects. But too often the Critic-judge plays the part of prosecuting attorney, and becomes a caviller — and caviller, fault-finder, is in popular language the equivalent of Critic. Criticism is an awkward word to denote a Critical essay, though it is apt enough as a designation of the science and art of the Critic: hence the use in English of the French word *critique* to designate an act of criticism or an essay in criticism. Kant wrote the critique of pure reason, an estimation and determination of the rational faculty.

4. Censor, a Latin word from *censeo*, to weigh as in scales, to estimate, was the title of a high magistrate of ancient Rome, one of whose duties was to conserve the public morals and to strike with his judgment (*censura*, censure) offenders: hence a censor is not, like a critic, supposed to stand impartial

and passionless between the offender and the violated laws: he is essentially rather a prosecutor than a judge, though he is a judge also, from whose decrees no appeal lies; his censures, like ecclesiastical censures, are sentences of condemnation. Very interesting it is to note that the verb *censeo*, from which comes censor, though originally it meant weighing and counting (one of the important functions of the censor was enumeration, *census*, of the people and ascertaining their ability to pay taxes), came in time to be a sort of technical term expressing the solemn pronouncement of judgments in the senate of Rome; it meant at first, then, "I calculate;" it meant afterward "I solemnly declare": so the Yankeeism, "I calc'late," has a very respectable precedent.

5. The primary meaning of engross would seem to be to make big or bigger; very soon it took on the special meaning it still retains, that of writing in large or distinct letters. Another meaning, which it still retains though but feebly, is that of getting control of the whole or great part of the stock of any commodity in the market. A meaning analogous to this is that of occupying all one's attention or all one's thought with one subject: the rationale of these two uses would seem to be the relation between cramming or stuffing, as with food, and distension. But in none of the received meanings of the word is justification found of such a phrase as this: "The task of conquering the Boers has engrossed England's military resources": yet it might truly be said that it engrossed all the thought of the nation.

6. Discuss is of Latin origin, from *discutere*, to dash to pieces, shatter; in the language of medicine *dis-*

cutere and discuss mean to scatter, disperse. In lowest Latin *discutere* came to signify the act of distinguishing mentally, and so coming at clear notions of a subject: hence, our use of the words discuss, discussion. Sir Thomas Browne, being a medical man, very naturally uses the verb discuss in the medico-technical sense even when he is treating of matters with which his art is not concerned, as when he speaks of "*discussing* the sorrows of a friend by making them his own" — as it were, making them less intense by distributing them between the two.

7. The actions expressed by the verbs imbue, instil, inculcate, infuse, do not differ in their results or product, viz., instruction, or the like. Nevertheless, they differ widely in grammatical construction, and this difference is due to their respective etymologies. Imbue is from the Latin *imbuere*, to steep; instil, from *instillare*, to pour in by drops; *inculcate*, from *inculcare*, to tread in; infuse, from *infundere*, to pour in. It is a solecism to say, "thrift instilled *upon* them:" to abide with them, it must be instilled *into* them: but, indeed, thrift is better inculcated than instilled; and it cannot properly be infused, nor can one be imbued with thrift. Of the four adjectives or participles, one only is predicable of persons — imbued; the other three are predicated of the knowledge, skill, habits, or the like, acquired from the instilling, inculcating, or infusing: knowledge is instilled into the pupil; moral precepts are inculcated into him; ideas, motives, are infused into him. Shakspere has "Infuse his breast with magnanimity;" but such phrases are inconsistent with the etymology of the verb, and are now rightly in desuetude.

8. Ancient Latin grammarians employed the word *sententia* in precisely the same meaning as English grammarians do sentence. In English, besides this technologic sense, the word once had other meanings which attached to it in its original Latin form; *e.g.*, declaration of an opinion or decision, an axiom or apophthegm, a judgment of condemnation. Of these three meanings of the word, only the last is now current, even this having been narrowed down from the broad sense of judicial decision to pronouncement of a penalty. Of the other two meanings, specially the second, there is a clear reminiscence in the word sententious. This has no relation to the "sentence" of the grammarian; it expresses the quality of a style abounding in pithy remarks and judicious observations.

9. The word Copy has a curious history. It is the Latin *copia*, which means plenty, copiousness, as we say; thus, *frumenti copia*, plenty of grain, grain supply; *verborum copia*, a plenty of words, wealth of words. Then it signifies number, multitude, and in that sense is used (in the plural form, *copiae*) to denote a military force, an army. And as whatever serves for attaining an end is the means to that end, *copia* is used in the sense of means or opportunity: *fecit mihi Platonis legendi copiam;* he gave me opportunity to read Plato, viz., by lending me Plato's writings. At this point the connection between *copia* and copy begins to appear; but as yet *copia* denotes not the books, but the opportunity. In the same sense one might say, *Copiam mihi fecisti Ciceronis conveniendi;* you procured for me opportunity of meeting Cicero. But now suppose the borrower of

the works of Plato transcribes them for his own use, or to sell the transcript; in that case he makes for himself or others *copia*, opportunity, facility, of reading Plato, or simply *copia Platonis*, supply of Plato, so to speak; and if we take *copia* (or supply) here in the concrete sense, meaning the transcript which is the means of our having opportunity to read Plato, then the *copia Platonis* is "a copy of Plato." *Copia* being understood in this sense, never was such a *cornu copiae* as the printing press.

10. The signification of Note has been greatly enlarged since the invention of typography. When books were all hand-written, and paper, or other like material, was costly, the text filled the page, leaving very narrow margins, in which room perhaps could be found for an asterisk or other mark (*nota*) to call attention to a particular passage, or for a word or two of gloss, or citation of book and chapter; but it would be impossible, under the conditions, to add marginal notes, numerous and often lengthy, such as are deemed essential in modern works that lay claim to authority in history or science. An ancient historian very rarely indeed mentions his sources, and he gives on his page no citations of authorities; he is himself, for the reader, the ultimate authority. Thus all compilers of history stood on a par as authorities. Nor could the highest ingenuity enable the writer of history, in the time before printing, at once to pursue the course of the narrative, and to exhibit the grounds on which the story rested. The mechanical make-up of the printed page first made this thing possible, and when it was made possible, it was demanded of authors. Thanks to the invention

of movable types, the historian can no longer dogmatize, but must give chapter and verse, and often *ipsissima verba*, of the authors from whom he gets his material.

11. Index, too, has taken on a new meaning since the art of printing was introduced. In Latin the title of a book was called *index;* then the term *index* was extended to embrace what we call table of contents, or heads of divisions of a work, — its books or parts, and its chapters. Thus the *elenchus*, or table of contents of the thirty-seven books, each comprising very many chapters, of Pliny's "Natural History," is by Pliny himself spoken of as *index*. But if an index, in the sense of an alphabetical list of subjects treated in a book, with reference by number to the page-number of each, was ever compiled before the era of typography, then it must have been the work of the owner of such book, not of the author nor of the copyist: it would be of little use to the owner of another copy of the same work written out by a different hand. The art of printing, by rendering it possible to compile an index equally true for an indefinite number of copies of a work, has vastly facilitated the labor of research in every department of literature.

12. Though ancient authors did not give to the introductory passages of their works the formal title Preface, they, of course, usually prefixed some account of themselves, or their studies, or the reasons that led them to write. But some of the great writings of antiquity were sent forth without any prefatory remarks whatever: Xenophon's "Anabasis," for example, Caesar's "Commentaries," the "Annals" of

Tacitus. But more usually they open with what we should call a Preface: such is the very brief opening sentence of the "Histories" of Herodotus, or the masterly retrospect of the history of the Hellenic peoples in the "Peloponnesian War" of Thucydides. Our word Preface is the Latin *praefatio*, for which our language had a homely equivalent term, — foreword, or forewords. The Latin word is from *prae*, before, and *fari*, to speak; past participle, *fatus*. But the Latins did not use the word to distinguish the prefatory remarks from the body of the work. The more usual signification of the word in Latin was excuse, or apology, as when one asks tolerance for a vulgar or unseemly expression by introducing it with the apologetic phrase (*praefatio*), "if I may so speak;" or, "saving your presence." For Preface, "advertisement" is often used by good authors: thus Butler prefixes an advertisement to the "Analogy," Pope to the "Messiah," Thirlwall to his "History of Greece." Nowadays advertisements are business announcements only.

13. Colophon, a Greek word of unknown origin, is equivalent, though not etymologically related, to the Latin *culmen*, top, summit, and in Greek to put the Kolophon to a piece of work was to give it the finishing stroke: passing into Latin, the colophon had there the meaning of completion. But it does not appear to have been used either by the Greeks or the Latins to denote the Finis of a book, nor the entry there made either by its author, or by the copyist or by a third hand. In mediæval times the author or the copyist always wrote a colophon, and in a given case the identity of the "colophonist"

might become a matter of some interest. Thus, in the Brussels Royal Library there is a bundle of MSS., ten in number, including the first of the four books of the "Imitation of Christ," all in the same handwriting: at the end is this colophon: "Finished and completed by the hands of Brother Thomas à Kempis in the year 1441." This colophon is taken to be proof that Thomas wrote the "Imitatio": but the proof is far from conclusive: a mere copyist might have made the same entry, without laying any claim to the authorship. And if Thomas was the author, why did he not give the rest of the books of the "Imitatio," all four of which were completed twenty-one years before the date of this colophon? Most of the colophons of manuscript books published in the middle ages contain, in addition to the name of the scribe, some pious ejaculation. In one, a later hand, after the transcriber's death, pens, in a Latin that would have given Priscian the fidgets, these words: "He who wrote this book, his soul is in Paradise." The very first books that issued from the printing press were without the colophon; but soon the worthy printer used the colophon as his medium for self-advertising. An anthology of the colophons of the first half century of typography, if ever it is compiled, will be found to afford most delightful reading.

14. The use of a quill as an instrument for writing seems to date from a period not prior to the sixth century of our era: the quill then superseded the reed (*calamus*) as the reed itself had superseded the *stilus*. The *stilus* was a most fit instrument for the use it was put to, tracing characters on a tablet or board coated

with wax; when papyrus came into use a different kind of implement was required, one that could make ink-strokes. But though the instrument *stilus* was laid aside forever as a writing-tool, the word remained in the Latin, and still remains in all the languages of civilization, as a term of literature and of art. As a term of literature, its significations transcend the power of analysis and definition: we can be made to feel them, but we cannot define. The word *calamus*, the usual name among the Latins for the reed used in writing, never even in Latin attained any high rank in the literary terminology: the only reminder we have of it to-day is in the very familiar Latin phrase *currente calamo*, as the pen runs on. Quill and pen, on the contrary, have left in the language of literary art ineffaceable traces: yet the quill and the pen have gone into desuetude as completely as the calamus and the stilus: this of course is said of those words in their original sense. For Ben Jonson, the tail plumes of the peacock were still pens; Milton uses "pens" in the sense of wings; and for "the wings of the wind," Wiclif has "the pennis of wyndis." Such use of "pen" now would be intolerable, not justifiable even by the poet's license. Though for us the derivation of pen is not lost from memory, and though we know the history of the word, still between the things pen and quill or feather on the one hand, and the notion of pen as writing instrument on the other, there is no vital relation: pen is for us first and last the writing-implement only. When pens were feathers indeed, or quills, it was not unusual to employ the word quill as synonymous with pen, and to say "under the quill," as

we "under the pen." An etymologist of the fifteenth century, author of the first English-Latin dictionary, *Promptuarium Parvulorum*, gives as the Latin equivalent of "Quylle," "a stalke, *calamus*." Here, incidentally, he acquaints us with the primary meaning of quill, or at least with what in his day was understood to be its primary meaning, stalk: it must have had that sense in the then current usage. And Webster, and after him Cassell's Dictionary, find in the Gaelic a word *cuilc*, meaning a reed, a bulrush, and recognize an etymological kinship between that word and quill. If this etymology is true, quill and calamus are brought back to one signification, that of reed, or stalk (which latter is one of the recognized meanings of *calamus* in the Latin), and thus our quill or quill pen becomes etymologically the same as the calamus of the Latins, and our instrument of writing a reed, not a feather. Another interesting coincidence is that the Latin word *stilus* (of root different from the Greek *stylos*) means primarily stem or stalk, as of asparagus, or mullein: it is used in this sense by Columella. This being so, we have as result, that Style, Quill, Calamus are all three terms derived from plant forms, reed and stalk: so that whether we write with a metallic pen, with a plume, with a reed, or with a stalk, it is ever the *calamus* and the *stilus* we employ!

15. The word comma (Greek *komma*, a stroke, blow, cut, section) means in the ancient grammarians a section or clause of a period, and for us the punctuation sign of the same: in German typography, as in our handwriting, the comma is a little stroke or cut from right to left downward. Colon (Greek *kolon*)

means member, and in grammar member of a period; its sign (:) is in Greek the same as in English, but its use is slightly different in that it stands both for the colon and the semicolon. Our sign semicolon is the Greek interrogation sign (;) which we convert to (?) by writing the hooked part (,) above instead of below the point. A singularity of Spanish handwriting and typography is the employment of two interrogation signs for each question, one at the beginning, the other at the end: so too the Spanish usage is to prefix and suffix the note of exclamation.

16. A verse is, etymologically, a line of prose writing as truly as a metrical line is a verse. Verse (Latin *versus*, plural the same) means a turning — here a turning from the end of one line back to the beginning of the next. The ploughman with his horse or ox and plough is a versemaker in this sense; and the turning at the end of a furrow is *versus* in Latin; the plough is the steel pen by which these Verses are made. From the verb *aro*, to plough, is *exaro*, of the same meaning in agriculture, but it is a quite usual and entirely classical word for writing. In view of this derivation of Verse, it would seem to be better to call a line of metrical composition a verse than a line: this *is* a verse; a line of prose is only by accident a verse: if the page were wider, that which is now the end of a prose line would not be the end.

17. Travesty means change of vesture: specially it signifies a pantomime in which by changes of clothing one actor personates many different characters. In its literary sense, it denotes burlesque treatment of a subject that originally was treated in an elevated style. Using the word in its etymological sense, we

might well say that recover is a travesty of recuperate: recuperate is from Latin *recupero* direct; recover is from the same through French *recouvrer*. Recover bears no etymological relation to discover, Latin *discooperio*, to remove a covering. *Recupero*, recuperate, has its root in *capio*, to take, seize, and primarily means to get or take back again what once was ours.

18. Story may have been in use in English before history, of which it is an abbreviated form: originally, story and history had one same meaning. In the Authorized Version of the Bible the word history does not occur; but story is there used twice, and in both instances it has the meaning history, *e. g.*, "They are written in the story of the book of the Kings." In Italian *storia* is a usual form of the word. In Old French it was sometimes written *estoire:* but in modern French the orthography is *histoire*, which means both history and tale, story. The word is from the Greek, and there originally meant research, and the fruit of research, learning of any kind; secondarily it had the special meaning which now attaches to it in English. The father of history employs the verb *historeo* in the sense of "inquire," and in that sense he was one of the most diligent of historians.

19. The current invidious meaning of Diatribe did not attach to it till long after its introduction into the language. Diatribe (four syllables) is Greek, and means literally a thorough rubbing, a wasting (as of time), and so a spending of time, as in study of a subject; hence a thorough study and the fruit of that study in a dissertation. Authors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries used to entitle their critical studies Diatribes (in Latin *diatribae*), without meaning by

that term anything of the nature of invective or vilification. Thus we have a commentary on the second gospel spoken of as "that excellent *Diatriba* on Saint Mark." There is no doubt that the now received meaning of diatribe is due to the violence with which scholars in the times next succeeding the Renascence used to assail their rivals in learning, taking every possible occasion to prove their opponents dunces, falsifiers, and plagiaries.

20. The noun Statement and the verb to state are very much overworked. A man now states what his father told, or related, or recited, or narrated, or affirmed, or even said; and his grandfather's recital, or narrative, or history, or story, or account is now always statement.

21. Standpoint comes to us from the German *Standpunkt*. It is condemned by purists; but being a very convenient word, expressing concisely the same notion as the awkward phrase, point of view, it has found general acceptance, and is rooted now in good usage. The purists fault it on the ground that it is not compounded according to the correct Anglic formula, but on the model of German compounds, as *Nähmaschine* (sew-machine), *Renbahn* (run-track), *Beisszahn* (bite-tooth, incisor). But the case is not exactly so, for the German word *Standpunkt* is not formed from *stehen*, the verb to stand, but from German *Stand*, which is the same as our noun stand: from the German verb *stehen* (to stand) and *Punkt* (point), a compound word would be got *Stehpunkt*, not *Standpunkt*, Standpoint. Even if standpoint was compounded of the verb stand, that would not make it anomalous in English, for we have a great many

words of like composition, for example, hang-nail, hangman, ripsaw, drill-sergeant, driveway, turnstile.

22. Inveigh and Invective are from Latin *invehor*, which means, as nearly as possible, to let drive, to attack impetuously, as a charioteer or a horseman in battle.

23. Contention, in the sense of a point contended for, is censured by an over-nice critic as an abuse of language. On the contrary, that signification of the word is in full accord with the genius of language and of the language and is perfectly idiomatic. If conviction means not only convincement of the mind, but also the subject-matter of the convincement; then the subject-matter of a contending is a contention. If two persons contend over the proposition x is y, A holding the affirmative, B the negative, is not "x is y," A's contention, and "x is not y," B's contention? It is seen that the use of contention in the sense of "point in dispute" is beyond reproach. The word belief is also used subjectively and objectively, or abstractly and concretely in the same way.

24. Epithet is a word of Greek origin, identical both in sense and in formula of composition with the Latin *adjectivum*, adjective; adjective indeed is its authentic synonym. But in popular usage, epithet is understood to imply some degree of reproach, and in conversation is seldom used in the sense merely of "qualifying word" or adjective. Though epithet is less homely to us than adjective, one might well wish that it could be used without ambiguity in the sense of "qualifying word" simply; there is too schoolmasterly an air about "adjective."

25. Term, as more or less synonymous with word, is from the Latin *terminus*, limit, extremity. The Romans had a god of boundaries and landmarks, Terminus. Bacon uses the word term in the ancient sense, "Nature's two termes or boundaries." Term has very many meanings in modern English, one of which at least is worthy of special remark. A proposition in Logic is said to have two terms (*termini*, boundaries, extremities) connected by the copula (is or are). For example, in the proposition A is B. A and B are the terms, and "is" is copula; so in the proposition, "man is mortal," the terms are man and mortal. Term in this sense was for a long time a purely scholastic term, but it came out of the schools into the great world, and there quickly became a synonym of word. Term as vulgarly used is a part of the great vocabulary of cant.

26. Abstruse (from the Latin *abstrudo*, to thrust away, to hide away) designates the character of a subject of study which is far out of the beaten tracks; which is recondite. The epithet (and say the same of "recondite") is properly applied not to the student or the researcher, but to the subjects of their study. It is used improperly in this sentence: "I know him to be abstruse and unusually well-read."

27. Trivial is from the Latin *trivium*, intersection of *tres viae*, three roads; the meaning of the adjective reflects no high compliment on our poor humanity. The meeting of three roads is a point at which men are likely to congregate, or at least to meet one another and to talk. That talk is the talk of the *trivium*, trivial; that talk is "of no consequence."

Before it took on that meaning, trivial meant commonplace. The word Trifling is from a different root. A synonymist thus distinguishes between the two words: "Trifling and Trivial differ only in degree, the latter denoting a still lower degree of value than the former": a pretty contemptuous judgment to pass on "common conversation."

28. Terse is used by Sir Thomas Browne in its true etymological sense when he speaks of "stones precious and vulgar" made "terse and smoothe." Literally, terse means wiped, rubbed, hence polished. Terse was formerly said of persons; but it is used now only to express conciseness, neatness, and elegance of diction. Hence "tersely put" or "tersely stated" is not the same as "briefly" or "in few words;" concision, precision, and elegance of form are all three essential elements of Terseness. A modest man, however great a master of elegant, concise, precise expression he might be, would not say, "I will state the matter tersely;" he would let his praise be sounded by others; but he might well say "to put it briefly."

29. Trite is from the past participle of Latin *tero*, to rub, rub away, wear away; hence, the etymological sense of our word is, worn down. A trite remark or observation is one that is commonplace, stale, hackneyed. Remarks on the weather are, as a rule, trite; the same formulas are employed daily and by everybody. A remark that is trite may nevertheless be weighty in itself, *e.g.*, "evil communications corrupt good manners": but trivial remarks are not worthy of notice. The apothecary's words triturate, trituration, have the same origin as Trite.

30. A library of a thousand volumes neatly bound and duly ordered on the shelves is a brave sight; there be that would view it with profounder respect than they would a regiment of soldiers armed; if the books are judiciously selected to meet the wants and satisfy the taste of one who has access to them, one might be willing to pass the remainder of life in their company. But if the "books" consisted of rolls of paper, papyrus, or other material twenty-five feet in length by twelve inches in width, comparable to rolls of wall paper, perhaps their company would be less agreeable. The number of readers of books, if books were still produced in that form, would beyond a doubt be smaller now than in the darkest of the dark ages. When we speak of a book as "volume," we recall, or we should recall, were we alive to etymologies, the conditions of bookmaking in the ancient days when a volume was in truth a volume, a roll (*volumen*), and to read a book was to "evolve" it, unroll it (*explicare, evolvere volumen*). A work would be divided into a number of "books" according to the quantity of writing it contained, and each "book" (*liber*) would be a separate volume or roll. A computation of the length of the rolls of papyrus on which Livy's History of Rome was written, will give a "realizing sense" of one of the difficulties that attended the act of reading in those times. A "book" of Livy in Valpy's Delphin edition occupies fifty-five pages, having a total length of forty feet; the width is three and three-fourths inches. The ancient *volumen* would have a width (margin not reckoned) of say eleven inches, so a line would be thrice as long as Valpy's. But the letters would be larger in MS., and the lines

farther apart. Legibly written, a running foot length of the papyrus roll would not contain more than two foot-lengths of Valpy. Thus there would be twenty feet of written text; the length of the 140 rolls would be 2800 feet. It is not every one that can manage a roll of wall paper, even if his task be only to cut it into lengths. If the newspaper were made up in a *volumen*, there would be no Fourth Estate; and librarians would serve their apprenticeship in a wall-paper-factory.

31. Jot has the same signification as "tittle;" it is the name of the Greek letter *iota* (*ι*), the smallest character in the alphabet; and both jot and the unabbreviated form iota are still used to convey the same meaning, a trifle, a nothing. But one of the most passionate controversies between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the Semi-Arian controversy, turned on the letter i or iota: whether the "second person" of the Trinity was *homousios* or only *homoiusios* with the "first person;" as mere vocables there is just a jot, an iota, of difference between them.

32. Title has an august origin: its first form is *titulus*, which means a label or the like, then any mark in the margin of a page of writing, as in the Justinian Code (whence the word came into our language) to note a chapter or section; the name of that little mark became the proverbial expression for a trifling thing, but in pronunciation and spelling it was altered to tittle. Title is a matter of the highest consequence in the law of property: it means the ground of right upon which ownership or dominion rests. The adjective titular etymologically implies possession of title, that is, of proprietary right: hence,

the titulary of a church benefice would mean the one who is vested with the benefice; titular bishop, one who holds canonical right to diocesan jurisdiction and to all the temporalities of a bishopric. Nevertheless, the adjective titular has in English come to be equivalent to nominal, decorated with a title, but possessing no power or authority.

33. Diplomacy is from diploma, a paper or parchment writing by which is conferred some privilege, power, or authority under seal. The deciphering and interpreting of ancient diplomas, charters, and the like was at one time a very necessary art, and even a science, and was called diplomacy or *res diplomatica.* In later times the conducting of negotiations between governments by exchange of "papers" or *diplomata* got the name of diplomacy.

34. Stationer was originally the designation of a bookseller. Etymologically it signifies one who takes a station (or stand) in a street or other public place, like a blind beggarman or a vender of mutton pies. The early booksellers were what we should call fakirs: they took their station at a fixed place, and on a board or table spread their wares out for view. To the trade in books was added later that in writing materials, and in time the writing-material venders were known distinctively as stationers, while the original stationers got the title of booksellers. The London guild of stationers, founded in 1403, still subsists, and their guildhall is Stationers Hall: its membership comprises stationers, booksellers, and publishers.

PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, THE PROFESSIONS.

35. The Cynic sect or school of ethic philosophy differed not essentially, at its origin, from the Stoic, which it antedated by a few years. Its founder, Antisthenes, and his early disciples were forerunners of the hermits of the Thebais and of the most grotesque aberrations of asceticism in the fourth century and in mediæval times. Their outspoken and outacted contempt for the world and all its vain shows has imitation, yet only faint-hearted imitation, in that sternest of modern Puritan communities which is known to the profane as "Hook-and-eye Baptists." Cynic means dog-like (*kyon*, dog), but why were those honest, even if misguided folk called by the nickname Cynics? It may have been because they met in the Cynosarges gymnasium at Athens; but more likely because they were disliked for their Puritanical narrowness, their snappishness, their surliness, and for their alleged filthy habits: "call a dog a bad name," etc. Whatever the origin of the nickname, the later followers of Antisthenes seem to have merited the title Cynic by their mendicancy and their satyric wantonness. The traits of the sect, then, are the dog's traits,—snappishness, and what we shall call shamelessness, and the latter not less notable in them than the former. But now what is the meaning of Cynical in English; is it ever used in the sense of "lost to shame," "sunk in sensuality"? If so, the dictionaries take no notice of the fact. For English-speaking people, Anglic people, cynical means currish, snarling, snappish, misanthropic; and a cynic is a sneering, sarcastic, or surly person.

These definitions do not run in French. In French the primary, dominant, and almost only signification of the adjective is impudent, obscene, shameless.

36. What is the moral (so to speak) character of the dog, and what is denoted by the words in our language which are formed from the animal's name? As a rule, these words show, on the part of the makers of our language, a recognition of some degree of "moral" worth in the animal, and first of all of his faithfulness to his friends, in all their fortunes and specially their misfortunes. At the same time we are not blind to the dog's vicious and offensive traits. Take the words and phrases as they occur in a dictionary: first, those importing a favorable judgment upon the dog. In this category we have the verb "to dog," signifying the animal's unflagging persistence: the dog is, above all, "diligent in business." "Doggedness" is a word less than one-half reproachful; and we prize "bull-dog tenacity." "Watch-dog of the treasury" is an honorable appellation. We felicitate a man when he wins the object of his affections — the "lucky dog;" and who is ever offended when he is called a "sly dog"? Even "lazy dog" is hardly a reproof; for the dog is never lazy save in seeming. We borrow from a word expressive of the dog's ways the verb to wheedle. Of words and phrases that express less pleasing canine characters may be mentioned the verb "to hound," which is nearly always used in the sense of persecuting. When we call a man a dog without such adjectives as lucky, sly, we use a term of scorn; and "dirty dog" is not without justification in dog habits. Cur is always a word of contempt, said of man or dog.

On the whole, it will be admitted that on such evidence as the dictionary supplies, the dog cuts no ill figure in the English vocabulary.

37. But the word Cynic led us into this inquiry: it may be well to see in the Greek vocabulary with what eyes the ancient Greeks viewed the dog. In the lexicon, be it remarked, Odysseus' dog cuts no figure; nor does Plato's "most philosophic animal." An average Greek lexicon will show over a hundred words denoting canine characters and qualities, nearly every one of them unfavorable to the dog; there we find "dog-fly," meaning shameless fly; the adjective *kyneos*, shameless; *kynognomon*, impudent; *kynolesches*, obscene talker: in the long list from which these examples are taken, is not to be found one word, noun, adjective, or verb, expressive of any good or useful qualities in the dog, except the terms of the chase.

38. It is plain, therefore, that the French, in their use of the word cynic and its derivates, are more true to the original and genuine meaning than the Anglics. Even in naming the sect of the Cynics the French language has clung to the Greek form *kynismos* (doggery), which it renders *cynisme;* while the English coins the word cynicism, quite needlessly, instead of using the word which was in use for two thousand years.

39. Had the word Empiric come into our language after Lord Bacon's day, it would now be in high honor instead of being a term of reproach. It is of Greek origin, and as a noun means experimentalist, an experimental philosopher, an inductive reasoner, and one who tests by experiment the conclu-

sions of his logic. Of course modern philosophers and modern physicists and men of science generally are Empirics in this sense, the only etymological sense of the word. It seems to have been originally employed in a "good" sense to designate a school of medicine which had its rise two hundred or three hundred years before our era. This sect or school rejected the traditional and *à priori* teachings of the dogmatic schools and professed to derive their knowledge of diseases and medicaments from observation and experiment. The old school by their ridicule of the novel system, and the experimentalists themselves by their braggart pretensions and their failures, brought the term into contempt, and it has been ever since in disgrace. In modern times practicers of the healing art or of surgery — bone-setters, for example — who enter the calling of physician without what is called a regular medical education, trusting wholly to what they have gathered by their own effort and by their own experience, supplemented by the traditional notions existing among the common people, are called contemptuously Empirics: hence, Empiric, in the terminology of regular practicers, means quack, charlatan. In far the largest number of cases the censure is justified; but there must be many exceptions where the native genius of one whom Nature made a Doctor without "imposition of hands" shall balance all the learning of the schools; and the most regular of regulars, if he accumulate not the fruits of his experience, becoming so far an Empiric, will after forty years be no better physician than on his graduation day.

40. It is not by accident that in Greek, Latin, German, and the languages derived from them the terms used to designate the notion Morality or Morals all mean custom, usage. The Greek word *ethos* (plural, *ethea* or *ethē*) has a very lowly meaning at its origin, the lair of a wild animal, and whether in the singular number or the plural, that is the only sense it has for Homer: since Homer's day it has reached very high dignity, but that dignity it attained in the Greek language itself, when the philosophers began to study the matter of conduct; it is different with other words of Greek origin, which grew to their present stature only when transplanted to alien soil, as notably is the case with the word "idiot." From haunts of beasts, *ethea* came to signify the wonted haunts of men, their habitations; then their habits, customs, usages. When the reasons for usages came to be inquired into, laws of conduct were developed, and those laws are Ethical: their sum is Ethics, or the science of Ethea: the word in Greek is *ethikē:* whether Aristotle first gave the name to the science or not may be a question, at all events he is the earliest author quoted for the use of the word, in Liddell and Scott's "Lexicon."

41. The Latin word for Morals is *mores,* which is the plural of *mos;* and *mos* has for its primitive meaning "manner, custom, way, fashion, use, wont of persons, as determined, not by the laws, but by their own will and pleasure" — so the "Latin Dictionary" of Andrews; but one would like to see the proof that *mos* in its primordial use was a term applying only to man and his manners, ways, or fashions. However that may be, there is no question

that *mos*, and its plural form *mores*, meant originally only accustomedness or manner or ways of doing things, without regard at all to what we call Ethics or Moral Law or responsibility: it is as colorless in that respect as the word "way" or "road."

42. The German *sitte* (plural, *sitten*) is allied to our sit, seat, and thus is identical in original purport to the Greek *ethos*, seat of a wild animal; the origin of the Latin word is unknown. *Sitte* has about the same history as *ethos* and *mos;* and like them its plural, *sitten*, and its derivatives, as *sittlich*, to this day stand both for use and wont and for Morality. We whose mother tongue is English, have no homely word like those of the Latins, Hellenes, and Germans, but must use Latin and Greek terms to express the idea of the relation of human acts to that supreme and worshipful inner sense of the soul which the Latins call *Pudor* and we weakly call Conscience — for we cannot translate the grand Latin word by shame — nor can any man who has been nurtured with the milk of Hebrew tradition, as found in the story of man's fall. But we are in worse case than the Germans, at least in different case, in that while they see in *sitte*, *sitten*, *sittlich*, *sittlichkeit*, as the Greeks in *ethea* and the Latins in *mores*, the very ground out of which Ethics and Morality were digged, we speak an alien language when we use those words, and it is impossible for us, even though we become accomplished Grecians, and Latinists, and Germanists in later life, to put ourselves in the place of our early forefathers, and to look out upon man's life as they did. There is something sacramental in one's induction into the mother tongue;

we not alone speak in that tongue: our habits of thought are determined by it.

43. The conclusion to be drawn from the considerations we have advanced above, is that if history and the records of travel had not taught us that Morality has largely varied according to latitude and longitude, the aspects of nature, and man's physical, intellectual, and economic environment; language is there, like the geological formations of past ages, to demonstrate the truth. Viewed simply as a question of language, quite apart from ideas — if the supposition were conceivable — the expression "absolute Ethics" is a contradiction of terms, being equivalent to the unconditioned conditional, or the whiteness of black. In the domain of Morals, nations have acted toward foreign nations as they have acted in the domain of language. The Greeks and Romans called the nations whose languages they could not understand, jabberers, or, as they expressed it, *barbari*: for the Greeks the languages of the peoples on the banks of the Danube, and of those on the Rhine, were no languages at all; yet those languages were own cousins of the language of the Greeks and Romans. Of course the customs of the barbarians were unethic, immoral for the Greeks: but then the barbari no doubt returned the compliment. The like contempt for the foreigner, his ways and his speech, is still seen. For the unlettered English-speaking person, the language of Dante is gibberish; in the eyes of insular John Bull, the customs of the neighboring Continent, on the "Sabbath" and every day, are highly immoral.

44. Moral and Immoral, vulgarly restricted to denotation of regularity and irregularity of conduct

in the sexual relation, have, it hardly needs to say, no such narrow limit either in etymology or in literary usage. The grocer who sands or damps his sugar; the usurer who advantages by the straits of a borrower, — are, or may be, by reason of those acts, strictly as Immoral as the adulterer. But the extortionate usurer who violates the first dictates of humanity is nevertheless a man of strictly moral life, if only he is faithful to his marriage vows. Perhaps we must add to the denotations of Immoral, in the vulgar restricted sense, the taking part in games of chance and the use of intoxicating liquors. But in the code of the restrictionists, "gambling on the street" is not under condemnation; though ragged boys who play for buttons are vile sinners. The man who embezzles $350,000 of a bank's moneys is nevertheless spoken of as a strictly Moral man, for he is a pattern of conjugal propriety and holds in abomination a game at cards.

45. In the vulgar use of speech, the virtue of Temperance is narrowed down to the meaning of teetotalism: that is grotesque; the very word which says "moderation in use" is made to say "no use at all." Consistency would seem to require that those who so understand the meaning of Temperance should agree with the celebrated church father Origen, in his understanding of the passage Matt. xix. 12, and go and do like as he did. The word Decent still retains even in the vulgar speech most of its original meanings, — becoming, seemly, decorous; but its contradictory, Indecent, which should denote only the contradictories of these, viz. unbecoming, unseemly, indecorous, has, in popular usage or popular cant,

only the meaning obscene or immodest as that epithet is commonly understood. Were we to say of the candidate for political place who appeared coatless and unkempt before an audience of workmen, that he made an indecent exhibition of himself, that would probably be taken as ground of an action for libel, because of the popular misapprehension of the word Indecent. It would be said that there was no indecency, that the politician had made no indecent exposure; but though in the performance there was not any indecency, as the vulgar understand the word, there was essential indecency, indecorum, in appearing in careless attire in a public place as teacher of the people. Had that politician, fully attired, inserted himself in a salt sack, so that even his forehead should be hid, his behavior would have been an indecency indeed. The acuteness of the sense for "Indecency," as the term is vulgarly understood, passes belief. A man was arrested by a policeman in New York not long ago for "indecent exposure," his offence being that he showed the stockinged calves of his legs clasped round with elastic garters; and the court sustained the "ruling" of Bobby the clubman. Ever since then that garter peddler appears at his wonted station: but "pants" now conceal his calves.

46. Cardinal is from Latin *cardo*, hinge, and means pivotal, or that upon which anything turns; hence principal, chief. The four principal moral virtues of the ancient Greeks, as translated by us, are Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance; and they are called the cardinal or pivotal virtues, because on them the rest are supposed to depend. But if the Romans had been original investigators of the principles of con-

duct, they would probably have summed up all the virtues in one, *Pudor*, — the finest and noblest expression in any language of the mainspring of all virtue and all honor: it is a word that cannot be translated by any one English term. Cardinals in the Roman Church are, according to one of the popes, so called because they are all "closely attached to that hinge (the holy see) on which all else turns."

47. Predicament is a term of logic, and primarily denotes a class of concepts or terms predicable of other concepts or terms: it is also called a category. In English its fortune has been like that of the corresponding noun predicate, and of the law term premises (*q. v.*). Predicament as a term of logic is gone quite out of use, but in the grotesque vulgar sense it gives no sign of obsolescence. That vulgar sense is "a particular state, condition, or position; especially a state or position of difficulty, trial, or danger." And for this abusive denotation of the word Shakspere is quoted as the authority (Merch. Ven., IV. 1, near the end): —

> "In which predicament I say thou standest."

Now, it is true that Shylock was in "a position of danger;" but Portia does not make that a predicament: his predicament, his category was that of —

> "an alien
> That by direct or indirect attempts
> (Doth) seek the life of any citizen:"

Prove that Shylock is in that category, and then his life is at the duke's mercy. In logic and in grammar the noun predicate is that term in a proposition which is affirmed or denied of another term, the

subject: in "White is a color," color is the predicate. That word, used as a verb, means to affirm one thing of another: "I predicate shrewdness of jockeys." Out of this legitimate use has sprung the American vulgarism, "to predicate upon"; "The honorable senator predicated much of what he said, upon the refusal of the war department to submit to Congress the correspondence." The proper word would have been such as founded, grounded, based, bottomed,— this last a favorite word of Thomas Jefferson's.

48. Absurd is a strong and useful word if held to its quasi-technical sense of contrary to reason, inconsistent with reason or with mathematical laws. It is from Latin *absurdus*, but in Latin its derivative meanings have little relation to the etymology of the word. It is truly and technically absurd to say that a pound of gold is of greater utility to man than a sack of wheat. It is absurd to say that a human organism can live for indefinite ages. But it is an abuse of terms to apply the word absurd to every seeming contradiction and to every proposition that conflicts with our own special doxy: such or such a political or social reform, such or such a revision of laws and constitutions is absurd: they may be unwise, rash, preposterous, wicked, but not absurd; change of that which is ever in flux is never absurd, cannot be absurd.

49. Intuition means, in the language of metaphysicians, whence it was imported into common speech, direct vision by the reason, as distinguished from indirect or illative or rationative perception of the truth of a proposition. The school of Locke and all the sensualist or sensist schools deny Intuition, holding

that *nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the sensorium. In metaphysical language the idea of space and of time or duration are Intuitions. In this sense of direct intellectual perception of truths was the word introduced into the English terminology of metaphysics by Coleridge, and his express purpose was to avoid "confusion and obscurity." But Intuition and Intuitive are vulgarly used in many senses which have nothing to do with the technical meaning: this is a kind of cant. If intuition is to be held strictly to its scholastic meaning, there is no such thing as intuitive right, intuitive feeling, intuitive use of idioms, intuitive skill in carpentry, woman's intuitive perception of childhood's needs, woman's intuitive discrimination of colors. The phrases just cited are all taken from current periodical publications, as is also this passage from an account of a fire in a menagerie: "Before the caretakers were aware of any danger, many of the animals showed unwillingness to re-enter the cages after exercising: they sensed the fire, not through mysterious intuition, but notified of fire through the sense of smell." Milton distinguishes between intuition and ratiocination, using the very words of the schools, "intuitive" and "discursive":

> "Whence the soul reason receives, and reason is her being,
> Discursive or intuitive;"

discursive reason being the reason arriving at knowledge of truth by induction or deduction; intuitive reason, the reason directly seeing absolute or necessary truth. What is called "women's intuition" is not intuition at all, but reasoning from their impres-

sions; for "women trust more than men to first impressions and natural indications, *e.g.*, physiognomy."

50. When we say, "he was beside himself," we use a phrase involving the same metaphor which is found in Ecstasy. Ecstasy, in the sense of trance, comes to us from the Greek of the New Testament. The Greek classic writers appear to have used the word *ekstasis* only in the sense of a transport of rage or an access of terror. Whether in the "good" sense of trance, or in the "bad" sense of a fit of rage, the fundamental meaning of the word is displacement (the same idea which is expressed by "transport"), and in particular displacement of the mind or senses: literally, ecstasy is "standing outside" oneself, beside oneself. Ecstasy is, of course, often used to signify very inferior degrees of mental exaltation, but it is still employed to denote the very highest state of rapture (this word, too, implies displacement, the state of being snatched from oneself). Ecstasy is one of the very few words in our language that with age have assumed a larger and a nobler sense than they had in the original tongues.

51. Bashfulness is not a virtue but a weakness; it is like scrupulosity. Webster defines it "excessive or extreme modesty," — a rather curious expression. In Latin and Greek, Modesty, as here understood by Webster, is *pudor* and *aidos* respectively. Did any of the ancient philosophers ever give a name to excess of *pudor* or *aidos?* The translators of the Bible in the seventeenth century, when they came to the passage 1 Tim. ii. 9, found in the Greek text *meta aidus*, and translated it "with shamefacedness." That is the only use of the word Shamefacedness in their

version. Shamefacedness, — what a word! It cannot possibly mean anything else but bashfulness, and we may be sure that the apostle Paul would never commend the cultivation of that vice. King James's company of translators were men who had studied with great care the monuments of ancient English speech, and wherever a homely Saxon word was found that accurately expressed the sense of the Hebrew and Greek originals, that word was almost invariably (not always, however) chosen in preference to any English word of Latin or Greek origin current in their time. Hence, necessarily their version had a strong archaic flavor even for their contemporaries. Not improbably the King James Bible needed a gloss no less for James's subjects than for Edward VII.'s.

52. They went to the Saxon source for a word to express *meta aidus*, and following a hideously bad orthography and a blundering etymology, wrote Shamefacedness, a word of the order of watergrass and sparrowgrass. The virtue whose name they spell Shamefacedness has as little to do with "face" as watercress has to do with "grass." Shamefacedness, if ever such a word was coined of set purpose, could mean only bashfulness and discomposure in presence of strangers or the great. The word was in the language — in books — but it was not always so written. There were the usual number of variants in the spelling of the original adjective, *e.g.*, shamefast, schamefast, shamfast, besides shamefaced. He or she who is shamefast is very unlikely to be shamefaced ever or bashful; he or she is strong (fast: compare fastness, a stronghold) in that virtue which the Greeks called *aidos* and the Latins *pudor*, but for which

there is no equivalent in the English language to-day, thanks chiefly to the blunder of those revisers or translators of the seventeenth century. They changed the true name shamefastness into a name of dishonor and hissing. About two hundred and fifty years after the publication of King James's Bible, the unfortunate error was corrected by the modern revisers; they substitute "with shamefastness." Why did not the very look of the hateful word shamefacedness deter the old translators from employing it? There was at their disposal the good and fit word Modesty. Can it be that because the word modesty was pre-empted by the Rheims translators, they had to take the leavings?

53. Scruple is from the Latin *scrupulus*, which means such a small fragment of stone as might get into one's shoe and cause annoyance; *scrupulus* is also an apothecary's term of weight, one twenty-fourth part of an ounce, a scruple. The Romans used the word to signify uneasiness, worry. Among moralists, it came to mean uneasiness of mind, worry; and no great nation was ever so scruple-ridden as were the Romans in the best times of their Commonwealth; sometimes, because of a scruple touching the correct performance of public religious rites, the most important affairs of government, as the installation of consuls or the opening of a campaign, had to be adjourned: curious instances of this are recorded by Plutarch in *Coriolanus*. Among moralists, *scrupulus* came to mean an anxious state of mind about the righteousness of an act or a course of conduct, and in particular worry and trouble of conscience without reasonable cause. It is not a desirable state of conscience, being too near allied to hypochondria; it is

an infirmity, a pitiable infirmity, not a virtue; the tactic of the director of conscience is in every way to give the scruple-ridden patient — and a patient he is indeed, a sufferer — courage to disregard the ever-accusing voices: but scrupulosity is far more difficult to eradicate than the opium habit; besides, the director must act with extreme discretion, lest in extirpating the scruples he cut the nerve of conscience. Such is scrupulosity. Nevertheless, when the epithet Unscrupulous is applied to a man, the probability, nay, the certainty, is that there is intention to accuse him of total lack of moral principle and conscience. The phrase "without scruple" is employed by the best writers in the sense of moral recklessness; thus Macaulay, "he broke through the most sacred ties without scruple or shame"; so, then, if the murderer's hand is stayed by the thought of the enormity of his purposed crime, that is the murderer's scruple — that is the pebble in his sandal! The dictates of the same conscience whether in saint or in sinner are not scruples; they are the eternal law.

54. Economy, Political Economy. The etymological meaning of Economy is housekeeping or management of a household (Greek, *oikos*, house, *nomos*, regulation). Hence, though frugality or saving is an essential part of economy, it is not its predominant note: Xenophon in his "Oikonomos" (*oeconomus*) justly puts in the first rank ability to control the domestic servants of the household. The phrase Political Economy is of Greek origin in both its parts. But under any of the current definitions of the word political, Political Economy seems to be a misnomer.

Political means pertaining to the state; and household management realized in the state is simply government in all its departments. The Political Economy of the United States, in the legitimate meaning of "political" and "economy," is the conduct of the government in its three departments, including army and navy, administration of the public domain, regulation of commerce: in short, the total activity of the state. If there is any interest, or business, as of production or exchange, or any question of profit or loss with which the state is not directly concerned, the state is not the manager of such affairs, is not the *oikonomos;* and hence, the *oikonomia* (economy) of such affairs is not political or public, but private. If such a thing as Political Economy in the legitimate sense of the words existed, every interest of the people who constitute the state would come within its purview, and the state or government would not be merely a statistician of trade, manufacture, commerce, nor simply a judge to determine questions of property or right between non-public parties, but would be all in all in the body public. The current view of Political Economy may be consistent with "public" Economy in a loose sense; but it is not consistent with the idea of a "Political" Economy. It is absurd — to wit, a contradiction in terms, for a man to call his "science," Political Economy, and then to commence his treatise by saying that the part which the state should play must be that of a spectator at a prize fight: *laissez faire.* The ancient Roman term for the state, *res publica,* and our own term, Common Wealth, involve the notion of political economy in its widest sense; and if in a Republic

any interest of a public nature is taken out of the category *res publicae*, that Republic is so far an oligarchy.

55. Test, from Latin *testa*, baked clay, potsherd, is the same word which in French (*tête*), in Italian (*testa*), and in other Latinish tongues, means human head and head in many figurative significations, as *tête de l'armée*, *tête du pont*. Test was once used in English to denote simply potsherd, but in time became restricted to the signification of cupel, a vessel made of pulverized calcined bones and used in assaying gold and silver. From Test as an instrument of assay comes the verb "to test," to examine by the cupel, and then to examine by other means, as by chemical reagents; and the examination is called a test. From this last meaning come all the other meanings of the word test in English. But how came *testa*, a piece of baked clay, to signify head, and in particular the human head, in the languages derived from Latin? There can hardly be a doubt that the resemblance of a human skull, thrown up out of an old grave when it is opened to receive a new tenant, to a lump of baked clay, suggested the name. It is odd that the human head, throne of reason, should in those languages get its name from a lump of ruddy clay. Though the Spanish has a name for head derived from Latin *caput*, it uses the word *testa* to signify forehead and understanding. "Remember thou hast made me as clay."

56. The phenomenon of Atavism or reversion is often seen in language — words recovering significations that they seemed to have lost centuries before. In the phrase Medical Ethics we have an

instance of reversion to the primitive meaning of *ethe, mores, sitten:* see Section 5, § 40. The professional code of ethics which medical societies undertake to enforce is very largely a code of etiquette or correct behavior: Thou shalt not accept lower fees than thy Union (to borrow a word from mechanics' language) prescribes. Thou shalt not advertise in the newspapers. Thou shalt not keep privy to thyself thy discoveries in the art of medicine, nor sue out letters-patent upon the same. Thou shalt not sit in consultation with a "practitioner" of an heretical school of leechcraft. The Doctors unconsciously go back to primitive Greek and Roman usage of the words Ethical, Moral; for of Ethics or Morality in the received sense of the terms, these precepts of the code bear no trace. And yet the calling of a Physician, a Healer, touches Ethic in its highest sense at many points. The physician is a priest and mediator between stern nature and poor humanity: in that relation Duty and Compassion are terms full of ethic significance; but those ideas make an insignificant figure in the Code.

57. When Aristotle was writing his Nicomachean Ethics he unaccountably missed these mountain heights of Professional Ethics; nor have subsequent moralists so ordered the visual angle of their contemplation as to bring Professional Ethics within its scope. But when they learn of a code of Professional Ethics existing among Practical Politicians, they will make haste to recognize a new department of their science. One of the maxims, if not one of the cardinal principles of this code is, as expounded to a newspaper reporter by a party "magnate," that "it is

contrary to the Ethics of Republican party politics for Mayor X to appoint the representative of a disgruntled faction to office," — especially to an office controlling much "patronage."

58. The current meaning of Cure in the sense of restoring a sick man to health is probably due not to the doctors, but to their patients and the laity. But who are answerable for the name Physic given to the medical art and to medicines, and for medical men being called Physicians? One should wish that the medical profession could acquit itself of the charge of arrogance that lies against them for assuming that boastful appellation: as though they were *per eminentiam* the *physici*, the searchers of nature (*physis*), the true naturalists (*physici*). It seems too true that the designation was prepensely assumed by the medicos themselves: but we will never believe that though they gave to their art and science the name Physicē, and to themselves the name Physici, they ever went so far as to call their haphazard combinations of drugs Physic — the remedy prescribed by nature.

59. There is no question but that Doctor as a degree of a university or of a school of arts signified Doctor of Theology long before it signified Doctor of Medicine or doctor of any other faculty. Whence then comes it that to-day who says Doctor is held to mean Doctor of Medicine, unless, *aliunde*, it is made to appear that the doctorship in question is of divinity, or laws, or philosophy, or dentistry, or what not? Faculty, too, though as a term of the university it denotes any one of many departments of university teaching, has been appropriated to itself almost exclusively by the medical profession.

60. Disease, both noun and verb, had formerly a less definite signification than the noun has now: the verb, in whatever signification, is gone out of use. Disease denotes primarily discomfort, uneasiness, not necessarily any organic or functional disorder of the body or mind; as when the recluse of Norwich writes, "There was nothing between the cross and heaven that might have diseased me," *i. e.*, troubled me. But by the beginning of the seventeenth century this meaning was obsolete, as may be inferred from the substitution by King James's translators of "trouble" in the room of "disease" at Mark v. 35, where Tyndale's version, which lay before them, has "why diseasest thou the master?" As a noun, however, the word remained in use, though in an altered sense, not that of discomfort, malaise, but of malady, disease as now understood: nor has it since regained either in popular or in literary usage the primary meaning. In the King James's Version both disease and the earlier Saxon noun sickness are employed in the sense of bodily disorder, *e. g.*, "a loathsome disease," "a sickness unto death." A curious instance of the changing fortunes of these two words is had at Matt. iv. 23. There the Authorized Version gives "healing all manner of sickness and all manner of disease," translating by "sickness" the Greek *nosos* (whence the medical term nosology) and the Greek *malakia* (weakliness, infirmity), by disease. But the Revised Version is "all manner of disease and all manner of sickness." It is plain that for King James's commission of translators sickness meant, not nausea, (to which meaning present British usage seeks to restrict it), but disease as that term is now understood.

61. The minute orifices of the skin are called pores, a word of Greek origin, *poros*. But *poros* in Greek originally signified passage-way, and specifically a ford in a river, then a strait or narrow gulf of the sea, also the track of a ship through the sea; finally any passage, any way or means, any way out, and hence the name given to the orifices of the skin. The Latins called them *meatus*, signifying ways, passages. The Greeks called the merchant who made voyages by sea or land, *emporos*, and thence comes the word emporium.

62. When the law winks at, or ignores, or tolerates certain practices or certain businesses, liquor-selling, for example, or when it licenses them, such businesses are said, but improperly, to be sanctioned by the law or the government. A lawyer would hardly use the word sanction so loosely. In the language of the law — and from the law has the word been derived into our speech — sanction is the penalty decreed to compel obedience to the law; and of course where no law exists relating to such businesses or practices, or where the law merely says under what conditions it will suffer such businesses to be carried on, it gives no sanction (in the true legal sense). The exaction of a license fee is not a sanction of liquor-selling; but the laws which seek to prevent unlicensed trade have a sanction in the strict sense: they are enforced with penalties. Sanction is the Latin *sanctio*, derived from the verb *sancio*, to make sacred (*sanctus*, whence our word Saint) or inviolable.

63. There are many legal phrases in which the word breach occurs in the sense of violation: breach of close, of covenant, of duty, of the peace, of pound,

of prison, of promise, of trust. The phrase "breach of rights," used by Herbert Spencer, is not found among these, and that for good etymological reasons. Ask the question, What is done to the close, covenant, etc.? and in every case the answer is, It is broken: but what is done to the rights: are they broken too? No, they are violated; there is no breakage, hence, no breach. If the last of the legal phrases mentioned above be examined, it will be found to be equally faulty with Spencer's phrase, if trust be there taken in the usual sense of confidence reposed in one person by another: the trustee cannot commit a breach of *that* trust. But he can commit a breach of his own faith and duty, and faith or duty is the true meaning of trust in that legal phrase. Trust is used in that sense once in the Authorized Version of Saint Paul's first epistle to Timothy, "Keep that which is committed to thy trust."

64. Date is from the Latin *datum*, given, as in the case of a mortgage deed; or sent, as in the case of a letter. The date used to be always appended at the end of the letter or document, and the place and the time of sending the letter or executing the deed constituted the date. But now date is used in the sense of point of time, without reference to place. This is true specially of the verb to date, which implies no denotation of place, but only of the point of time. The ancients rarely dated their letters; thus, though we have hundreds of Cicero's letters, they are all, or nearly all, undated, and the time of their writing has to be inferred from circumstances.

65. The medical profession will cheerfully admit that the ancient physicians knew very little indeed of

physiology, pathology, anatomy, or the action of drugs; nevertheless those old pretenders to knowledge were wont with all assurance to say that such or such symptoms "indicated" such or such remedies of the pharmacopœia, or such or such intervention of the surgeon's scalpel or lancet. This preternatural thirst, they would say, indicates the use of the lancet; that diseased state indicates toads' excrement; and so on. Of course Nature, had she been consulted, would indignantly have denied that she had indicated or called for any of those preposterous medicaments or modes of treatment. The same phrase is still in use among doctors of physic; and though the arrogance is only in the word, not in the thought of those who employ it, still a doctor of medicine who is master of all the knowledges and all the resources of his profession, might well hesitate to employ the phrase nowadays. He knows too well that medicine is still empiric, experimental. Indicate belongs to the cant of the profession.

66. Symptom (*symptoma*), from the Greek verb *sympipto*, originally signified a chance occurrence, but specially mischance. The ancient Greek or Roman physicians do not appear to have employed the word in the sense now given it, of indication of a diseased condition. Our word accident, a word of Latin origin, is nearly identical in meaning (*cado*, to fall, *pipto*, to fall) with *symptoma*; and in French a symptom is called *un accident*. If this sentence from Macaulay were translated into Greek, "alarming symptoms had appeared in other regiments," a scholar acquainted only with classical Greek literature and ancient medical science would be unable to

understand the meaning of the word *symptomata*: the nearest he could get to it would be "alarming diseases," like typhus, — he would never suspect that anything like mutiny was meant.

67. In ancient Roman society Client (*cliens*) was a man living under the legal protection of a wealthy or powerful citizen, his *patronus* (patron). *Patroni* had often a numerous clientage (*clientela*). The lord or *patronus* owed to his client aid and counsel in legal and other complications, and he was guardian and protector of the client's children after their father's death. To the *patronus* the client owed reciprocal service and aids. The tie of client and patron was sacred; a *patronus* who was false to his client was declared, by the laws of the twelve tables, to be anathema, *sacer esto*, be he accursed. The word client still lives in our language; but the only tie that binds client and his protector now is the cash nexus. The term has more or less legitimate use when it expresses the relation between the advocate and the man whose interests he defends in the courts; but now every professional man — except medicos, they have their patients; and parsons, they have their parishioners — has his clients: civil engineers, architects, house and land agents, coal-mongers, green grocers, barbers, bootblacks, beggars. Though the doctors have patients, not clients, still they have their *clientèle*, a French word, thought to be much finer than English clientage. A rather curious thing is that when the grocers and haberdashers and the tapsters address their clients in advertisements, they call their clients their "patrons," and their custom "patronage," which is slightly confusing. Sir Thomas

Browne employs the word in its true etymological, and we may say the classical sense, when he writes that he does not willingly join in disputes over matters of religion, lest "the cause of truth should suffer in the weakness of his patronage;" here very plainly patronage means the office of a defender or advocate, but in that sense the word is now "obsolete;" and no account of Browne's usage is taken in at least one of the voluminous modern dictionaries. That meaning of the word is lost; but there are other meanings which survive; they are: Lord Nincompoop's patronage of learning; Santiago's tutelary care of his devoted Spaniards; the right of presentation to a church benefice; the right of the victor in political warfare to divide the spoil.

68. Surgeon is from Greek *cheirurgos*, and was at first spelt chirurgeon, and is still in French *chirurgien*. *Cheirurgos* is from *cheir*, the hand, and *ergon*, work, and hence means, literally, manipulator, one operating with the hand, and, of course, a handicraftsman. The verb very early assumed a sinister meaning, to do acts of violence, to do bloody work. Surgery was in the middle ages, an incident of the barber's craft, and barbers and surgeons — the order of the words is significant — were incorporated in London in 1540, as one company, that of the Barber-Surgeons; some two hundred years later the two crafts went apart, forming separate bodies. In the days of the great Grandgousier, grandfather of the more renowned Pantagruel, it was no "barber-surgeons," but Barbers that dressed the wounds of Picrochole's subject, Marquet; and the fees paid to those Barbers, seven hundred thousand and three

philippuses, prove that their professional standing was of the highest.

69. Farriery and Veterinary Surgery were long coupled, and both arts were exercised by the same man. In the course of time Farriery acquired the exclusive meaning of Veterinary Surgery; while the original Farrier (farrier proper, for farrier is the Latin *ferrarius*, ironworker, secondly, shoer of horses and oxen) had to call himself "horseshoer." But now the medical men who treat the diseases of horses and other animals are known not as farriers, but as Veterinary Surgeons, or Veterinarians; and inasmuch as Farrier, a right good word, lies waste and unused, it might well be taken again by members of the craft to which it always of right belonged. As for the Veterinary Surgeons, their art and science are quite as much medical art and science as surgical, and therefore their designation would be more precise, were it made simply Veterinary or Veterinarian: that word is from Latin, *veterna*, draft animal.

Section VI.

TERMS OF THE CHURCH AND RELIGION.

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1. WHAT a fine word is Worldling! it is distinctly a Christian word, but it expresses an idea that is common to all religions that have in them a spark of spirituality, and to all but the most materialistic philosophies: for the first Epicureans and the first Cynics, no less than Socrates and Plato, and the Stoics, both Grecian and Roman, contempt of the world and its petty interests was a commonplace; nevertheless, neither to those ancient ethnic philosophers, nor even to the Christians themselves in the first fine enthusiasm of their otherworldliness, did it occur to coin a word that would designate the one whose interests and whose studies were concentrated on worldly things — the Worldling. The first Christians, it is true, had a word to express "the world" and its interests as opposed to "the kingdom of God," to the soul or the spirit; and even this term was unknown to the Stoics — the term, for they had as clear perception of the idea, the thing, "the world," as even Saint Paul; the Stoics, instead of "the world," said "human affairs," things vain, things that pass away; while for them "to be worldly" found expression in the phrase "to be given up to pleasures" or to trifling things. In the New Testament we find for the first

time the Greek word *Kosmos*, used in the moralist's sense, or rather in the Christian sense. The ancient Greeks must have seen a kind of impiety in using the word *Kosmos* in that sense; for with them *Kosmos* (literally, ornament) signified the universe, this universal frame of things, and specially the heavens and the pageant of the heavenly bodies; the Latin *mundus* had the same meaning.

2. In the Latin Church, the word *saeculum*, the age, largely supplanted *mundus* in the sense of "the world." From *saeculum* comes our word secular, and secular in the sense of "worldly" has been in use since the first age of Christianity. But it was yet a long time before our word Worldling was coined. It came not till the message of Christ was carried to the Germanic races. They were not slow to evolve the fitting, the fittest word; and of all the languages of Western Europe, at least, only those of Germanic or Gothic origin possess the word which brands as alien to the Spirit the soul that is wholly devoted to secular interests — Worldling. The German language has no less than three words like worldling, viz., its precise counterpart, *Weltling*, with *Weltmensch* and *Weltkind*; fine also is the German word for Worldliness, *Weltsinn*, the worldly mind. The French has no noun for Worldling, for *mondain* is an adjective, and we need to express Worldling a very "substantial" word, a substantive, for the Worldling is a pretty considerable phenomenon. Nor have the other Latinish tongues any word answering to our word Worldling. Can it perhaps be that we Anglics have the word, because we have in cleanest-cut form the thing? Professor J. R. Seeley's remarks in his admirable study of "Natural

Religion" would seem to favor that explanation. Speaking of the men of his country, he says: —

3. "Does not this eternal question of a livelihood keep us at a level from which no ideal is visible? . . . We are too tame for either aspirations or regrets, or if we have them we know, as a matter of course, that they cannot be indulged. Money must be made first, and a good deal of it; comfort, not to say luxury, cannot be dispensed with, for the very thought of self-denial is too mediæval; then comes pleasure, of which we can scarcely have enough. When all these claims are satisfied, the remainder of our time may be given to our ideal, if we have one at all; we are perhaps aware that so much will not suffice; but we are humble and do not even in our dreams expect to accomplish much." (Pt. II. Ch. 1, p. 127.)

4. In the teachings of Jesus Christ, and specially in those of the Apostle Paul, the opposite of "the world" is "the Spirit." That word Spirit came into our language from the vocabulary of the Christian religion, as it was imported into all the Latinish tongues. But in none of these is the term available for use to-day in the true, full, and exclusive New Testament senses. When Spirit came in, there was in our mother tongue an exactly equivalent word, which was used concurrently with Spirit in the New Testament meanings of Spirit, the word Ghost, in German, *Geist*. But Ghost now means only apparition of the dead. As for Spirit, such a cloud of common meanings surround it that it is without contour, without definite meaning for us.

5. Person, apart from its etymological history and

its theologico-technical use would seem to be a word as easy to define as "man" or "human being." But its significations are not bounded by the limits of humanity nor of nature itself; as it stands in the English language, no definition fits it that is inconsistent with the doctrine of the Divine Trinity. The word came into English with that doctrine, and for ages it was viewed with relation to that doctrine; and even were the whole world to abjure the creeds of Christendom, the stamp of the belief in the Trinity would still remain on the word Person, and would have to be reckoned with. For though from a given date the term Divine Trinity should be dropped out of all literary use and out of mind so that it should never more appear written, printed, or spoken, there would all the same remain the literature of the past, and a large part of that would be unintelligible without such definition of the word Person as would fit the terms of that dogma.

6. "Person" has an interesting history, as indeed it has been an eventful one, ranging from the mask of the play-actor to the hypostases of the Divine Trinity. It is of Latin origin, from *persona*. A highly probable derivation of *persona* is from *per*, through, and *sono*, to sound; the quantity of the penult of *sŏno* is the one bar to this derivation. At first *persona* signified the "false face or mask worn by players on the stage;" this mask was of baked clay, and it covered the whole head, resting on the shoulders; the masks were larger than the average head, and the voice, as it issued, was magnified and hollow. There were masks for old-men characters, youths, middle-aged, matrons, and maids; all the parts were played

by men, women's parts by youths. From the masks the name *persona* passed to the characters enacted, and the characters in a play are still for us *dramatis personae*. Easy was the transition from the mimic stage to the theatre of real life, and the part which a man plays in public life is his *persona;* then *persona* came to be nearly the same as person in our usage, but its import was perhaps more nearly that of personage. The grammarians early adopted the word in the sense in which it is still used in grammar.

7. Such is the history of our word in Latin down to about the fourth century. The Arian controversy brought to the front in the early years of that age the doctrine of the three Divine Persons, — the "three subjects or agents constituting the godhead among Trinitarians," as Noah Webster naïvely says. For awhile *persona* and its Greek synonym *hypostasis* resounded (*personabat*, indeed) in the councils and synods of the Church.

8. In English the name of the player's mask crowded out the native name for a member, without distinction of sex or age, of the human race; thence, it came to signify the physical being, as when we say "cleanly in person;" finally Person came to be used in a restrictive sense of the one person in a village community or parish who is, after the lord of the manor, the principal local personage — the Parson.

9. Hypocrite came into our language stamped with one meaning, and from that meaning it never since has swerved one hair's breadth; if there are in English any other words of which the same may be said, they are very few. It comes to us from the Greek of the New Testament. In classical Greek, *hypokritēs*

means mime, player, but not yet a man who makes false pretence of virtue or goodness, though such false pretending is expressed in classic Greek by a cognate verb and by the noun ***hypokrisis***, our hypocrisy. That in Greek ***hypokritēs*** means play-actor, and therefore feigner, personator, is known of every schoolboy; but there are probably many good Grecians who know little more than that of its earlier history; and yet that history is writ on the front of the verb ***hypokrinomai*** (whence hypocrite) as plainly as the meaning of "hairless" is writ on the face of that adjective. To be brief — for here opens a vista of etymologies which invites indeed, but must not allure — the verb ***hypokrinomai*** means simply to reply: therefore ***hypokritēs*** means, primarily, one who answers questions, and specially one who answers in court; the verb is used also to express the action of oracles in giving responses or answers; in the Septuagint Greek version of the story of Joseph and Pharaoh, a Greek verb of very nearly the same composition, viz., ***apokrinomai***, is used to say Joseph "answered" Pharaoh, and Joseph "interpreted" Pharaoh's dream, "told him all about it." The actor who on the stage took part in the dialogue, or "question and answer," was ***hypokritēs;*** finally, ***hypokritēs*** was one who plays a part on the stage, who acts a character; and from this to "feigner" is an easy step. What in the story told of Demosthenes is called Action, is in Greek Hypokrisis, the primary meaning of which is reply, answer, then histrionic art, finally, delivery, elocution: whence, the metaphorical sense of playing a part, outward show, in short, hypocrisy. The adjective ***hypokritikos***, our hypocritical, seems to have been used in classical

Greek chiefly in the good sense of "skilled in histrionic art" and "having a good delivery."

10. Though Grace in the theological sense is precisely the same word as Grace in what might be called its profane meanings, the two uses came into the language separately, and are as far apart as though two orders of ideas were expressed by two distinct words. All the meanings of grace have their foundation in Latin classical usage of the word *gratia* (Section III. § 35). The root meanings of *gratia* are: favor, regard; that which wins regard; return for favor (gratitude). In the theological sense (and here all the schools agree) grace means gratuitous favor, favor that is not merited; in the banker's sense, grace of three days means so much of delay granted as a favor; a form of prayer is called grace after meat, from the very purport of the prayer, giving thanks (*gratias agere*), and also from the word with which the prayer begins, *gratias* — for that prayer was composed in Latin before it found expression in English. But the prayer before meat is not properly grace, for it is not a prayer of thanksgiving, and in it neither the thought nor the word thanks or grace occurs; the Latin formula begins with *benedic*, bless, and hence the name of that prayer is "the blessing before meat." This word grace has on the whole been very fortunate in English; it has retained all its classical import, and it has never been degraded in our language; in its theological use we can in charity allow that at least "it means well." The word still means for us all that is gracious, — kindliness, considerateness, gracefulness, beauty. The influence of the theological concept of grace, "divine grace," is

almost imperceptible in usage; but there is a very beautiful instance in "Romeo and Juliet" of Grace used in a sense very like the theological, though here the gracious influence is ascribed to things inanimate:

> "O mickle is the powerful grace that lies
> In plants, herbs, stones, and their true qualities."

But though Grace and its derivatives have in English retained all the dignity and worth of their ancient original, they once came perilously near to being made a hideous cant through their misuse by Puritan snivellers. When Sydney Smith was taxed of impious levity for having ridiculed the cant of canters, his reply was that he was only defending the sacredness of the words of religion against abuse by "the most ignorant and arrogant of human beings." The word Gracious and its direct derivatives — graciously, graciousness — must be regarded as exceptions to the rule that English use has preserved from degradation the words that have come to us from Latin *gratia;* for gracious, graciousness, graciously are very largely terms of snobbery and toadery, and are hardly used except with connotation of condescension. And one could wish that his grace the duke, and his grace the archbishop, would either merit the style, or refuse to wear it.

11. Tradition in the Roman Church is very much like the English common law: it contains, or hands down — such is the theory — the *depositum fidei,* deposit of faith made with the primitive believers, and especially, but not exclusively, with the apostles, by the founder of the religion. A part of this deposit got into writing during the lifetime of some of those

who were hearers of the Founder's preaching; a very much greater part did not get into writing in that age, or if some part of it did get into writing beyond the apostolic documents that are extant, that part has not come down to us. But the words of the Founder — again such is the theory — were treasured in faithful hearts, and were passed down from generation to generation in divers forms. One form would be, as defined in Article 35 of the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles, "customs, rites, forms, and ceremonies." Another form of this tradition is the writings of the "fathers" and "doctors," in every age, those "fathers" and "doctors" being taken to represent the belief of the Church in the successive ages. Similarly, the common law of England is a body of judgments and precedents handed down from one generation of legists to another, and piously believed to be the express image of Justice, as far as human creatures are capable of conceiving of justice. By the way, it is nothing short of a vulgar error to depreciate tradition *qua* tradition; it is also a vulgar error to suppose that by tradition is meant a stock of old wives' tales passed by word of mouth from generation to generation. All history is tradition; very nearly all of science is tradition. We hold our English speech from tradition. Our moral law, our creeds, our prejudices are traditional.

12. Cure, Curate. By an obvious process, the verb to cure (Latin *curo*), from the same source as Anglo-Saxon *caru*, anxiety, and meaning originally "to care for," as does a physician or a sick-nurse, came to denote "making whole" or "healing," that being

what is expected of the medico, and what he is supposed to do. To the honor of the medical profession be it said, the change of meaning was not effected by the "practitioners," but by their ignorant clients, — the term clients is used with apologies to the Green Bag, its rightful owner. Similarly the redoubtable portent Priestcraft is the product of ignorance and superstition in the people, rather than of lust of power on the part of the people's spiritual guides. It is questionable whether the priesthood could stand if it set about rooting out all superstition; and *populus vult decipi: decipiatur* — the people love to be humbugged; humbugged let them be — is a rule of practical common-sense. For is not the priest bid to use discretion in this matter? Saith the wiseman: "Be not righteous overmuch, neither make thyself overwise; why shouldest thou destroy thyself?" Why indeed? "Cure" of souls means care of souls; and Curate means "one having cure of souls." In Spanish, the parish priest is the *cura*, literally, "the cure" or "the care," as we call petty magistrates "justices." In French, the etymological equivalent of curate is *curé* (Latin *curatus*), and *curê* means parish priest. But the English "curate," of the same derivation as *curê*, means, not parish priest, nor the equivalent, rector, but assistant or *locum tenens* of the rector. It was not always so. In the English Book of Common Prayer, curate, in at least one place, stands for the general term, "one having cure of souls;" and in a parish the one who pre-eminently has such cure, and who is therefore *curatus*, is the rector. This employment of the word denoting most sacred responsibility to designate, not the person on whom the responsi-

bility *ex vi termini* devolves, but his subaltern, his substitute, his "man," "crystallizes" a whole history of simonies; it is reminiscent of a state of things — and that state of things has still a vigorous existence — in which one man had all the honors and all the emoluments of a church benefice (say the same of public office, and even of place in non-public business), while a pittanced helper had all the work and all the care. The phrase "cure of souls" may now fairly be said to be obsolete. So obsolete is it, that when an American Episcopal minister, returned from a brief visit to the Philippines, gave out in print an account of his observations there, telling of the prospects of his own sect in the islands, and spoke of a cure here and a cure there, meaning pastorate, one of the foremost newspapers of New York, in reprinting passages from the narrative, carefully changed in several places cure to curé, thus changing sense into nonsense, but displaying an acquaintance, if not with English, at least with the outward form of a foreign word.

13. The expression Mensal Church, when its signification is understood, recalls passages in ancient history telling of the manner in which the Great King rewarded his favorites or distinguished Grecian renegados or exiles; as when Artaxerxes assigned to Themistocles three opulent towns for his maintenance, one, Magnesia, for his bread, the second, Myus, for his viands or meat, and Lampsacus, for his drink. Men called a spade a spade in those unsophisticated times, and when a satrap came into office he knew, and everybody knew, as Mr. Flannagan of Texas knew (and, like Mr. Flannagan of Texas, honestly

confessed), that he was there for the profits. The term Mensal Church is in effect an honest confession (which is always "good for the soul") that the loaves and fishes of church preferment are very substantial things, and have weight in the balance. The authority given by "Cassell's Encyclopædic Dictionary" for the use of the term Mensal Church, is this passage from McClintock and Strong's "Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature": "Prior to the Reformation in Scotland, when the revenue of a bishopric" — the cyclopædia says popish bishopric, but why say popish, seeing that there were no non-popish bishoprics? — "arose from the annexation of parish churches, those allotted to the bishop himself were called Mensal Churches, as furnishing his table." The Mensal Churches supplied timber for the prelatical maw. There is a charming frankness in the expression; there is the same frankness when, in our own day, and in "the mother country," a cure of souls is officially called "a living," that is, a livelihood, one's bread and butter, and one's other creature comforts. It is reported in profane circles that cures of souls are quoted high or low *in foro ecclesiastico* — the church market — as compared with a purely sublunary standard.

14. Shrine is the Latin word *scrinium* with but little change of meaning. *Scrinium* is a derivate of the verb *scribere*, to write, and denoted a box or chest to hold books and other writings; secondarily, it signified a chest or casket in general. It came into use in English as scrin or scrine; but from the first took on the specific meaning of reliquary or casket to hold sacred relics. That was the signification of

the word, while ever relics of saints were venerated in England. Afterward, the word shrine was used, but improperly, to designate "any place or object hallowed by its associations or history." But what analogy can there be imagined between a box containing bones of dead saints, and the house of Mrs. B—— in Venice, which "has become a shrine for distinguished foreigners"? The poet Spenser recalls the primary meaning of *scrinium;* he entreats the chief of the Nine Muses—

> "Lay forth of thine everlasting scryne
> The antique rolles which there lye hidden still."

15. Piety. This word occurs once only in the English Bible of King James, viz., in 1 Tim. v. 4: "If any widow hath children or grandchildren, let them learn to show piety toward their own family;" the Revised Version retains the word. Wherever else in the original Greek the same verb or noun occurs which in this passage is rendered Piety, the Authorized Version has "godliness." But what is the meaning of piety in the above passage? Evidently kindness in the etymological sense, natural affection. This is precisely the root meaning of *pius* and *pietas* in Latin: piety in the religious sense is the application of the word to a slightly different order of things. Every tiro in Latin knows of the "pious" Eneas — pious, as being dutiful and loving to his father Anchises. We find a similar use of *pius* and *pietas* in the celebrated hymn *Dies Irae:*

> "Qui salvandos salvas gratis
> Salva me, Fons Pietatis—"

who savest freely them that are to be saved, save thou me, O fount of natural affection (or of kindliness). In the next stanza of the hymn we have

"Recordare Jesu Pie —"

remember kindly Jesu. A trace of this meaning of Piety, and more than a trace, persists still in the derivates of *pietas*, as in pity, pitiful. Loan offices have in Italian the name *monti di pietà*, and in French are *monts de piété*. In Christian symbolism, the Pelican is the type of Jesu's kindly regard for man, — the Pelican nourishing its young with the blood that trickles from the self-given wound in its own breast; and in another ancient hymn of the Catholic Church the Redeemer is thus invoked:

"Pie Pelicane Jesu Domine —"

Kindly Pelican, O Jesu Lord.

16. Kind (from which is "kindly") is a very notable word. As a substantive, it denotes nature and human nature; as an adjective (kind, kindly), it denotes feelings and sentiments dictated by nature and human nature. Hence, kindness in its true and widest sense means philanthropy, but how much finer is that homely Saxon word. It is much indeed to recognize the bond of a common nature between great and small, poor and rich, lettered and simple; but it is a finer thing to recognize the obligation of that bond in the adjective "kindly." A fourteenth century author whose use of ancient English words we have had frequent occasion to cite as of high authority, namely, the recluse of Norwich, uses nearly always "kind," "kindly," "unkind," in the sense of

nature, natural, unnatural; *e.g.*, "Sin is contrarious to our fair kind;" also "sin is unkind."

17. Atonement is used many times in the Old Testament and once in the New; but there the Revised Version throws it out and substitutes "reconciliation," which in the English of the present day is the term to render the Greek word in Rom. v. 11. In the English of to-day, and ever since the publication of King James's Bible, Atonement means making amends, paying a penalty, expiation; for that is the sense of the word everywhere in that version, with the one exception noted. It is probable that the hybrid word Atonement, in the sense of expiation, makes its first appearance in that Bible, though the word from which it is formed occurs in Spenser in the verbal form atone, atoned, with the meaning of become reconciled for the verb, and reconciled, made friends, for the participle; and in writers two hundred and fifty years earlier than Spenser, we find the verb "to one" with the verbal substantive form oneing or oning, meaning union, making one. Atone itself is equal to "at one," therefore in agreement: enemies who become reconciled are "at one"; this is the true etymological sense of atonement — reconciliation; and King James's translators make a true use of the word at Rom. v. 11. But their own course all through the Hebrew Scriptures, in signifying by that same word, not reconcilement but expiation, made expiation the dominant sense, and the word no longer conveyed any other meaning but expiation: survival of the fittest, *i. e.* of the unfit, as usual, was the result, and the revisers of 1880 had to do capital execution on the word where it retained its true sense — the sense it had for Shakespeare: —

"He seeks to make atonement
Between the Duke of Gloucester and your brothers;"

and put the Latinish word reconciliation in its room.

18. The fortunes of the Greek word *episkopos* in its migrations into innumerable languages are curious enough to merit the honors of a monograph; a few glimpses of the word's history will suffice in this place. In passing into Latin, it suffered just the slightest touch of alteration, and became *episcopus*. But before the history of its travesties as a complex of alphabetic letters is touched, its first travesty of meaning must be noted. In Greek *episkopos* means overseer precisely (*epi*, over or upon, *skopos*, looking). It entered the New Testament with form unchanged, and for all that the context there shows or hints, with meaning unchanged; it is still *episkopos* and it is still overseer. Now for a moment descend the stream of time for a distance of about fifteen and a half centuries, and read the instructions under which the translators of the Authorized English New Testament wrought, and there will be found a prohibition to translate *episkopos* by overseer (they disregarded the rule in at least one place, Acts xx. 28); that prohibition is significant of change. Ascending the stream toward its source, we hear at intervals the voice of an *episkopos* claiming sovereignty over princes and peoples, the whole world over, and find that *episkopos* actually exercising power greater and as irresponsible, even in secular affairs, as those of Augustus Caesar; the overseership had grown considerably in ten or twelve hundred years or so, and declined considerably after that; but it has not yet come down to the hard pan of its original simplicity. But our

concern is rather with the word *episcopus*, than with the thing *episcopatus*. So then the word which begins as *episkopos* becomes *episcopus*, and then (not to follow chronological order, nor even traceable genealogy), *biskup* (Icel.), *biscof* (Swed.), *bischof* (Ger.), *bishop* (Eng.), *easbuig* (Gaelic), *êvêque* (Fr.), *vescovo* (Ital.), *obisbo* (Span.), *bispo* (Port.), *asgob* (Welsh), *vesque* (Provençal). The French *êvêque*, equivalent to *eveq*, is likely to strike most readers as the farthest departure from *episkopos*, for the only letter common to the two forms is the comparatively insignificant initial vowel — which however is accented, but for what reason it were not easy to say; that e is clipped off in the kindred Provençal, and in nearly all the other languages also. Yet inasmuch as v is very near allied to p, and qu is equivalent to k, and the circumflex over ê indicates elision of s at some former time, *êvêque* really represents pretty fairly *epesk*, which shows much of the essentials of the original word. The surname Gillespie, anciently spelled Gillespic, has for its first syllable the word that we spell gillie, and for its two last syllables the Gaelic for bishop, *easbuig*.

19. Everybody knows that the three words Clergy, Clerk, Clerical, are from one original source, and that Clerk (in England commonly pronounced clark) once had the same meaning as Cleric. Thus Clerk or Clark once meant precisely Clergyman, and the phrase "clerk in holy orders" is still current; literally, it means clerk or cleric or clergyman who has been admitted to holy orders. But is it not pleonastic to add to clerk (clergyman) the phrase "in holy orders" or "in orders"? It is pleonastic, as the terms clerk, clergyman, and cleric are understood to-day and as

"orders" and "holy orders" are understood. But all those words and those phrases came into use in a time when "clergy" denoted the status of a man who takes the first step in the ecclesiastical career, a step then four removes from the holy or major orders: he became a "cleric" or "clerk" when he received the ecclesiastical tonsure, which is not an "order" at all; and he might rest there, and proceed no farther in the ecclesiastical career, yet would he be a clergyman, with all the rights, privileges and immunities of clergy, as truly as the Archbishop of Canterbury, or the Pope of Rome. That man might after the tonsure receive as many as four ecclesiastical orders, and yet not be a "clerk in holy orders," or in "orders," — for in the phrase the word "orders" was always used of the "holy" or "sacred" orders, viz., the subdiaconate, diaconate, presbyterate, and episcopate: the four lower orders are the "minor" orders. But in the Church of England, as it exists, the first of the orders conferred is the diaconate, and a man who has not received that order is not a clerk, cleric, or clergyman at all, but a layman; therefore clergyman, in strict propriety of language, cannot mean anything in the Anglican system but one who has received holy orders; and hence "clerk in holy orders" is on that system tautology.

20. It may be worth while to look into the etymology of the word Clergy. The root of the matter is in the Greek word *kleros*, lot, portion of an inheritance. By some students of ecclesiology, the clergy (*clerus*) is so called because in choosing a disciple to fill the place of Judas, and on other like occasions, the apostles cast lots (*kleroi*). That casting of lots may

have had to do with the adoption of the word *kleros;* but there is good ground for a different view, which refers *kleros* back to *kleros* in the sense of portion of an inheritance. This view is founded on passages in the books of the levitical law, Numbers and Deuteronomy; as when "The Lord spake unto Aaron . . . I am thy part and thine inheritance" (inheritance in the Septuagint, *kleronomia*); and when it is declared that the tribe of Levi "shall have no inheritance (Sept. *kleros*) among their brethren: the Lord is their inheritance" (Sept. *kleros*). That those passages of the Hebrew books decided the use of the word *kleros, clerus,* to signify the clergy, appears from the form of words employed by the candidate for induction into clergy by the rite of tonsure: "*Dominus pars haereditatis meae* (in Greek *kleru meu*) *et calicis mei,*" The Lord is the portion of mine inheritance and of my cup.

21. Blaspheme, with its derivatives, is from Greek *blasphemeo,* to revile. In Greek neither the verb nor its noun forms have any special theologic signification; and the Greek who wished to say that a man was guilty of blasphemy — as the word is understood by us — would have to give definiteness to the term by adding "against the Gods." The word and the thought come to us through the Vulgate from the Greek New Testament. But, with form strangely altered, it descends to us from the Vulgate through the French language also; and thus we have in English two lineages of words from the Greek words *blasphemeo, blasphemia,* one of which might well be called the legitimate and the other the illegitimate line of descent. As already remarked, the legitimate line

is descended from the language of the New Testament direct; it therefore clings to the theological sense: nevertheless some Grecizing English writers appear to have used the word Blasphemy in the sense of mere revilement or slander. Thus does the word "revert," as the Darwinists say, to "the ancestral form" or the ancestral meaning; it is a case of "atavism." The atavistic "sport" however had little vitality, and it is as good as extinct now. Contrariwise, the illegitimate line appears to have reverted to the ancestral stock in classic Greek very early, and it still possesses a strong vitality; herein it repeats the phenomenon not infrequently seen in human stocks, the illegitimate progeny showing a vigorous bodily and mental and moral constitution, while the legitimate is in every sense puny. This illegitimate line had its rise in the Norman-French verb *blasmer*, modern French *blâmer;* its English form is monosyllabic, Blame. The meaning of Blame is just that of its original, *blasphemeo,* in classic Greek, but less strong; not reviling but faulting, censuring. The illegitimate line is incomparably more fertile of compound and derivative forms than the legitimate.

22. Miscreant illustrates in its derivative meanings — and the derivative meanings alone survive, the etymological meanings are most effectually obsolete — the prejudice through which we regard those who differ with us in matters of religious belief. The genesis and early history of this word will be best given in the words of Archbishop Trench: "To the Crusades and to the intense hatred which they aroused throughout Christendom against the Mahometan infidels" — here Trench is of course using the

word "infidel," not as he understands it, but as it was understood by the crusaders — "we owe Miscreant as designating one to whom the vilest principles and practice are ascribed," — though primarily and etymologically miscreant means only "having a wrong belief," heterodox, heretical. In another place the archbishop writes: "When Shakespere makes the gallant York address Joan of Arc as a Miscreant, how coarse a piece of invective this sounds; how unlike what the chivalrous soldier would have uttered; or what Shakespere, even with his unworthy estimate of the holy warrior-maid, would have been likely to put into his mouth. But the Miscreant of Shakespere's time was not the Miscreant of ours, . . . but simply a misbeliever." Thus Archbishop Trench. But Shakespere makes York say to the Maid:

> "Break thou in pieces, and consume to ashes,
> Thou foul accursed minister of hell;"

and he says her life was "wicked and vile," and calls her "strumpet." Plainly Shakespere employs the word in the very worst senses of which it is capable; the synonyms of Miscreant given in the dictionaries are terms of honor compared with Miscreant as understood by Shakespere's Duke of York.

23. Renegade is in the same case with "miscreant." A Renegade is one who has recanted one religious creed, and adopted another; for that one reason, it matters not what the man's life may have been, he is "a worthless, abandoned fellow; false and traitorous." It would seem to be only a beneficent exercise of the power of life and death if society, the state, should order to the flames all such worthless, vile, detestable creatures.

24. Scandal and Slander are both from the Greek New Testament word *skandalon*. The original meaning of *skandalon* is the stick which carries the bait in a trap; a secondary meaning is, the trap itself. Throughout classic Greek literature the idea of snares and stratagems is always associated with *skandalon* and its derivatives; in that literature it is never used in the peculiar sense which it has in the New Testament, that of stumbling-block. The Greek word has two translations in the Authorized Version of the New Testament, stumbling-block and offense (offence): but as equivalent to *skandalon*, the word "offense" has a meaning different from the current meaning of offense; it means that which causes stumbling in the moral sense, which causes moral lapses, or tends to cause them; it does not mean giving umbrage, causing displeasure. The use of "offense" for scandal, stumbling, stumbling-block, by the translators of the Authorized Version was a serious error; the common people never understood the word in that sense; the new Revised Version everywhere consistently translates *skandalon* by stumbling or stumbling-block. The English word Scandal did not come into use through the Authorized Version, for it does not once occur in that version. It perpetuates very little of the original meaning of the New Testament Greek *skandalon;* its import in the language of the people is very clearly seen in the current meaning of Scandalous, viz., offensive to propriety, also defamatory, slanderous: meanings quite unknown to the writers of the New Testament books, and very plainly not intended by them. Had they meant the things expressed by our word offense, as now understood by

us, or the things we mean by offensive or defamatory, the whole Greek vocabulary was at their command for precise and unequivocal designation. But they rejected the Greek vocabulary with its fixed definitions of words, and though they did not coin a new word, they did what was in effect the same thing: they took a word already in the language, the word *skandalon*, and attached to it a meaning it never had in Greek, — the meaning of stumbling-block or stumbling-stone, a cause or occasion of sinning. Hence *skandalon* was a technical word of their religious system; as such it was adopted by the authors of the Vulgate, and by all the fathers and divines of both the Eastern and Western churches. The Revised English New Testament does not admit the word, but instead of translating the Greek noun and verb, by "offense," "give offense," it has for the noun *skandala*, occasions of stumbling, and for the verb, *cause to stumble*, thus giving back to the passage Luke xvii. 1, its original meaning.

25. The perverted meaning of the word is more clearly expressed by another English form of the Greek *skandalon*, viz., Slander, which means defamation only. Thanks to the blunder of the translators of King James's time, the evangelic term Scandal is totally lost in English. One looks in the dictionaries in vain for even a hint that Scandal had ever in the English or in any language the meaning of setting of a trap for another, the putting a block or a stone in his path over which he shall stumble and fall, the setting a bad example to others whereby they shall be led into sin; but such precisely are the meanings of *skandalon* in the New Testament.

Section VII.

WORD-PAIRS, SYNONYMS, ANALOGUES.

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1. ASTONISH and Astound are variant forms of a word derived from Latin *attonitus*, struck by a thunderbolt or lightning. Astonied and stonied are earlier forms of Astonished; of course the "stonied" led to a ludicrous derivation from "stone." Before the Latin word *attonitus* came into Old French, it was already much weathered and worn, as regards its signification, and denoted effects hardly less trivial than our word *astonished*. But in classic Latin it never ceased, while acquiring figurative meanings, to be used in the literal sense of thunderstruck, paralyzed by a thunderbolt. With us the literal sense is quite lost, and even the native word, expressive of the notion "struck by lightning," namely, thunderstruck, no longer is used even by poets in the literal sense; in fact, thunderstruck is almost gone out of use except as a half-comic word. Of the two words, astonish and astound, the latter is by far the more expressive, and retains more of the original force of the Latin *attonitus*. When this Latinish word came into our mother tongue, we had already in the Anglo-Saxon vocabulary a word of essentially the same force and meaning as astonish and astound, namely, stun, to make dizzy, to strike senseless, as with a blow

on the head: meanings which the word still fully retains. The two participial forms, Astonied and Astonished, are found in King James's Bible used in precisely one same sense. There the sense of stupefied is given in many places to the past participle astonished, where one might perhaps look rather for astonied, *e.g.*, Jer. xiv. 9: "O Lord . . . why shouldest thou be as a man astonished, as a mighty man that cannot save?" So, too (Acts ix. 6), Paul, "trembling and astonished, said." But, Dan. iv. 19: "Daniel was astonied for an hour." What can be the meaning of Astonishment in Ezek. iv. 16 and 17: "Drink water with astonishment; be astonied one with another"? If "Astonied" had been used to express the prophet's state of mind, when told to eat a rather nauseous manna (verse 12), the word would be apt, but perhaps not quite forceful enough.

2. Both in lack and want, need is implied; neither of the two words expresses simply not having. One may be free from financial cares; but unless he wishes to have such cares, he does not lack them or want them. But a prominent journal in its editorial page has the phrase "lack of financial cares." Even when we say two-score wanting two, or lacking two, we do not say that it is without two, for it has many times two, but that it needs two for completeness.

3. High, tall, and lofty, both in their etymological and their figurative meanings, are largely interchangeable, — for example, a high mountain or a lofty mountain; a tall tree or a high tree. In figurative meanings, lofty has usually an implication of haughtiness, arrogance, as a lofty air; but it is also used in the sense of sublime, dignified. There appears to be

in usage a tendency to say tall instead of high, when a person's definite stature is spoken of: six foot (or feet) tall. The phrase is probably without warrant in the usage of correct writers of English; tall would seem to be like low or short, a term not definable by precise measures; to express the absolute measure of tallness, we use terms of height; not so of comparative tallness: A is an inch taller than B. Lofty is a derivate of a word *lyft*, air, sky, cognate with the German *Luft*, air; it well expresses haughtiness, pride; and only once in the English Bible is it used, save in an invidious sense. The cant phrase or vulgarism tall talk, gives to tall the signification of lofty. George Washington, in writing a personal description of himself, says he is "six feet high, and rather slender than thick;" he writes "high" where some new word-fanciers would have "tall," and he also has "thick" where we should write "stout." The dominant meaning of stout now is corpulent, thickset: not so when Washington was a young man; stout then meant primarily strong and courageous.

4. Palliate and Extenuate are as near perfect synonomy as two words can well be; one can always, without serious violation of the proprieties of speech, be substituted for the other. Nevertheless, writers who study precision in the use of words, do not use these two indifferently, one for the other. To palliate a crime or offence is to cover it as with a cloak (*pallium*), so disguising it and hiding its features. The crimes of Robin Hood are, in the popular ballads, palliated with the cloak of a virtuous desire to even up the social conditions of the people of England: there was bloodshed and all manner of violence, but Robin and

his hundred incomparable archers were crusading against wrong. As a knight-errant of the cause of the poor, he was celebrated in song, not as a robber and cutthroat. These crimes were "extenuated" in the same ballads, their atrocity made to appear less, by citation of Robin's instructions to Lytel Jhon:

> "Loke ye do no housbonde harme
> That tylleth with his plough;"

and of his respect for womanhood: he would

> "never do company harme
> That ony woman was ynne."

He did "bete and bynd" bishops and archbishops, and stripped lordly abbots bare, but with the plunder he enriched the poor. Extenuate means, literally, to make thin, to dilute, and figuratively, to make appear less serious, less blameworthy, etc. Extenuation, then, cannot mean excuse for the doing of an act. But in that sense is the word used in this sentence: "A short ice-crop is pleaded in extenuation for a raid on the people's pockets."

5. Type, Prototype, Antitype. The word Type is perhaps one of the most familiar of all words of Greek origin; first, because it designates the basis — movable types — of the art preservative of arts; and, secondly, because, from immemorial ages forepast, whoever has studied the Greek grammar has undergone drill in conjugating the verb *typto*, whence our word. That verb *typto* means to strike, to hit; and the noun *typos*, signifies a blow, and also the effects of a blow, as an impress on the face of a coin; then, besides various other meanings, it denotes a pattern, model, after

which anything is fashioned. Hence prototype (*protos*, first) means the original design or model: *e.g.*, according to Hebrew story, Cain was the prototype of murderers; similarly, any man of eminence in any department may be called the type of his class, — as Washington is the type of the unselfish patriot. The antitype (*anti*, over against) is that which answers to the type or prototype, as the coin answers to the die by which it is struck off: Bolivar was the antitype of Washington; metal types are the antitypes of the matrices in which they are cast. All types must possess in an eminent degree the distinguishing characters of their class, must in a sense be its epitome. Type and typical are useful words; but men make of them cant phrases, so that we hear no more of kinds or species, but only of types. Instead of "slumming," idle folks now "note types."

6. Germane and German (as in cousin-german) are one same word, like humane and human. The original meaning is "of the same parents," at least of the same father; but it is used also in the sense of "from the same grandparents:" hence, cousin-german. *Germanus* and *germana*, nouns, have in Latin the significations, brother and sister; in Spanish, the true Latin word for brother, *frater*, became *fraile*; but in time *fraile* was applied to brethren of religious orders exclusively, — the friars or freres, and the natural relationship had to be expressed by a word formed from *germanus*: thus brother, brotherhood, in Spanish are *hermano, hermandad.* In Italian, too, the word formed from *frater*, viz., *frate*, went out of use as an expression of blood brotherhood, and was applied only to friars; then the brother by nature was called

fratello, meaning little brother. Surely this is very curious.

7. Execute, Exequatur, and Exequies are all from the Latin verb *exsequor*, to follow to the end. To execute a commission is to carry it out to the end; he who carries out the provisions of a last will is its executor, but is called also executor of the deceased, as the carrier-out of a capital sentence was once called executor, and now "executioner," of the man he kills; the department of government which carries the laws of the legislature and the decrees of courts into effect is the executive; the following of a corpse to the grave was, in Latin, *exsequiae*, exequies, but we say "obsequies;" the Latins had no word *obsequiae* in this sense, though they had a verb *obsequor*. Obsequor was not used in the sense of rendering funeral service; from it is our word obsequious, which, like *obsequor*, denotes compliance, but, in common use, obsequious implies servility. *Exsequatur* or *exequatur* means, literally, "let him carry out or perform" this or that.

8. The pair of words Foreign and Outlandish are exact counterparts etymologically. At one time they were used as synonyms; but now, though they both mean "belonging to other lands," one, Outlandish, takes note of what in foreign men, manners, morals, customs, or costume is distinctive or peculiar, only to spurn them and condemn them, or to mark their divergence from the normal standards of morality, propriety, etc., that is, from the home standards; for it is ever so: orthodoxy is our doxy; their doxy is heterodoxy. The other word, Foreign, while noting divergencies from the same standards, is not so bigoted

that it will condemn as absolutely abnormal all departures from the home fashion. Foreign is the more liberal word — liberal in the sense of "becoming a man of liberal education"; Outlandish, in its now received sense, expresses the view of the boor and the ill-educated. In German *ausländisch* expresses the notion "foreign," or "from abroad" with both its liberal and boorish meanings. When travelled Englishmen are called "outlandish and unnatural English," there is no necessary reflection upon foreign manners and usages, but only on English apes of foreign fashions.

9. Custom and Costume are doublets — one vocable in two forms. The Latin verb *consuesco*, to grow used to anything, is their source, and the Latin noun equivalent to custom or use and wont is *consuetudo*, whence English consuetude. Costume is customary attire, habitual dress. The same distinction exists in French between *costume* and *coutume;* but the distinction is not ancient, for a poaching fisher is said in French to fish against the *costume:* proof that formerly *costume* and *coutume* were one in signification. The hecatombs of human victims that used to be sacrificed by the Kings of Dahomey to the manes of their venerated deceased sires were called pleasantly, The Custom : in nearly all civilized countries it is still the Custom (or customs) to compel merchants who enter their ports or their gates to part with a share of their goods. The name given to this practice indicates the ground on which it is justified, Custom: it has ever been so. The tax on exports is also rightly denominated custom. In mercantile business every buyer is called customer, though he

comes but once to the mart. Custom (*consuetudo*) is one of the recognized fountains of law (*jus*); in the Roman jurisprudence, custom under certain conditions abrogates positive laws; in the English economy of law, the only mode of abrogation is by formal legal expunging of the statute.

10. Aggravate and Aggrieve are both from the Latin *gravis*, heavy; the first comes to us direct from the Latin verb *aggravo*, and the other from an obsolete French verb *agrever*; these two had one same signification of making heavy. Our adjectives grave and grievous, our nouns grief, grievance, gravity, and our verb grieve are derived from *gravis*. The primary meaning of *gravis* being "heavy," the verb *ag-gravo* means literally to make heavier, to *add* weight; but in this literal sense of increasing the burden, as of a ship or a sumpter horse, *aggravo* is little used in Latin, the figurative sense superseding it, *e.g.*, *vulnus aggravare*, to make a wound more painful or more serious. This signification of making an ill condition worse is the only one in which the verb Aggravate is properly used; it is a vulgarism to employ the word in the sense of annoying, causing pain or grief. That signification belongs properly to the form aggrieve. In aggrieve the element *ad* of the Latin verb *aggravo* (equal to *ad-gravo*, to burden additionally) loses its significance, and the word means to cause grief, pain, or annoyance. But the simple verb form grieve is a stronger word than aggrieve. A wayward son may "aggravate" the sorrows of his widowed mother and so grieve her; and the mother is then rightly said to be "grieved," not "aggrieved." Aggrieving may be superficial; grieving is in the heart; aggrieved implies

some degree of resentment of injury; the broken-hearted mother's grief has no such implication. The subject of the verb aggravate may be a person, or it may be any condition, thing, or object whatsoever: not so with aggrieve; here the agent is always a person, and the act of aggrieving is essentially a moral act. Present usage does not approve the use of aggravate in the sense of magnifying or exaggerating faults or foibles into crimes; but we rightly say that faults and offences are aggravated by the agent's deliberate commission of them.

11. Obeisance and Obedience are forms of the Latin *obedientia*. Obeisance has much the same relation to obedience that curtsey has to courtesy; it is the ceremonial expression of obedience. The liegeman testifies by obeisance that he is *obedient* to his lord. By courtesy we are all each other's obedient servants, and we make obeisance accordingly. There is a peculiar use of the word obedience in church history. In the great schism of the fourteenth century the rival claimants of successorship to Saint Peter had each his following, and the followers of each claimant constituted his obedience, the faction obedient to his commands, just as a number of listeners is an audience. The High Church party of the Anglican Church apply the term obedience to the whole body of Christians who acknowledge the papal supremacy; this is the Roman Obedience; for the same High Church party the Anglican Obedience comprises all "Catholic-minded" members of Anglican churches. In German and Latin, "to hear is to obey." The Latin verb for obey is *obedio* (*ob*, toward, *audio*, hear); and the corresponding German verb is of like

formation: *gehorchen*, from *ge*, intensive, *horchen*, listen (primary form *hören*, hear). *Ge* and *hören* form another verb, *gehören*, which in the literal sense would be a close parallel to *obedio;* but, by a fine trope, it is used to mean belong: *der Stuhl gehört mir*, the chair belongs to me.

12. Necessity, Necessaries. These two nouns appear to be employed in correct usage (when spoken of things needful) as though they were the singular and plural forms of one word. Food is a necessity: food is one of the necessaries of life. It is more correct to say necessaries of life than necessities of life: it is more logical also, for necessities (Latin, *necessitates*) is an abstract noun, while the necessaries of life are proverbially concrete — they are the substantials. Not that the (formal) abstract character of a term should bar its use to express a concrete thing where need requires; for innumerable nouns abstract in sense and in their form are in the best usage employed to signify concrete notions; but a just linguistic conscience will abate the evil where possible. As in affairs, so in language, the best has often to be compromised away; best "the enemy of good" (as the French finely say), having to make what terms it can with "good," "less good," "indifferent," even with "bad," nay, with "worst;" for "worst" in no small proportion of cases is "fittest," as is proved beyond cavil or dispute by its "surviving." In the present instance is seen such compromise. After logic and the language-conscience have had conceded to them Necessaries, they, in return, as a *modus vivendi*, have to accept for expression of a concrete notion the abstract noun Necessity.

13. The only valid reason for the existence in the language of the two verbs Awake and Awaken would seem to be the desire to express in different terms the two different actions of coming out of sleep and arousing from sleep. This intention is frustrated when awake and awaken are both used to signify simply the spontaneous passage from sleep to waking. Wake and Watch are one word originally which came to be differently pronounced for different meanings; the primary sense is being awake. The night-watch are men who wake while others sleep; when the dead are waked, they are watched, attended by a wakeful company; a pocket-watch tells the hours as does the night-watchman going his rounds; the watches of the night are the divisions of the night portioned out to relays of guards or sentinels; on shipboard the whole day of twenty-four hours is divided into watches or spells of duty.

14. Subtil or Subtile and Subtle are variant forms from Latin *subtilis*. Usage seems to have determined for subtil or subtile the signification of tenuous, fine-spun, impalpable, imponderous, chiefly in the literal sense, as "the subtile web of the spider," "electricity, a subtile fluid," "subtile effluences." On the other hand, subtle has in usage lost its literal meanings, and retains the metaphorical only. These metaphorical meanings imply either intellectual acumen simply, or cunning and craft with malice. The word Subtil and its derivatives subtilty, subtility, always in the English Bible denote craftiness and malice.

15. Bewray, a word identical in meaning with Betray, is used once in the English New Testament of 1610; "thy speech bewrayeth thee." There was

good reason for not putting here "thy speech betrayeth," viz., that the original Greek in this place (Matt. xxvi. 73) has an expression different from betray, it has *delon poiei*, — Latin *manifestum facit*, makes (thee) manifest; the phrase is very well and faithfully rendered in the Rhemish Version "thy speech doth discover thee." Bewray was very little in use when the King James's Version was made, consequently it was not generally understanded of the people in the early seventeenth century, and it may be said to be now obsolete. Why then is it retained in the new revision, one of the declared purposes of which was to make the books more easily understandable by substituting living for antiquated words? It cannot be pleaded for Bewray that it denotes only discovery without connotation of perfidy; the most ancient use of the word, on the contrary, favors the sense of perfidious discovery of secrets, as in the rules of the mediæval guilds we find mention of those who Bewray the guild's counsels. When Longfellow wishes to express the thought of unintentional betrayal, he says Betray, not Bewray.

> "That our tardy flight should be betrayed
> By the sound our horses' hoofbeats made."

16. Slick and Sleek are one word with its vowel made short in one form, long in the other, and they both mean smooth. But Sleek is used rather to denote smoothness as a tactual or a visual sensation. "If a cattles skin be sleke and gay;" while Slick denotes smoothness of surface with reference mainly to facility of movement: hence, slipperiness. In their figurative senses, the two forms also differ: Sleek de-

notes smoothness or plausibility of personal address and exterior, — "a sleek hypocrite"; Slick rather denotes plausibility, as an attribute of a story, an excuse, a project, a scheme, etc.

17. The Greeks had a goddess Peitho, whose name is rendered Persuasion: they had also in their vocabulary a verb *peitho*, to persuade; to ask which of these two is prior were an impiety, and the etymologist must needs award priority to the goddess. The Latins, on their part, had a goddess, Suada, and a verb *suadeo*, name and verb being equivalent to the Greek Peitho. But of priority there is now no question; the verb antedates the goddess, for documentary proof exists of this deity having been hand-made to order by the poet Ennius, about B. C. 200. The etymology of Persuade is interesting. There is a probable kinship between *suadeo*, to win by talking, and *suavis*, sweet, agreeable; and the Greek *hedys*, of like import, would seem to be of the same family. However that may be, Suasion, Persuasion, is the effect of appeals addressed mainly to the heart; while the word Conviction, from *convinco*, to conquer, tells of battles won in the clash of mind with mind. In usage the two verbs, persuade and convince, have been held pretty strictly to their etymological signification, as have also been the respective nouns; but the best authors have employed the past participle persuaded, where etymology would dictate convinced.

18. Emergency, Exigency, Urgency. The meaning often given to Emergency, viz., a crisis, a critical juncture, has no foundation in the etymology of the word, and is doubtless due to "induction" or influence of the other two words here linked with it.

Emergency, emergent, are from Latin *emergo*, to emerge, to rise or project out of water. In the figurative sense, emergency would be about synonymous with occasion or occurrence, if the notion of unexpectedness be added. We may foresee an occasion, *i. e.*, anything that befalls, before we come face to face with it; and the same may be said of occurrence, literally, that which runs to meet us; we may dodge a bomb-shell as it hurtles through the air; we may step aside when a runaway team is approaching. But what emerges, as the dorsal fin of a shark, gives no sign till it rises out of the medium in which it was before sunk: hence, the notion of unexpectedness, suddenness, is inherent in the notion of emergency. Besides the influence of the like-sounding words urgency and exigency, this note of suddenness may have also helped to give to emergency the meaning of "a critical moment," a call for action on the instant. The Latin has no noun *Emergentia* formed like emergency, nor even one like emersion, and neither the verb nor its noun *emersus* has any connotation of urgency or exigency. In the phrase "emergent occasion" as commonly used, the adjective is understood to signify "pressing," "urgent," but in correct usage, and as the phrase is understood by those who read words in their true sense, it has not that meaning: it signifies only an occasion that presents itself. It might not be easy to find a pair of words more perfectly synonymous than emergency in the abusive sense of "pressing necessity for action," "crisis," and exigency.

19. Crabb's discrimination of exigency from emergency is futile and fallacious: it leads one to suspect

that Crabb had little acquaintance with the etymological history of the words he pronounces upon with such an air of infallibility. In determining the signification of the two words their etymology is of capital importance. Exigency is from the same Latin verb *exigo*, from which come our words exigent, exact, exaction; and it is first cousin to exegete, which is from Greek. Its etymological meaning is urgent demand, or urgency. But as we have seen, the root idea of emergency is occurrence, and at strongest, unexpected occurrence, with which came to be associated the idea of demand for action. Crabb nevertheless attributes to emergency imperiousness, and to exigency an inferior degree of pressure or urgence. The example he gives in illustration and confirmation of his view led him into an unconscious fallacy. So far is emergency, as used by accurate writers of English, from implying the idea of imperious necessity, a nice examination of the very passages cited to show that meaning, will rather prove the opposite conclusion, viz., that in such passages "emergency" means simply an unforeseen occasion: *e. g.*, Macaulay writes, "He never in any emergency lost even for a moment the perfect use of his admirable judgment;" in that sentence "unforeseen conjuncture" might fully replace emergency; and surely "unforeseen conjuncture" does not mean "imperious necessity." Urgency expresses the same notion as the Latin verb *urgeo*, to press, push, impel in a physical sense, but also in the moral sense. The fine metaphorical usage of *urgeo*, in the sense of pressing an opponent with arguments, is frequent in Cicero.

20. **Ingenious and Ingenuous, from one prime root**

in Latin, have severally preserved in English their individual characters in spite of their close approximation in sense and sound and spelling. They are in Latin *ingeniosus* (or *ingenuosus*) and *ingenuus*. *Ingeniosus* (ingenious) comes direct from *ingenium*, natural parts, character, or constitution moral and mental; *ingenuus* (ingenuous) is from a verb *ingeno*, to impart at birth, to implant, and the adjective means primarily, native; secondarily, free-born. Its signification in English is well-born, also well-bred; then candid, open, sincere, as becomes a free-born man. Ingenious signifies gifted with genius, ability, or cleverness — mental and intellectual qualities. The *ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha* was not without ingeniousness of a certain kind, but his maker was pleased to note rather his gentility, his being well-born and bred a gentleman: this quality he expresses by the epithet *ingenioso*, though on the basis of our distinction *ingenuoso* would have been called for. It is seen that the Spanish language does not follow the Latin usage. Perhaps it is not without significance that in Spanish, birth and breeding have precedence over ability to do.

21. Immediate, Direct, Indirect. The word-form and the notion Immediate presuppose the form and notion Mediate; but the dictionaries note upon Mediate that it is "dropped altogether out of use, or but rarely used." That is unfortunate, for the word served a good end while it was in the vocabulary, and no other word equally true and definite in meaning has succeeded to its room. Immediate does not mean direct; hence, the contrary of Immediate cannot be expressed by the contrary (or contradictory) of direct,

i. e., by indirect. Direct means, literally and figuratively, in a right line; indirect, by a line that is not right. Immediate means, literally and figuratively, "with no interval of time or space, without instrument;" and mediate means the opposite condition, of an intervening medium, agency, or instrument. The immediate effect of the revival of learning in the fifteenth century was a curiosity to know what was contained in the Greek and Latin classics. That knowledge opened vistas into new fields of speculative thought; speculative thought led to scepticism regarding much of the belief of Christendom: scepticism led to revolt against church authority. That revolt was immediately the effect of the scepticism, but mediately of the bringing of Greek MSS. from Byzantium, and of the Renascence; all the stages between were *media*. The genesis of Protestantism from the Renascence may have been direct, but it was not immediate. The sun's rays concentrated in a lens come to us not immediately from the sun, they are mediated, passing through a medium (the lens); neither do they come to us direct from the sun, for they are bent out of direct line by the lens. The energy stored in coal is from the sun, but mediately, not immediately. It is curious to observe that under a system of religious belief the foundation stone of which is Mediation, the term (of the selfsame origin) which denotes Mediation concretely should have gone into obsoletion. The very "love of the Father" is mediated *per Christum Jesum Dominum nostrum*, as the ancient liturgies have it. Prayers are addressed to the Father through the same Medium; they reach the Father mediately, not immediately. The whole

economy of the Christian religion is thus seen to be a Mediation; but we cannot, using live English words, say that this relation of the Christian to the Father is that which it is, Mediate. Direct (adv.) means in a straight line; directly has that same meaning, but it is also used in the sense of immediately, forthwith; direct is not so used. Direct is better than directly in such phrases as " he went direct to the hotel," " he rowed direct across the bay."

22. Travel and Travail have one origin, are one word; they are the French *travail*, work, labor. Till quite modern times, Travel and Travail were written indiscriminately, whichever meaning was in the writer's mind. Beaumont and Fletcher have " A woman that will sing a catch in her travel " — *i. e.*, while she works. In ancient times travel was travail indeed, and was fitly so named.

23. Rigid, Rigorous, Rigidity, Rigor, Rigorousness are all from one Latin root, found in the verb *rigeo*, to be stiff; also in the verb *frigeo*, to freeze (rigid and frigid are at root one, like melt and smelt); and the Greek verb *rigeo*, to shiver for cold, is of the same kin. Rigid and Rigidity have the one denotation, stiffness, mostly in the physical sense; Rigor, Rigorous, Rigorousness have mostly the metaphorical sense of inflexibility of will, austerity, severity. The surgeon's phrase *rigor mortis* (death stiffness) shows that in Latin the word *rigor* retains its literal physical sense. An author of high distinction in literature uses the phrase " rigid lives " in the sense of lives of austerity; he had better written rigorous.

24. Sordid is hardly used now in its etymological sense, dirty, filthy; but almost exclusively in the

secondary (or rather tertiary or quaternary) meanings of niggardly and regardful only of "filthy lucre." Squalid, on the other hand, though like Sordid it denotes in Latin (they are both of Latin origin) dirt, filth, figuratively as well as literally, is not used in English now except of material filth or of conditions implying filth. The difference in Latin between the two verbs *sordeo* and *squaleo* (and the corresponding nouns *sordes* and *squalor*) is that *squaleo* means specifically "to be stiff with dirt," the result of extreme slovenliness or lack of care; while *sordeo* means to be dirty from whatever cause. Those ancients must have had some experience of dirt that they should have coined terms to define its species.

25. Virtual and its adverb Virtually are rarely heard, being supplanted by Practical and its adverb Practically. But virtual and practical are not equivalent terms. The distinction is perhaps best seen in the use of the adverbs. The presiding officer of a deliberative assembly who is profoundly respected by the members is virtually present (though for the moment bodily absent) because of the influence of his authority; in such a case he is not properly said to be practically present. A fond mother has her child always virtually under her eye, not practically. But if the presiding officer is in telephonic connection with the assembly, so as to direct the action of a temporary substitute, he may be said to be practically present.

26. Time and Tide had originally one same meaning, with the difference that tide was rather season or a special division of time. Time is from Latin *tempus*, through French *temps*. Tide is the same

word as the German *Zeit* or the Dutch *tijd;* but as noted above, its meaning has been restricted in English. In eastertide, eventide, yuletide, we have survivals of the meaning "season." Tidings is exactly equivalent to German *Zeitung*, except that the English word is plural in form: both are equivalent to chronicle, of Greek derivation. Timely and Tidy, two words, are etymologically one, though in use they differ; nevertheless they once had one signification in use also, as is shown by this verse of an old poet:

"If the weather be fair and tidy" —

i.e., seasonable. In the current phrase, "he has a tidy sum of money," tidy has again a meaning that would seem to attach rather to timely; for what is a "tidy" sum? Is it not such a sum as may seem to meet the demands of the days as they pass? But notwithstanding this intermingling of significations, timely and tidy differ in their meanings; timely meaning opportune, suited to the time; tidy, orderly, neat.

27. Discover is the exact etymological parallel of Uncover; so too is reveal (to remove the covering or veil). Uncover alone of these three retains the literal sense; for such use of discover as is seen in Sidney's "Arcadia," where persons riding in a coach the cover of which is let down are said to "remain as discovered and opensighted as if on horseback," is obsolete. Though reveal never had in English the literal sense of withdrawing a veil or curtain or otherwise uncovering, it has ever had an analogous metaphorical meaning: "The thoughts of many hearts shall be revealed." The secondary meaning, still metaphorical, of discover and reveal, is again the

same — to make known. Here reveal stops, while discover further takes on the meanings of finding and of spying out. The nouns discovery and revelation both express the idea of making known; but again the word from discover has many derivative significations, while the noun revelation suffers arrest of development. We have discovery of islands of the sea, discovery of natural forces; and the office of spies and scouts has been called discovery.

28. The three words Hotel, Hospice, Hospital are of one origin, from Latin *hospes*, guest. In English, Hotel and Hospice still retain the primary meaning, guest-house, the difference between the two being that the hospice is founded and conducted for charity and humanity without view to remuneration; while the hotel does the like offices, but with a distinct purpose to make profit; at the same time the hotelkeeper or the innkeeper may be, and indeed is proverbially a man of large human sympathies. Hospital, too, bears still in English some traces of a meaning like that of hospice; thus Christ's Hospital is the Blue-coat School of London, one of the noted public schools of England; it is not only a school, but a hospice for the pupils that are admitted to it. Spenser calls a place of entertainment a hospital:

> "Which chusing for that evening's hospital,
> They thither marched."

The Knights Hospitallers of Saint John of Jerusalem founded in the holy city and in other places guest-houses for entertainment of needy and infirm pilgrims; and these houses were called hospitals. When the members or "poor brethren" of the order of

Saint John of Jerusalem were metamorphosed into chevaliers, cold was the charity that was doled out to the sick and mendicant palmers; the hospitals became "hôtels" of the Knights, as the word *hôtel* is understood by the French. In the Justinian code, mention is made of hospitals in our sense of that word, but the name there given them is from the Greek, *nosocomia* (singular *nosocomium*); had the purpose of the founders of the first hospitals been to afford medical aid, those institutions would have been called *nosocomia*.

29. Generous and Liberal, both in their higher and their humbler significations, are very near synonymous; but the attributes betokened by them respectively have their roots in different soils. Generosity, according to its etymology, is the product of noble or illustrious lineage: Liberality, of the status of a freeman. Generosity is from *generosus*, and that from *genus*, race, ancestry; Liberality is from *liber*, free, opposed to *servus*, slave. If generous means magnanimous, so does liberal. But note a difference between the fortunes of the two words: in usage liberal has sometimes been made to signify licentious, dissolute, while generous has never been so dishonored. The Liberal Arts in which degrees are taken in universities, are so called, as being arts, sciences, or studies befitting a freeman, as opposed to servile arts or gainful arts, such as the mechanic arts. The Liberal Arts are also called "the Humanities," arts or studies that are humanizing, elevating, refining. The use of the term Liberal Arts dates from the classic period of Latin literature.

30. The synonymy of the two verbs Lavish and

Squander is absolute, except that in usage, lavish is nearly always coupled with a phrase expressing its purpose or its object. "Ridicule lavished on their forefathers;" "they lavish money on amusements." But squander is used of profuseness, wastefulness in general, without mention of its effects or its purpose. It is to be noted that the primary meaning of squander is scatter, disperse, without any implication of waste: as in "Merchant of Venice," "ventures squandered abroad," — ships and merchandises in every sea. The word is not now regularly used in that sense, but Cassell quotes from a London newspaper of 1886, "the great Armada squandered upon the sea," — scattered over the sea by tempests. The word squander probably is from Squatter, a Scotch word meaning to splash water, to scatter. Lavish seems to be derived from an ancient English verb "lave," to pour out; if so, it is a close analogue of profuse, from Latin *profundere*, to pour forth. Lavish is used in the very same sense as that Latin verb in Isaiah xlvi. 6, "They lavish gold out of the bag:" the context shows that lavish here does not mean squander, spend, or waste; the gold is poured out of the bag and given to the goldsmith.

31. The two verbs Approach and Approximate are like an adjective in the positive, and in the superlative degree. In Approximate there is visibly an adjective in the superlative degree, *proximus*, nearest, very near; and the same superlative exists in approach, which comes to us from the French, where it is *approcher;* but both approach and approximate are from one Latin original, *approximo*, to come near, literally, very near. When Approx-

imate was introduced into our language, approach was already there, and the only reason for the new word was that it expressed something more than the old; and that it does: in astronomy, approach may be predicated of a movement that implies indefinite æons; approximate can be rightly said only of those which have ascertained limits.

Section VIII.

OBSOLESCENCE, OBSOLETION, NEW COINAGE.

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1. In these glimpses of the histories of English vocables, we have come upon numerous instances of the falling into desuetude and into discredit — happily the one does not connote the other, it is a vulgar error to think they do — of words in every way worthy of the places from which they are ousted to make room for others that could not claim a stronger right. We have seen or shall see even capital words — words expressing the most fundamental notions — dropped out of usage, and their places not filled at all, to the grievous impoverishment of the language: instance the gap that yawns where the term meaning "human being" should stand. Or take a less serious case. Among the ancient Romans, from very early times till the era of the empire, all freeborn citizens (men) bore three names, viz., *praenomen*, *nomen*, *cognomen*, always ranged in that order: example, Marcus Tullius Cicero. The first of these, *praenomen*, answered to what among us is called the "Christian" name or the "given" name; and the third to the "family" name among us; *nomen* was the name of the gens to which the person's family belonged. The gens name was probably a reminiscence of a pro-

historic totemism, or perhaps of ancestor-worship; it certainly was a reminiscence of patriarchy, and not improbably of an earlier matriarchy. We have in English a word, so very rarely used it is as good as non-existent, which is exactly equivalent to *praenomen*, viz., forename. The forename of Sir Hercules Smith or Robinson is Hercules; it is a trifle absurd to call Hercules a "Christian" name, or to call the forenames of Julius Cesar White a "Christian" name. And though the expression "Christian name" does not signify one of a number of names proper to Christians, but only "christen-name" or baptism-name (in German *Taufname*), all the same there is an incongruity between Hercules or Lucifer and "Christian name." Besides, what proportion of those whose christen-name is George or Amanda ever were christened?

2. A few of the good and expressive words compounded with *dis* that have been thrown out of the vocabulary or branded "obsolete" are mentioned in another place; two or three more may be cited here. Dissociate, for example, to which disassociate has been preferred by writers supposed to use the English language with propriety, supposed also to have an ear for pleasing sounds; other such words are, discrown, diseasing (in the sense of causing annoyance, but that was doomed so soon as disease was made the general name of the ills to which flesh is heir), disgage (disengage preferred). A very good new word cast from the same mould as the foregoing is dishome; the very respectable term foreclosure must have welcomed the new comer as a valuable aid to expression.

3. Coming in one of the voluminous English

dictionaries, under the title "Dishonour," upon this entry: "* 4. To violate the chastity of, to debauch," a reader having in mind that the asterisk stands for the note "obsolete," will wonder how ever the word "dishonor" could part with that meaning. May be he is in error as to the significance of that asterisk, so he goes back to the "Prefatory Note" in vol. i. of the dictionary. There he reads: "Obsolete words and significations are marked with an asterisk (*)." So, then, English has no one word to-day to express the dishonoring of a woman. Why was dishonor, in this sense, dropped? Is it "indelicate"? Will it be said, the word in that sense was superfluous — there was debauch? But "debauch" has not properly the same signification. If Professor William Dwight Whitney's derivation of the French verb *débaucher*, given *obiter* in his "English-German Dictionary" is the true one, debauchment of a maid is a civil offence primarily, and the wrong is done primarily not to the maid, but to her parent, or to whoever is to her *in loco parentis*; "Fr. *débaucher* (*bauche*, workshop), orig. allure from the workshop" (Whitney's "Ger. Eng. Dictionary," P. II. *s. v.* Debauch). But be it noted well, the commercial denotations of the verb "dishonor," viz., refusing to accept, or neglect or refusal to pay a bill, or refusing or making default in meeting a promissory note, are neither obsolete nor obsolescent. Of the five meanings given to the verb, — the commercial meanings counted as one, — the "obsolete" meaning is the only one which has aught to do with honor properly called; the other "honors" and "dishonors" are extrinsic trappings and tinselments — the guinea-stamp, often on base metal — or

extrinsic disgraces; a woman's honor is intrinsic, or it is only sham.

4. These few instances of the process of Obsolefaction — so be it called rather than Obsolescence, for obsoleteness of words is as much a work of dictionarians and grammarians lending the weight of their *asteriscal* authority to pull down honorable names of things (they are obsolefactors of words), as of a natural law of language — these few instances are types of many hundreds that are discoverable by research in this and other large classes of words in a great dictionary. And while good and expressive vocables are dropping out of the vocabulary, new words or new meanings of words are coming in to make the "struggle for existence" with the old, and sidling them out. "In the struggle for existence," it is written, "the fittest survive." Sing Pæan for that. It is "natural law," and the dictionarians are ministers of that law — executioners. Now the meaning of Fittest is in the application of it: it is all a matter of definition; and Darwin — or is it Herbert Spencer? — has defined Fittest that which survives: and conversely, that which survives, Fittest. This is not argument in a circle; it would be so were the Doctor Subtilis of the fourteenth century to reason so; but as used by the Perplexed Philosopher of the nineteenth, it is the sublimed essence of logic.

5. The verb Discard is one of the survivals in this struggle for existence, and consequently is fittest. It is a gambler's word; but it is Fittest. But not only has it the authority of the Natural Law of Survival in its favor; it has also the authority of Shakespere

"I here discard my sickness;"

and our Longfellow makes the paltry word do service as synonymous with renounce, disown:

"Henry of Honeck I discard."

The author of a book called "The Gentleman Instructed" uses it reflexly in the sense of divestment, "I discard myself of those things that are noxious to my body;" anon, it takes the substantive form, and we hear of a "discardure of religion." The next revision of the Book of Common Prayer may be expected to have in the form of baptizing, "Dost thou, in the name of this child, discard the Devil and all his works?" with the answer, "I discard them all."

6. But there are some precious gains to be recorded in the way of new words. Mr. Henry D. Lloyd, in his work "Wealth against Commonwealth," tells of "a bill whizzed through Congress," meaning — well, meaning *whizzed*, for that word has no synonym, no paronym; but it is a royal word, and is itself its ancestors, — a Melchizedek among words. Such a word needs no definition, no explication; it is perfect English, Classical Greek, a cosmopolitan word, understanded of all people. Derail, with its noun derailment, is also a perfect word, though on its escutcheon is the bar sinister; it is however infinitely beneath whiz. It was a humiliation for the United States that Derailment was coined in France; the natural habitat of Derailments is the soil of this great Republic.

7. Professor Huxley was a deft handler of words and a skilful coiner too; specimens of his mintage are had in astynomocracy (Greek, *asty*, city, *nomos*, law,

rule, *krateia*, power), by which he means government by the billy and the night-stick, the ideal quintessence of state administration according to the Perplexed Philosopher. The phrase "administrative nihilism" is another type of the growths of Huxley's etymological garden: it is a summation of Spencer's Political Quietism.

8. Huxley's word Agnosticism, taken, as it always ought to be taken, in the sense given it by its fabricator and patentee, viz., the contradictory of Gnosticism, is a term that was much needed for accurate designation of an attitude of the philosophic mind toward dogmas of supernatural order. Previously, it had been customary to call sceptics, unbelievers, free-thinkers, and others who refused to accept such dogmas, Infidels, — a term of reproach in itself, and understood on both sides to be a term of reproach; it had and has the same connotations as Miscreant. Hence, though believers, in their writings and in conversations among themselves, would designate their unbelieving fellowmen Infidels, the usage of polite society — into which the Infidels might by accident drop — did not sanction employment of the word when free-thinkers were in the company. The Negro is "nigger" for white folk, when they mention him absent; present, he is "colored friend." Huxley's word is one that satisfies unbelievers of all shades, and as Doctor Wace gave proof in his controversy with the distinguished coiner of it, it is also one into which a believer can inject as much rancor and *odium theologicum* as into Infidel.

9. It was hinted above that the term Agnostic is not always used by professed Agnostics in the mean-

ing given it by Huxley. Huxley gives it as only contradictory of Gnostic; it says: Gnosis or gnosticism knows all things: as for me, there are some things I do not know, *e.g.*, supernatural things. But while Agnosticism was still fresh from the mint, it began to be quoted at different values, and almost immediately appeared the cocksure Agnostic who, being the contrary (not simply contradictory) of the Gnostic, knew that there never was, never can be, such a thing as supernaturalism, or such a thing as soul; he knew, he, that all that is tommyrot. Agnostic has been a Cant ever since; and Huxley's coin is made as worthless as a leaden medal, though it is refined gold. Its whole content might be summed in Huxley's statement of his own attitude toward the supernatural, which is, in substance, about this: I do not know anything about the Inscrutable; for me the Inscrutable is ever inscrutable; it may be that for the Gnostics, as also for Doctor Wace, and the Church Convention at Manchester, the Unsearchable is object of knowledge; for me it is not; I am not a Gnostic, and that is all that Agnostic implies.

10. Professor Huxley is no less happy in his resuscitations of old words, than in his mintages of new. The English were long used to call the fresh green tender wrack of humanity, Street Arabs; yet all those years there stood in dictionaries the good old Saxon word Wastrel, "any thing allowed to go to waste," but no one saw it there, till Professor Huxley had occasion to discuss the problem of poverty — the only problem that ever seemed to nonplus him. Arabia Felix, the blest, or even Petrea, the stony: what has Araby to do with the slums of English civilization?

Arabia disowns those counterfeit arabs; the creatures are Anglo-Saxon girls and boys: the same breed that Saint Gregory the Great called angels: *Angli immo angeli:* Angles? Nay, but angels. Now that they are what they have to be, they are disowned. But they are native, and to the manner born: true-blooded English Wastrels.

11. The Germans, when they have occasion to use a word of Greek derivation to express what we mean by Prehistoric, say *prohistorisch*, prohistoric. When a pure, legitimate word can be had as easily as a hybrid, why not prefer it, and why not use it always in preference to the hybrid? *Pro* in Greek means before, and history (*historia*) is a Greek word; compound the two, and you have "prohistoric." The *pre*, in prehistoric, is the Latin *prae*, before. The Germans could do very well without either the hybrid or the pure compound; they had in their own language native material out of which to compound as good a word as any that Greek could give, *vorgeschichtlich*, and no necessity was laid upon them to take E. B. Tylor's spurious coin; they could wait till a legitimate Greek compound was offered. Not only have the Germans their homely — the word is a word of honor, and it was a sacrilege to disgrace it — their homely adjective *vorgeschichtlich*, but they have, what we have not, a word to express at need the sum of the records and monuments of the times before history began, viz., *Vorgeschichte*.

12. The unusual violence of the wind and snow-storms of February, 1895, caused great suffering and loss of life among mariners and landfolk on the Atlantic coast, and throughout the country; and the

newspaper chroniclers presented, some of them, marvellously realistic pictures of the scenes of devastation. One of these scribes, in telling of a burial at sea, coined, or at least employed a singularly apt and telling phrase: "They dropped the dead babies into the yawn of the sea." Very happy, too, was the name, apparently coined for that occasion, to express the forlorn situation of outlying new suburbs, when cut off by such a visitation from their mother city and place of occupation, — Lonesomehurst.

13. Yon, Yond, Yonder, mean "over there;" they denote a place at greater or less distance, but within view — a pretty considerable deal of meaning to get compressed into three letters. But the words — or three forms of one word — are all gone into desuetude; in the United States as late as the fifties, they were freely in use among the "common people;" but they are seldom heard now except in "dialect." The loss of such words is not compensated by the gain we make of such new phrases as "he is n't in it."

14. The history of a language, like the history of a nation, is in great part a history of errors, too often of errors that might have been avoided, but which produced irreparable ills. The historian who studies the past of a nation, and who laments those errors and their consequences, is not supposed to be animated by the quixotic purpose of going back, and rooting out of existing laws and institutions the makeshift expedients, often irrational, which had to be adopted to remedy the ills. The English Constitution is a patchwork of tinkering expedients, so is the English common law; but the English government is the most stable in Europe, just because

the people of England are content to let things stay as they are, as long as they serve passably well. Hence, when the etymologist laments the loss of what he must regard as the fittest words, and their supplantation by unfit, — unfit as judged by his criterion, — he is not to be put down as a Don Quijote; he knows as well as any man, how hopeless a task it would be radically to reform usage in language. At the same time, he has the hope that here and there he may be able to correct old blunders; and that he may in some degree check the process of degradation: at the least, he cherishes the hope of developing, in some few souls, a sensitive language-conscience. It is not in the expectation that the true meaning of "physiology" will ever again in English be revived, that one, for instance, points out the misapplication of the term in our language. The fittest name for either "natural history," or "natural philosophy," would be Physiology-Science of Nature. That is the meaning given it by the Greeks themselves; and that is the meaning of it for Dr. William Gilbert, of Colchester, who entitled his immortal work *De Magnete*, on the lodestone, "a new physiology," or treatise of natural science (*physiologia nova*): the work was first published in the year 1600. "Physics" is a better term than "natural philosophy," but the science called physics has no just title to a name that covers the whole of nature; its title is as defective as that of the "physician" or the "physiologist."

15. Biology, a word coined, if not by Comte, then by one of his contemporaries, and hence a new word, serves very well its purpose of designating a science whose subject-matter is whatever presents the phe-

nomena of life; thus, for the first time, is found a word comprehensive of both zoölogy and phytology. As a definitive (or definitional) term, Biology is faultless; it is unambiguous, it covers the whole field, and it covers nothing else. But as a product of word-mintage, it is gravely defective. A far better word to express the totality of life, whether of animals or plants, would be a word of which one element would be "science" or its equivalent, discourse; that word is "logos," in the form "logia." The other element would be a word denoting life, as understood of both plants and animals: that word, in Greek, is *zoe;* compound the two, and the product is — a word which, though most fit, cannot be taken because there exists adverse possession for some thousands of years. The mischief is done; what is the remedy? Why, take another Greek word signifying life. So the Greek word *bios* is taken; that, too, means life, but in the sense of "span of life," or "course of life," or "livelihood," "victual;" it has nowhere the significations that *zoe* has. An ancient Grecian would need an interpreter to explain to him the meaning of "biologia;" his first guess would be a "treatise on play-acting," or the "art of play-acting." Those old Grecians had not the word "biologia," simply because they had no need for it; but they had the root-word *bios*, span of life, also livelihood, occupation, and from this formed the word *biologos*, one who portrays life on the stage, a play-actor; they had even the special verb *biologeo*, to sketch or describe to the life, as a clever literary artist does. Our word "biography" is of legitimate Greek origin, though it does not appear in any of the Hellenic classics that

have come down to us. The scientific terms "bioplasm," "biophytum," exhibit the same solecism as "biology;" the name given by Huxley to his exploded deep-sea colloid life-protoplasm, "bathybius," is formed in consonance with Greek etymology.

16. Jingo and Chauvinist (*chauviniste*), Jingoism and Chauvinism (*chauvinisme*), are two pairs of synonyms, Jingo and Jingoism denoting the madly patriotic Briton in his defiance of a world in arms; and Chauvinist and Chauvinism designating the like exaltation of patriotic sentiment in the perfervid Gaul. But inasmuch as French patriotic ardor has a different mode of expression or explosion from the same sentiment in the Briton, these synonymous words are not interchangeable. Jingo and Jingoism came into the language during the war between Russia and Turkey in 1877–8, when the clamorers for vigorous intervention by England, on behalf of the Turks, would nightly fill the music halls, so called, of London, there to inebriate themselves and one another with overweening patriotism, and to proclaim the invincibility and the irresistible might of British arms. Thousands of voices would join in the refrain:

> "We don't want to fight, but by Jingo if we do,
> We 've got the ships, we 've got the men, we 've got the money too."

Chauvinist is formed from the name of Nicolas Chauvin, a gallant private soldier in the armies of the first French empire. His devotion to Napoleon knew no bounds; whatever Napoleon did or said was for Chauvin best, wisest, and most beneficent. In a vaudeville, the "Cocarde Tricolor" (tricolor cockade), was introduced a character named Chauvin, whose

principal act was to render a song chockfull of patriotic sentiments and glorification of French valor.

17. A verb expressive of what the sculptor does when he exercises his art, is much needed in English; the only verbs of that signification that are given in the dictionaries are, "to sculpture," "to engrave," "to carve," and their insufficiency needs no comment. The verb "sculp" is marked obsolete; it probably never existed to be able to obsolesce, or even to die; for in the verses from Archbishop Sandys, quoted in "Cassell's Encyclopædic Dictionary" as warrant for the form "sculp"—

> "O that the tenor of my just complaint
> Were sculpt with steel on rocks of adamant,"

the word "sculpt" is, in all probability, from Latin *sculptus*, past participle of the verb *sculpo*, whence we have sculpture. We often see or hear the word sculp, but are conscious that it is used in a comic sense,—in the vein of Artemus Ward,—and as "burgle" is made from "burglar."

18. Reciprocation is a perfectly legitimate word, and has a fine liberal air; it is on the road to the knackers now, worsted in the struggle for existence by ressy-prossy-tee: the fittest survives. It looks as if the French had made this word; it enters into the title of a law of mathematics among them; Blackstone is quoted for it, as thus: "Any degree of reciprocity will prevent the pact from being nude." There must exist sound reasons in the *disciplina* of the law, and in the science of mathematics for preferring the word of hissing; but outside of technical use, reciprocity

would seem to be Cant. The word appears to be used in the language of political diplomacy to express a relation between states, whereby they are held to accord, or agree to accord, to each other, equal advantages in commerce; but the actual allowing of those advantages, *e.g.*, the admission mutually of certain goods, supposed to be practically equivalent to each other, as flour and coffee, duty-free, or at equal *ad valorem* import duties, is Reciprocation, the act, and not Reciprocity, the relation. A treaty which establishes such relation, may rightly be called a Reciprocity treaty; but that treaty's end is Reciprocation.

19. These two words * Prestigiator and Prestidigitator are found entered in a great dictionary as here shown; against Prestigiator is set the asterisk, note of obsoleteness, while Prestidigitator passes unchallenged, though the word is plainly the coinage — or better say tinkerage — of some mountebank who thought that Prestidigitation would neatly express sleight of fingers (*praesto*, ready, *digiti*, fingers). It were a grand word to express the art of pocket-picking, and that may have been the reason for the choice of it after all; but a great dictionary should not fail to show the real intent, so helping to bring it back to its etymological significations. If one word was needed to express sleight of hand, such word was already in the language and in all the dictionaries. Let us develop that word's history. Prestige is from Latin *praestigium*, and in Warburton, of the "Augustan Age," is used to designate a juggle, a juggler's trick; "the sophisms of infidelity and the prestiges of imposture." Need it be said that the

asterisk is set against this use? Warburton evidently treated Prestige as an English word and would no more have pronounced it "presteezhe," than he would have pronounced vestige "vesteezhe," the accent and the sounding of the i and g in Prestige would be for him as in vestige. The Latin *praestigium* has the same sense that prestige has in Warburton, a delusion, a juggle. The Latin word for juggler was *praestigiator*, and the woman juggler was *praestigiatrix;* the verb was *praestigior;* and the art was *praestigiatio:* a complete outfit of terms well known to writers of English in the forms Prestige, Prestigiate (v.), Prestigiation, Prestigiator, Prestigiatory, Prestigious (Cotton Mather). But now comes twiddling Prestidigitation, and, presto! the whole suite of legitimate vocables are swept off into outer darkness and obsoleteness. The new lineage has already produced this noble scion, Prestidigitatorial. The word now in use and pronounced "presteezhe" is the same that was used by Warburton, but it has a new special meaning — "confidence-inspiring effect of prior achievement;" this meaning attaches to the word in French, so in that sense the fit pronunciation is "eezhe."

20. The King James's Bible has "in vain" twenty-five times, the epithet "vain" fifty times, in various connections, the adverb vainly once, vanity and vanities about seventy times. But never once in all those employments of the words is vanity or its derivates used in the sense which is predominant to-day, — that of love of show, desire of applause or of admiration. Down perhaps to the "Augustan Age" of English literature, the vice or foible which we denominate

vanity was called vainglory, with its proper adjective vainglorious; and vain stood for fruitless, useless, empty, false; in short, vanity and vain were of about the same import as their Latin originals, *vanitas*, *vanus*. But the words have been almost emptied of those ancient and true meanings, and in ordinary speech and in current literature there remains but a trace of one of them, adherent to the adjective vain in such phrases as "the effort was vain," "our hopes were vain;" and in these the almost universal usage is "in vain;" the less fit shouldering the fit out, and thus becoming the fittest: for that is fittest which survives in the struggle for existence. Vainglory and its derivates are gone out of common use; it would be almost or quite an affectation to employ them. With the fundamental change in the signification of vain and vanity, it is doubtful whether the modern reader can get at the true meaning of those passages of the Bible in which the words are employed in the obsolete senses; *e. g.*, the proverb (xxxi. 30). "Favor is deceitful, and beauty is vain" does not mean (even though we read with the Septuagint "woman's beauty") that vainglory, or vanity, in the now generally accepted meaning of the word, goes with a fair face and comely form: only that personal comeliness by itself is of little worth.

21. Welkin, a word quite gone out of use in the spoken language and in prose writing, unless the bedraggled phrase "make the welkin ring" be regarded as use, is the same as German *Wolken*, clouds. Etymologies, specially Teutonic and Scandinavian etymologies, were easily lost in the times of storm and stress when England's intelligence was cut off

from communication with the Teutonic mind beyond the German ocean; and though the Germanic words remained, their native meanings became obscured. Hence though Welkin means sky indeed, nevertheless it means the sky overcast with clouds; yet Shakespere uses welkin adjectively for sky-blue — "your welkin eyes." It is much to be regretted that welkin, for sky, is obsolete; for poetical and other uses, another term besides sky is needed to express the blue vault above us: its native and natural name, Heaven, is used to designate a place or state which Agnostics of the strait sect cannot believe in, and which Agnostics of the straitjacket persuasion know is the thing that is not; and to one or the other sect belongs a pretty considerable part of civilized mankind.

22. When reading in the Bible of the "coasts" of Samaria, or the "coasts" of Issachar, one who knows little of the geography of the Holy Land will assume that Samaria and Issachar were contiguous with the Mediterranean or the sea of Galilee; for in present usage coast is equivalent to sea or lake coast. But coast is from the French *côte*, rib, side, coast, Latin *costa*, rib: hence when we read of the coasts of Judah or Benjamin, we are to understand the borders, howsoever defined, the sides they present to the contiguous territories. In the Revised Version of the New Testament the obsolete term coasts is dropped, and borders substituted; for "Bethlehem and all the coasts thereof" is substituted "Bethlehem and all its borders." The verb to coast is now gone out of use except as it denotes the movements of a ship; but formerly it had much the same meanings as accost,

which is a derivate of coast or coste. The Quaker Thomas Elwell, telling of an attempt at murderous assault upon himself, writes, "they coasted over to us," meaning, "they came over till they were beside us." The verb accost means primarily to be side by side and to approach; but in present use it signifies to approach a person and address him; accosting is the act of one who is a stranger to the person whom he approaches.

23. If in our day a writer of religious meditations were to employ the phrase, "I was merry," we should put him down for a profane vulgarizer of sacred things, — like the prize-winning revivalist in Chicago who exhorted his hearers: "Whoever feels he has the Holy Ghost, let him jump to his own height." In our minds merriment is associated with fulness of meat and drink; and of the numerous passages of the English Bible in which it occurs, in not more than two is the word merry used without that implication. But merry was in the older English a word with as little necessary relation to wine and meat as the word joyous or glad, and hence was not out of place even in men's prayers. Thus the recluse of Norwich, describing her vision of the Crucified One, writes: "The changing of his blessed chear changed mine and I was glad and merry. . . . Then brought our Lord merrily to my mind. . . . And I was ful merry."

24. Singular, as long as it was used in the etymological sense, meant precisely what unique means, alone in its kind or excellence. As late as Addison's time, it had that signification: "These busts are all very scarce and some of them almost singular in their

kind;" instead of "almost" singular one would incline now — if he had no language-conscience — to say "most" singular, a phrase impossible in Addison's day; "extremely" singular would be perfectly good English as she is spoke. With the radical word single, meaning "one only," before their eyes, it is unaccountable that educated writers should ever have so weakened the import of singular as to make it mean only extraordinary; but its native import is clean gone, and one needs a glossary to-day to tell him what the word means in Joseph Addison. The degradation of singular to the grade of "unusual, uncommon" (Webster), only adds one more to a lubberly lot of synonyms, leaving in the higher walks a great gap that has to be filled with that "almost singular" word Unique. How long till that too shall join the sad procession to the poorhouse? When unique loses definition, we shall perhaps adopt oneic. Even the German language has naturalized unique, queue and all!

25. The effects of weathering and wear and tear upon the word Regret are worthy of notice. The origin of Regret cannot be made out; but its prime significations are very definite, viz., sorrowful longing or desire; as nearly as possible it stands for the Latin *desiderium* as a term expressive of mourning. This primary meaning, however, may now truly be said to be obsolete. Secondly, it used to mean vexation, grief, or sorrow at something past; bitterness of reflection; remorse: of these secondary meanings the noun and the verb still retain more than mere traces. But in the fashionable use of the word Regrets, to signify one's pain on being unable to attend a four

o'clock tea, we see it reduced to its most beggarly estate. We send Regrets enclosed in a modish envelope.

26. Fulsome. When this word went out of use in its etymological sense of "filled out," "plump," not lean and lank; as in the verse

"Grew fulsome, fair and fresh,"

and no other word was substituted in its room, the language suffered a serious impairment. To-day, when we wish to express that a person is of moderately full bodily habit, we have no choice between plump, stout, corpulent, fat, and that hideous word fleshy, — there may, however, be two or three adjectives more, all equally inaccurate or equally offensive to good taste. Fulsome in its true sense would signify merely a bodily contour with well rounded outline; and that gives no suggestion of greasiness (fat), nor of butchers' meat (fleshy), nor even of ponderosity and unwieldiness, as corpulent; stout and plump are better than any of those, but neither of them is equal to Fulsome. The strait in which the English-speaking person is put by the unfortunate error of dropping out the true meaning and use of fulsome and fulsomeness, is seen in the adoption of a formula which does duty in French for a word, *embonpoint;* for all one may know, this may be as gross an expression in French as fleshiness or corpulency in English; but it can be used in good society without any hesitation — except hesitation to bewray by faulty accents one's ignorance of French; and one might well hesitate before he pronounces his ong-bong-pwong in the hearing of a person who speaks French.

27. Buxome is the exact equivalent, etymologically, of German *beugsam*, which means literally, flexible, pliable, pliant, being from the verb *beugen*, to bend; in German *beugsam* is hardly used but in this literal sense. Buxom or buxome is of the same origin as *beugsam*, and is made up of the same two elements: literally, it means what *beugsam* means, flexible, pliant; but it early assumed a figurative sense, — that of compliant, yielding; complaisant, obedient, and the like, as "to make thee buxome to her law." Of course in that sense a colt might be subdued to buxomeness; or a henpecked man might be buxome to his wife — obedient to her. But whatever was written in the old times was written by the men, and buxome, under their pen, assumed the character of a feminine adjective, — one expressive of distinctively womanly virtues, the chiefest of which is of course that of complaisance toward her lord; but even that meaning was in time lost, and the epithet came to signify plumpness, freshness of complexion, and abundant, ebullient animal spirits, with at least a suspicion of something else and more; the "buxome lass" was no favorite of the matron. Spenser, as was to be expected, retains much of the ancient signification of the word:

> "And bene of ravenous wolves yrent,
> All for they would be buxome and bent."

So too when in prose he speaks of the people being made "buxome to government." Chaucer gives a good illustration of the use of Buxome in the best sense, as denoting the behavior of a faithful and loving wife:

"For who can be so buxom as a wyf?
Who is so true and eek so ententyf?"

And the hermit nun of Norwich, Chaucer's contemporary (she was still living 1388, aged forty-five years), has this: "We be all mercifully beclosed in the mildhed of God and in his meekhed, in his benignity, and in his buxomness." And in another place: "When a soul is tempted . . . it is time to praie to make herself supple and buxom to God."

28. Wreak (v.) is the same as German *rachen*, to avenge; and in German *Rache* is vengeance. The phrase "wreak vengeance" is a tautology like "die death." After the root meaning of wreak was lost, the word began to be used in the sense of carrying out or executing: thus, Milton has "wreak my wrath;" but the verb is now hardly used at all but in conjunction with the noun vengeance. Pope gives us an instance of wreak used in the true or etymological sense, to avenge:

"On her own son to wreak her brother's death;"

and, as matter of course, this true use is asterisked. But Pope uses the verb wreak in the less true and less effective signification also; not improbably the hackneyed phrase "wreak vengeance" owes its vogue to Pope's use:

"Wreak my vengeance on one guilty land."

But the noun wreak in the etymological sense is still retained in the language — at least one of the great dictionaries lets it pass without the asterisk, though this beyond all question is to-day an obsolete meaning. For this use Shakespere is quoted:

"And what an if
His sorrow have so overwhelm'd his wits,
Shall we be thus afflicted in his wreaks,
His fits, his frenzy, and his bitterness?"

Another instance of Wreak (n.) used in the true original sense of vengeance is had in George Peele's (d. 1598) "David and Bethsabe":

"For in the holy temple have I sworn
Wreak of his villainy."

This is cited in Cassell as a use of wreak in the sense of "furious passion;" but it cannot mean anything but revenge: how could one swear "furious passion"? Wreak, whether verb or noun, is unaccountably slighted in King James's Bible; there vengeance is always either "taken" or "executed;" and we have vengeance, revenge, and revenged; even in Rev. xix. 2, where wreak would have finely expressed the meaning, we have instead of "wreaked the blood," "avenged the blood." It would be interesting to know the reasons for dropping wreak in that version — a word which fronted the translators or revisers in all the versions from Wiclif's down to their own.

29. Quick has gone out of use in its original sense of living, having life. Rapid, prompt to act, are the senses in which the word is now mostly used. To understand the phrases "stung to the quick," "cut to the quick," — *i. e.*, to the sensitive nerves underlying the epiderm, — one needs to be acquainted with the etymological meaning of quick, as the word is found in quicksilver, silver that is alive, that runs; quicksand, sand that is alive, having apparently a movement of its own; quickhedge or simply quick, a hedge of liv-

ing plants; quicklime, lime that has life. More of the original sense lingers in the verb quicken than in the adjective.

30. Fetch, meaning go and bring to me, is obsolescent, the phrase just given as its equivalent taking its place. Professor Marsh notes the obsolescence without regret, and seems to favor the disuse not only of fetch, but also of one or other of the two words bring and carry, because either would express with sufficient accuracy the meaning of both. But there is one thing that is likely to confirm fetch in its place in the English vocabulary, and that is the command given to the dog to "fetch it," when his master casts a twig into the water, or throws a ball to a distance, and calls for their return. The word will live in English as long as the dog is man's companion.

31. The word Life is cognate with the German *Leib*, and its primordial meaning is animated body; hence, life-guard is precisely body-guard, and in German life-guard is *Leib-garde*, *Leib-wache*, etc. The fortune of the word in English has been different from what it has had in German. In German *Leib* has lost nearly every trace of the signification life, another form, *leben*, having been selected to express that concept, while in English a wholly different word has been brought in to signify, first, the material framework of man and inferior animals, and then corporeal substances in general. When we say somebody, nobody, we employ the word body in its primitive meaning, human body, person.

32. The word Ante-social is unambiguous, printed or written; but addressed to the ear it is likely to pass for anti-social. The word is used by Herbert Spencer,

and probably no one else has ever had any use for it. But suppose one does need a word to express the idea of a state of human existence prior to human society, he will best use the unambiguous word pre-social.

33. Professor Marsh, in his Lectures on the English Language, notes the curious fact that almost all our terms precisely descriptive of Form are borrowed from Romance sources, and thus originally from Latin and Greek; he specifies the words round, square, circle, cube, angle, line, surface, curve, and adds that "our claim even to straight and flat, as native words, is matter of dispute. The list of such words as cube, circle, etc., would be greatly lengthened were the less exoteric terms of geometry to be noted, as periphery, diameter, ellipse, perimeter, etc."

34. Shrewd, signifying originally maliciousness, has now in common usage little trace of that opprobrious meaning, and rather denotes keen discernment in business affairs, business sagacity. When we say of a man that he is a shrewd investor, we are not suspected of questioning his honesty; but when Bacon said of the ant that it is "a shrewd thing in an orchard," he meant no praise of the ant. Shrewd is derived from Shrew or Shrew-mouse, a little rodent of "baneful and deleterious nature," says White of Selborne.

Section IX.

IGNORANTISMS IN WORDS AND PHRASES.

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1. By Ignorantisms as used here are meant the solecisms of persons who are presumed to be educated, and not the vulgarisms of the uneducated. Very near all the examples here given are taken from the writings or speeches of men who are reputed to be scholars, or from newspapers and other publications. And ignorance is shown as plainly by an assumption of superior knowledge, as by plain violations of the etymological proprieties, — *e. g.*, when one censures as a vulgarism such a phrase as "every other day," "he was given leave of absence," — as when a too fastidious editorial writer in one of the leading American journals puts "guest" (of a hotel) between inverted commas as being a "euphemism." But guest, in the sense of lodger in an inn, or person entertained at an inn, is the precisely exact word for that notion, and is no more euphemistic than is the co-relative term host or landlord or innkeeper. The employment of the word supererogation — "the reward of my supererogation" — by a correspondent of the same journal betrays a like ignorance of the meaning of the terms. A work of supererogation is a work or a service rendered over and above what is due or required. Such *work* of supererogation is the act of a person, and on the ground of it he may in equity

look for reward or compensation; but the *supererogation*, the fact that the act he does is not asked for (*erogari*), or required, establishes no ground for reward.

2. Authority is not lacking for the use of the word Caption in the sense of "heading," as of a chapter of a book. It is an ignorantism into which a very little Latin led some one at some time, and into which many others who might have known better have followed. Caption has nothing in common with head or heading, but this, that its first three letters are also found in *caput* which is Latin for head, and from which comes *capitulum*, chapter. The vulgar error is precisely like that of taking *in petto* to mean little or in miniature, because *petto* looks so much like petty. Caption (Latin *captio*, taking, seizing, from *capio*, to seize) is used properly in law in the sense of arrestation.

3. Berm and Brim were originally one word differently pronounced, like burn and bren (German, *brennen*). Brim or berm means border or edge, as the bank of a river or canal, or the horizon. When the water in a river bed or in a canal reaches the height of the bank, the river or canal is brimful; but it is not the water but the bed of the river that is brimful. No matter how many pebbles be thrown into a pail of water, the water will never be brimful. But in a newspaper account of a whaling voyage occurs the expression "the sea was brimful of whales."

4. Tantalize means not to tease and worry one in any and every way, but only "by presenting something desirable to the view, yet continually frustrating

the desire to possess it, by keeping it out of reach." The verb "crystallizes" the story of Tantalus, dying of thirst though steeped to the lips in water.

5. Flippant. In two manifestos published on the same day by two high officers of railway companies, one spoke of "flippant bail," the other of "trivial bail," meaning in both cases bail in too small an amount. Flippant is properly used to qualify either the behavior of persons, or their manner of passing remarks; it denotes pertness and volubility; it cannot be applied as an epithet to bail. "Trivial bail" is not open to any such objection; but "trifling bail" is better. Trivial, etymologically, is equal to trite and trifling; it denotes valuelessness. An author writes that the sale of his book was "trivial." A book may be trivial, treating of trivial things; though the sales might be inconsiderable, they could not be trivial. (See Section V. § 27.)

6. Host. When Host is used in the sense of "multitude," aggregation is always implied; the individuals making up the host are supposed to be standing together or thronging. The divisions of political geography do not throng, though their populations may swarm. Hence it is an improper use of the word host, to say that "in a host of counties drought prevailed."

7. An eminent jurist and statesman a few years ago characterized the unrestricted powers of aggregated capital as Abhorrent Forces, meaning forces worthy of abhorrence. Good usage does not approve the employment of abhorrent in that sense. Properly the word denotes "feeling strong aversion," as "He would abhorrent turn;" or, figuratively, it signifies a

similar aversion in things that are void of sense, as when we say, "nature abhors a vacuum," *natura abhorret a vacuo;* or when a philosophical view is said to be, "abhorrent from the vulgar." Darwin uses the word improperly — as was to be expected; for he has no regard whatever for the etymological proprieties, *i. e.*, for the natural laws of language: he uses the expression, "abhorrent to our ideas of fitness;" and again "abhorrent gladiatorial exhibitions;" may we suppose that he used this, and the other numerous solecisms found in his writings, to illustrate the law of the survival of the fittest, viz.: the unfittest, experimentally, as it were? At all events, there is no doubt that the Darwinian meaning, and the Jere. Black meaning of abhorrent, will live and flourish when Thomson's "he would abhorrent turn" will need a gloss. When it is desired to express the idea intended by abhorrent, in the phrases inculpated above, correct usage requires substitution of some such word as abominable or execrable, or one might, with or without leave from the dictionarians, say abhorrible; but if abhorrent seems to possess any special grace or force which makes it desirable above other words, then there is a way in which it might be retained and yet not retained, the etymological laws standing inviolate. Let it be changed to Abhorrend, a perfectly legitimate word, though perhaps not hitherto written or printed, and in need of no letters of Anglic citizenship from dictionarians; citizenship in English is its birthright, and it votes without "papers." For it is a word of the same formation and of like derivation with multiplicand, dividend (a word to which no objection is raised), ordinand, and others. The only objection to which it

is open is, that it has not dictionary approval. But let it get once into print — as it does herewith — and all the dictionaries will have it in their next edition.

8. Entail has a very definite technical meaning ascertained in law and in usage, and the essence of that meaning is the inalienableness of an estate forevermore. Any departure from that meaning of entail, verb or noun, which does not preserve this root of the matter, inalienableness, is illegitimate. It is truly and legitimately said that, "Intemperance entails on the progeny of the drunkard infirmities and diseases." But it is ridiculous to say, "The glut in the market entails on us the necessity of getting rid of our stock of wooden nutmegs at three cents a dozen: job-lots at two."

9. Co-respondent. In a suit for divorce in courts of the State of New York, brought, say, by husband against wife for cause of adultery, there cannot be more than one respondent, the wife. The wife's paramour, whether actual or only alleged, is not a party to the action of divorce at all, and hence is not co-respondent; there is no co-respondent. Nevertheless, no case of this kind is tried in New York courts, but the newspapers, or most of them, speak of the paramour always as Co-respondent.

10. As gamblers' slang passes into the literary vocabulary, it should be guarded sacredly against corruption. It is sad to notice Handicap employed by a writer in the daily press in the sense of lack of the qualities that win the race for horse and jockey. The horse supposed to possess the advantage in point of age, strength, or swiftness, is the one that has to bear the handicap; but in the following passage it is the

inferior animal that is handicapped: "Our young men may be better looking than their titled competitors" in the race for a matrimonial prize; "may wear better clothes, be more attractively wicked, and quite as useless; but the handicap is too much." Now the handicap is that "they have no pedigree nor coat of arms, and so are out of the race." Not only is this handicap not a handicap at all, in the strict sportsmanological sense of the term, but there is even no beginning of a race; the American steeds are not even entered; they are "out of the race."

11. We are familiar with the discrimination between men of the several professions (professional men) and laymen (those outside the professions). This discrimination was first made between the clergy and the mass of the people; but in time lines were drawn round the professions of medicine and law, outside of which again all was "laity." Webster's Dictionary, in its edition of as late as 1879, does not recognize this latter usage as universal; the term Layman, says Webster, is "sometimes" used to designate one who is outside of medicine and the law. But great changes have come about since Webster's limitation defined the import of the word layman: there has been a great revolution, and now all men, even clergy and doctors and lawyers, are laymen; while greengrocers, navvies, even pickpockets, are, in their characters of greengrocers, bootblacks, etc., the professional men, the "clergy," so to speak. In proof that all who are not grocers are laymen, take this from a grocer's advertisement: "Last week the types made us say we could buy goods 100 per cent cheaper than the ordinary retailer. Any one but a layman would know that we

meant 10 per cent." And Lord Rosebery, in a speech addressed to a chamber of commerce, offered an excuse for presuming, though a layman, to address commercial men. A curious result of this process of discrimination between lay and professional is seen when readers of books, the educated class, those who for ages were known as clerics or clerks, and so distinguished from the lay mass, are themselves called laymen, to distinguish them from bibliomanes, worshippers of rare editions and of volumes whose leaves are virgin, never having been cut.

12. Whatever may be the weight of authority for the use of "sodden," in the sense of soaked, no one with quick, unblunted etymological conscience will use the word in any such abusive sense. Sodden is the past participle of the verb seethe, and it means seethed, boiled. If any one is pleased to use the word in the sense of soaked and softened, as in water, or of soaked, saturated with drink, he will perhaps be understood, but the word sodden has no such meanings.

13. Reeking is also quite usually employed in a sense which has no justification in etymology; indeed it is not easy to determine what the meaning is that is intended by the phrase "reeking with filth;" probably covered, glutted, filled; but the word reeking has no such significations. The noun reek is the same as the German *Rauch*, smoke, and the verb has the same designation. Shakespere has

> ". . . reek o' the rotten fens; whose breath I hate;"

where reek means vapor; but he also has "with reeky shanks," where "reeky" would seem to mean dirty; in that case Shakespere employs the word illegiti-

mately. The phrase "reeking with filth" is an inadmissible form of expression; we may say "the filth reeks," or "the filth of the streets reeks," but only if that filth is giving out visible, or at least odorable, emanations.

14. The boundless tolerance of dictionarians is well exemplified in their admission to the vocabulary of such dog Latin slang as "vim" — "with a vim." It occurs in one of the great modern dictionaries of the English language, without any indication given of its slanginess; no note is there to warn the unwary that the word is a mere ignorantism; but the asterisk is prefixed, as in the case of obsolete words. But vim is no obsolete word; it never was an English word.

15. Fruition seems to be losing its meaning, viz.: use and enjoyment (about equivalent to the legal technical meaning of *ususfructus* or usufruct), and to be taking on the sense of fruitage, — a meaning not given it by any writer of passable authority. The word is from the same root as English "fruit;" in fact, in Latin, *fructus* means both the use and enjoyment of a thing, and the thing used or enjoyed; for example, produce, product, fruit, crops, etc.; but it does not signify the action of a tree in producing apples or pears, and that is the meaning very commonly given to fruition: "when the scheme comes to fruition," *i. e.*, begins to yield profits. An example of right use of the word is had in Bacon's essay on Riches: "The personal fruition" (enjoyment) "cannot reach to feel great riches." In passing, it may be noted that for Bacon the word riches is singular: "Riches *is*." He remembers that riches is the French *richesse*, equivalent to richness, and hence only in form plural.

But he is not consistent with himself, for in his next paragraph he twice writes, "riches *are*."

16. Between Encyclopædia and Cyclopædia, there is the difference of a syllable in pronouncing, writing, and printing; there is the further difference, that Encyclopædia is etymologically a true and complete word, while Cyclopædia is in its form much in the condition of 'Change: its head is lopped off; but as it lives on unconscious of the loss, no harm is done. If there can be Cyclopædia of mint juleps, the same will be by higher right an Encyclopædia of the art and mystery of compounding mint juleps.

17. Affiliate, with its derivates, is very commonly used ignorantly and blunderously in the sense of fraternizing (a better word than this would be brothering) or associating. In such use of affiliate, there would seem to be an underlying erroneous notion that somehow filiate involves the idea of family, and hence that to be filiated or affiliated implies association as in a family. Whatever the genesis of the vulgar meaning of affiliate, there is no such phrase known in correct usage, or in any but ignorant usage, as "to affiliate with." A man neither affiliates nor is affiliated either to or with a Freemasons' lodge; but a local lodge may be affiliated to a district lodge, becoming a daughter lodge. A man does not affiliate with a political party or with a church; Filiation is sonship, not brotherhood. Filiation and affiliation were expressed by other words in the Roman law. In the English common law, affiliation means the assignment, by court decree, of a child, as a bastard, to its father; and in that system of law filiation has the same sense. Outside of the law, filiation expresses

the relation of son to father, and is equivalent to sonship.

18. The man who first used the word Phenomenon and its derivate Phenomenal in the sense of "something very remarkable" gave a palmary example of a Vulgar Error. In philosophy and in science phenomenon means only appearance, or, in the largest sense, that which is cognizable by the senses. One can hardly be in error in tracing the vulgar meaning of the word to the lecture hall in which the man of science, or the popularizer of scientific knowledge, would announce beforehand one of his experiments by saying, "The phenomenon you are now to see," etc.; and as the ignorant audience would the next moment see some striking effect of mixture of chemicals, or some strange electrical action, they would naturally suppose that "phenomenon" meant "scientific miracle." Some good writers have inadvertently employed the words in this vulgar sense; but that, fortunately, has not availed to consecrate the vulgar usage.

19. Decimation, among the ancient Romans, was the taking by lot or otherwise from a corps of mutinous soldiers, or from a body of prisoners of war, every tenth man and putting him to death; hence, the only legitimate meaning of the verb Decimate (Latin *decimo* from *decimus*, tenth; the process of taking tenths, as traceable in our own language, is tithing) is to take the tenth man and make an end of him. But if an army loses in battle about one of every ten men, that too is decimation. The idea of tithing for death is inherent in decimation, and in using the word we must not forget the arithmetic.

If either a much smaller or a much larger proportion than one in ten is lost, we must change the numerator of our fraction. But what is one to do in such a case? If one must have the precise fractional term in "ation," and the loss is one in five, let him coin the word quintation; if one in fifteen, quindecimation, if one in twenty, vicesimation. But he must never say, "the army was utterly" or "terribly decimated;" it is best not even to say, "literally decimated" unless the loss was exactly one out of every ten, and not ninety-nine nor one hundred and one per thousand.

20. Hypothesis is a Greek word identical both in its composition and meaning with the Latin word *suppositio*, whence English supposition; the *hypo* and the *sup* (*sub*) both mean under; and the *thesis* and the *positio* mean putting or placing. As there is in English no verb derivative of hypothesis except the awkward and ill-sounding hypothesize, the verb meaning to make an hypothesis, "to assume hypothetically," has to be got from the Latin verb *suppono*, to suppose, or from some other source, as the verb "assume." Hypothecate is often ignorantly used as an active-verb form of "hypothesis;" but hypothecate means and means only "to lay down as a pledge or security."

21. Transpire, in the sense of happen, is an arrant ignorantism. Its pedigree is short and ignoble. Expire means, to breathe forth, and in particular to draw or to give forth the last breath. Transpire (v.) means, in the language of physiology, to emit through the excretory organs of the skin; figuratively, transpire means to ooze out, as a secret does, through closed doors and thick partitions; hence, to have vent and

to escape unnoticed. Some inattentive reader of such passages as this from Cowper: —

> "Pierced with a thousand wounds, I yet survive;
> My pangs are keen, but no complaint transpires;"

taking transpire as equal to follow, began himself to use the word in that sense; and the meaning to happen, to occur, was then but one short step lower.

22. Refer, Allude. These two verbs are synonymous in their use as words to express mention of a subject-matter in discourse. They both denote passing attention to some matter, never anything like discussion of it, study of it, weighing of it. Yet in common usage, both in speaking and writing, the very title-subject of a discourse is spoken of as "the subject referred to," or "alluded to" by writer or speaker. Refer seems to be ousting by degrees from conversational use such words as mention, recite, tell, or even recount, *e. g.*, "The train of events referred to by the speaker as accounting for," etc.; that train of events had been set forth with some detail by the speaker; one might as well say "hinted at" as "referred to" in such a case. A very remarkable instance of misuse of the verb Allude is seen in the form of contract for supply of gold coins and bullion between the Rothschilds and other men of money on one part, and the Secretary of the Treasury on the other (1895). Toward the end of the instrument, after the nature of the bonds to be given by the Treasury had been defined with all the minuteness the occasion demanded, those very bonds are mentioned as "the bonds here alluded to." In view of the manner in which that loan was negotiated,

the drawer-up of the contract might be pardoned had he "alluded" to the whole transaction as "this funny business."

23. "Over his own signature" is a gross ignorantism. When one certifies that a mortgage that he gives is given "under" his hand and seal, "under" is not used to denote the place of the seal and signature; it means that they, as it were, cover its every word, and give to the whole authenticity. Hence, though seal and sign-manual appear on the back of the document, it is still "under" them: the hand and seal are over it all. And though the date of an instrument or a letter be given at the foot of the writing, still is the document or letter given "under" the date. This "over the signature" is very plainly the dictate of a language-conscience that is ill at ease and vexed by scruples.

24. Of a dead law, the words remain written in the statute book, but the life is gone out of them; the words are dead letter. A law that is not enforced, though occasions for its enforcement be of frequent occurrence, becomes a dead law, dead letter; but it is dead only in the estimation of people unacquainted with the usage of courts. Under the English common law, no statute becomes antiquated or a dead letter through non-enforcement, even over a period of centuries; this was seen in 1880 when a statute of Edward III. (fourteenth century) that had been for hundreds of years dormant, was called out of its long sleep and enforced in Ireland. Letters in the post-office, which cannot be forwarded to their destination through impossibility of finding the person addressed, are fitly called dead letters. Examples of misuse of

the phrase dead letter are often seen in the newspapers, *e. g.*, "the formation of companies is practically a dead letter;" the speaker's meaning was that no companies were forming.

25. Sleuth denotes the track of a living creature, in particular the track of a wild animal, object of the chase; hence, sleuthhound, the hound which tracks an animal. In the terminology of the chase, the deer's sleuth is called slot. A sobriquet for a detective officer of police is "Old Sleuth," and in a semi-humorous way the newspapers commonly mention a detective as a sleuth; their readers, not thinking of the humor, take sleuth to be a regular synonym of detective. The only meaning the word has in sober English is track or footprint, — exactly the same, etymologically, as vestige.

26. Pleasant (of weather). Fair or agreeable weather may rightly be called pleasant weather. And we may say, "it is rainy," "it is cloudy," but not "it is pleasant," nor "is it," or "will it be pleasant to-day?"

27. Teem (v.) means to bring forth young, as an animal, or fruit as a plant; to be prolific; to be full-stocked. But the chief manager of a great trunk line of railroads speaks of the line "teeming with trains."

28. Wage (v.). One nation wages, or carries on war against another; but it is an ignorantism to say "the war wages." But, like "the house is building," "his health is mending," so "the war is waging," is idiomatic English. Etymologically, "to wage" is to put at hazard, to bet, to wager; hence to take chances, as with a war, to wage a war; that etymological point is worth remembering; finally, the word

means to "carry on" a war. But in the phrase, "a controversy is waging," the verb is used illegitimately.

29. What is the rationale of the Attraction mentioned in such a phrase as "Attracted by the desire to study humanity;" or "Attracted to the support of the bill by the belief that," etc.? We do not say that a steamboat is attracted to a point forward in its course; it is propelled thither. Similarly, desires may be said to propel or urge on; and so too belief. The force of attraction we must needs figure to ourselves as residing in the body to which another body is attracted, *e. g.*, in the lodestone to which iron-filings are attracted, drawn; in short, attraction is pulling, not pushing; and the form of phrase given above is illegitimate, and not to be used whatever "authority" may stand for it.

30. Share (v. intrans.) is properly used only when the one who shares gets or takes for himself a share in something that is divided between himself and others. We do not share in a conference. We may share in a banquet or in an estate or in a bequest, but we are not sharers in a public meeting. The verbs to share and to participate are largely interchangeable, so too are sharing and participation; and if in anything one cannot be said to share or have a share, neither can he be said to participate or to have participation. This was overlooked by the person who wrote, in the editorial page of a great newspaper, "participance of their sex in the news of the day." But perhaps the new-coined word does not mean participation or sharing.

31. Venerable is quite commonly used as synonymous with aged; so that often in sober earnest a

hoary old villain is called "venerable," and one shall read of a "venerable suit at law." But venerable means worthy of reverence and that only; and whether the object is an aged man, or an ancient crockery pot, it is not venerable unless it has, or he has, some title to veneration other than age or antiquity. The title to veneration possessed by ancient ruins is in their association with man; apart from man and religion, nothing is rightly said to be venerable. The skeleton of a megalosaurus of a million of years ago is no more venerable than the clay in which it lay. Nevertheless, maturity of years, if not fulness of years, is tacitly agreed to be a sort of subcondition of venerability, in the current acceptation of the term. However worthy of honor, or even veneration, a man might be who is still in the twenties or thirties or forties, we should hesitate to call him venerable. And though the fledgling just out of the theological school is "reverend" for everybody, the archdeacon must often, in the first days of his archidiaconal honors, feel slightly nervous when he is styled venerable, unless he has at least some sprinkling of gray in his raven or chestnut locks. The archdeacon who lacks the title of gray hairs, would do well to have himself tonsured.

32. Nonplus indicates the mental state of a man so worsted in debate or controversy that *plus non habet*, he has nothing more to say, no further reasons to adduce; he is at the end of his argumental resources. Such a man is not one bamboozled nor puzzled. Dictionarians give as meanings of nonplus, or being at nonplus, perplexity, puzzlement, bewilderment, but cannot cite from literature authorities for such mean-

ings. When South writes, "The nonplus of my reason will yield a fairer opportunity to my faith," he gives no sanction at all to this new meaning. What South says and means is, that when his reason comes to the end of its resources, and can advance no farther, then has his faith a fairer opportunity. A flagrant misuse of nonplus is had in this sentence: "The railroad companies are doing their best to nonplus the public with the belief," etc.

33. It is a mere ignorantism to use the word Balance in the sense of remainder; it is language of the shop, Pidgin-English. "I will send the balance of the tripe to-morrow." "That will do for the present; you can slick up the balance of the shop to-morrow." When a fishmonger is selling sprats and the scales are not in equipoise, he throws in one more sprat, and that sprat may, by a lawful metonymy, be called the balance; but even a fishmonger might hesitate to call that part of an order for sprats which he fills by supplementary delivery the balance.

34. The word or prefix Extra is very commonly used in conversation in the same sense as super, supra; thus we hear, "extra good," "extra cheap." Extra has no such meaning; its true force we see in the word extraordinary, which, instead of denoting a greater ordinariness, means "out of the ordinary." A few examples will serve to show the native signification of this prefix: extradition means giving up to an outside authority; extra-judicial, out of the ordinary course of judicial duty; extralogical, lying outside the province of logic; extramundane, outside of the world; extraregular, beyond rules. The abuse of extra has gone so far that many readers probably

will be surprised to learn that in correct usage extra never has the effect of intensifying the meaning of the word to which it is prefixed. Almost as objectionable a use of extra as the one just mentioned, is seen in the hybrid word patched up (not coined) by E. B. Tylor, extra-historic — which the vulgar will surely understand in the opposite sense to that intended by its originator; for by extra-historic Tylor means "outside of history," while the inevitable vulgar meaning will be "super-historic," that is, in a higher degree historic. But apart from this popular misapprehension of its signification, "extra-historic" is to be condemned as being a hybrid word of Latin *extra* and Greek *historic*. The right prefix would have been *ex* or *exo*, which is the exact equivalent of Latin *extra*. If the vulgar will misunderstand the true signification of *exhistoric*, be the blame upon them; the coiner of the word would be blameless.

35. The two words Deprecate and Depreciate give frequent occasion to Mrs. Partingtonisms, one being used instead of the other. A distinguished man of letters, in a communication to the starchiest of American evening newspapers, writes: "Much as I depreciate any unnecessary delay." What he meant to write, or what he should have written, was deprecate; and it is hardly doubtful that his copy had deprecate, made depreciate by the compositor who put the matter in type. But less learned persons may perhaps need a hint at the distinction between the words; that distinction is found in their etymology. Depreciate (Latin *de*, away, off, down, *pretium*, price, prize) denotes lowering price or estimation. Deprecate (Latin *de*, away, etc., *precor*, pray) means to pray a

thing away, to pray against anything. Such are the original meanings of the words; with these in mind, there is no danger of mixing the two words.

36. The use of depreciate for deprecate by a man of literary distinction was beyond a doubt either a mere slip of the pen, or a typist's error, or a compositor's mistake. But a still brighter light of the literary firmament, a man who stood in the front rank of literati, when taken in the act of deriving our word Polite from the Greek *politēs*, citizen, made a disingenuous defence; he said it was a slip of the pen — a thing as likely to occur in the case as for "two thousand, nine hundred and seventy-nine dollars" to be written out in full by a slip of the pen for "39 cents;" and this serious slip of the pen he further excused — that is, he sought to palliate the ignorantism — by classing it with those chance errors which about that time got the name of Heterophemies. Honesty is the best policy; better confess the ignorantism, better confess to having been lured by False Lights in etymology, than to try to cover the error with so gauzy a veil. The then new-coined "Heterophemy" (literally, "saying the other thing") is when a man intending to speak one word utters a different one: *e.g.*, says green, when he means red; it is a good and serviceable word, but it did not at all apply in the case of the derivation of polite from *politēs*. The distinguished littérateur "meant to say the other word." But he forgot to tell what that "other word" could be. The defence was weak, flimsy; it was a sneaking defence: but the learned word Heterophemy got him acquittal from a very lenient court, even as bediamonded pilferers are acquitted as being kleptomaniacs, not thieves; but

the heterophemists and the kleptomaniacs understand well that, written out in full, the sentence of the court would read, "Acquitted: but don't do it again." No woman wearing a dollar shawl ever pleaded kleptomania in abatement; no police judge would listen to her nonsense. And no Grub-Street poet would dare to excuse his ignorance of elementary Greek by alleging a habit of Heterophemy. Truly, to him that hath shall be given. The English word "polite" is the past participle, *politus*, of the Latin verb *polio*, to smooth, furbish, polish. Polite literature is elegant literature, as distinguished from merely useful. Politeness means social polish.

37. The eminent poet, humorist, and essayist whose surprising slip in Greek was so benignly condoned, made in the same essay or address quite as serious a lapsus in Latin; but his critic either failed to detect it, or chose not to take notice of it. In a letter to the journal in which the erroneous derivation of polite was first pointed out, another critic showed that the distinguished author's etymological argument to prove that Civility is also a product of city life, was hardly less faulty than his derivation of "polite." It is true beyond all question that civility, civil (*civilitas*, *civilis*), are derivatives of *civis*, which means citizen; but in Latin no more than in English does Citizen (*civis*) mean freeman of a city: rather less in Latin than in English; for whereas in English citizen or "cit" is locally used to signify freeman or denizen of a city, as distinguished from inhabitant of the country, it never had that narrower meaning in Latin. Citizen and countryman are opposite terms in English, never in Latin. In Latin, it is not Citizen versus

Countryman, but townsman or cityman (*urbanus*) against countryman. Hence, etymologically regarded, Civility is not a product of city life, but of life in a regulated state (*civitas*). Apart from etymology the distinguished author was undoubtedly right; but his own argument was an argument from etymology, and it must be judged from the etymological aspect. In the matter of fact, however, he was in the right, for the City (*urbs*, not *civitas*) has been the cradle of civilization, enlightenment, science, art. The author stood on solid etymological ground, and not less solid historical ground, when he found in *urbs*, city, the source of all that is indicated by the words Urbane, Urbanity. If any etymological argument from the Greek is needed to support the contention that liberty, enlightenment, civilization are the product of City life, it is enough to know that without *polis* (city), there had never been *politeia*, or well-ordered government.

38. The use of Identify in such a sense as we find in the phrase "identified in mining interests with Brown," or "with Smith's garbage contract" is an ignorantism; the proper words would be associated or connected, in the first case, and having an interest or interested, in the second. Correct usage gives no sanction to the employment of Identify in either case. One may "identify himself with the common people;" that is, make himself in feeling one of them, the same (*idem*) with them; but two men who ply the oars of a skiff are as much identified in that work as two exploiters who "work" a mine in company; there is in neither case identification.

39. Phalanx means a body of armed men, usually

an oblong parallelogram in close battle order. Polybius is quoted for a description of the Macedonian phalanx from which it appears that that typical Greek military formation was "a square battail of pikemen, consisting of sixteen in flank and five hundred in front; the soldiers standing so close together that the pikes of the fifth rank were extended three foot beyond the front of the battail." Such being the phalanx, the phrase "solid phalanx" is pleonastic; for unless the battalion or formation is solid, there is no phalanx. A promiscuous crowd is in no tolerable sense a "solid phalanx," nor a phalanx at all.

40. In one of the resolutions of a semi-political convention, the national administration "in power" at the time was denounced as recreant — by which the resolutioners meant craven, cowardly — and the Congress then sitting at Washington as truculent. The context showed that what was faulted in President and Congress was the subservience of both to the wishes of "the money power," the President truckling to the trusts and combinations, and Congress slavishly obeying the commands of the chief executive. The writer of the resolution in question, and the convention which adopted it, understood "Truculent" as synonymous with truckling; but though the two words sound so much alike, they are as far apart as rain and ruin; there is even a conflict of meanings between them. *Truculentus* (Latin) is a strengthened and lengthened form of *trux* (wild, ferocious), and means stern, grim, fell, cruel; and the English word truculent signifies all that and nothing else; there is in truculent no faintest suggestion of such meanings as fawning, cringing, or obsequiosity. Truck-

ling was the epithet the author and those on whose behalf he swung the pen needed, — *sua si bona norat*, had he known what he did want; the verb truckle is from the name of a low bed on casters, that can be trundled under a higher bed.

41. In a manifesto of a similar body of social reformers occurs the phrase "vividly justify." An impression on the mind, or on the sensorium, may be "vivid," something that lives, and that does not quickly fade away. Colors that are bright are rightly qualified as vivid; they are alive. A description of a battle may be called vivid, if it suggests to the imagination the actual phases of the combat. In short, vivid (Latin *vividus*, living, animate) means lively, life-like; and as one would never think of saying "a life-like judgment," so one cannot rightly say "vivid judgment" nor "vividly justify."

42. Calibre used in a metaphorical sense to signify greatness or smallness of mental capacity, is a real gain to the language. But the figure is often spoiled by the incongruous terms of measurement applied to it. Thus men will speak of high calibre and low, as though Calibre were synonymous with scale, as in the thermometer or the barometer. But as Calibre is primarily the internal diameter of the bore of a tube or a gun, and consequently also of the ball or cartridge that exactly fits that bore, the question of calibre is one of greater or less, not of higher or lower; though difference of calibre in brain-case measurement may indicate a higher or lower in mental grade.

43. When the word Consent carelessly repeating our lish language, it signified both as one of the natives,

being of one mind or feeling with others; but in time it took on the added meaning of voluntary agreement or acquiescence, so differing little if at all from Assent; and to-day this meaning is the dominant one. This has led to the use of *consensus* to signify simple agreement in thought without regard to the will. The derivatives of consent express only the original meaning of the word (Latin *consentio*, to be of one mind, of one sense or sentiment), as consentient, consentaneous; except Consenting, which follows the fortunes of the word from which it comes. The original meaning of consent is seen in "words have their import from the consent of those that use them," where of course voluntary agreement is out of the question. As *consensus* was introduced to take the place of consent in the original meaning of that word, it denotes agreement in thought, opinion, or feeling; Consensus of opinion is therefore equivalent to Agreement-in-thought of opinion. Very often the phrase Consensus of opinion is used where "the general opinion," or "public opinion," would fitly express the thought. But Consensus of opinion is not only pleonastic, it is also absurd, in form at least. One can see how opinions may agree or disagree one with another; but how can there be agreement or disagreement of opinion with itself? We can no more have "consensus" of opinion than "concert" of a fiddle. An improvement might be made in the current formula by writ- and "Consensus of opinions;" there we have at least word trucansable basis of a "consensus," namely, there is in trucinions. The word consensus is not meanings as fawning, c the language: it was indeed a

desideratum; but unless it is held fast to the precise meaning it had for whatever scholar first brought it in, it will soon have a place in the language only as a component part of the faulty phrase "consensus of opinion."

44. Crystallize is very often used improperly in its metaphorical sense. Crystallizing, in the literal sense, is a notion familiar to all; we see it when ice congeals; we see it when brine is evaporated. In correct metaphorical employment of the word, there is always denoted some phenomenon or some process in one way or another comparable to a crystal or to crystallization. There is a metaphorical crystallization of the Tantalus myth in the verb tantalize: the whole story is, as it were, congealed in the word. It is no inept metaphor to say, that in the coin which represents a day's wage, the workman's toil of a day is crystallized. But in conversation you shall hear, and in demi-literature you shall read, of crystallizations that have no sort of analogy either with nature's process or its product.

45. If one of the ancient Romans were to revisit earth, making the descent at New York, should he happen to notice the "armorial bearings" of New York State, the thing that would arrest his attention first would be the, to him, familiar word Excelsior, and he would in his joy exclaim, Alabama — or in the Latin version of "Alabama" — *hic requiescimus*, here we rest. But the next thing would be to ask himself what that Excelsior meant, for he never in his life saw such a device in old Rome. "A strange device," he would exclaim, unwittingly repeating our Longfellow's own words. Perhaps one of the natives,

to enlighten the visitor from afarback, would interpret for him the poem from end to end in Latin as she is spoken in Gotham: in vain: the visitor would still be unable to understand the "strange device." No one perhaps would think of telling him that Excelsior means feathers made of thread-like wood-strippings. So the ancient Roman would perhaps seek a home in Massachusetts, where the device of the State's armorial bearings is Latin and no mistake. Who is answerable for that "strange device" of New York State in the first instance? Had he known the least little bit of the language of the Romans, he would have seen that something like "Altiora," or even "sursum," was what he wanted. But Excelsior! who is Excelsior anyhow?

46. When Mr. Isbister and Betsey, his sister, resolve upon giving a treat at their home in Great Camomile Street, letters they write their friends to invite; but do they send the invitations? Not at all; they *extend* them; and to the guests when they arrive is *extended* the bountiful hospitality of the mansion.

47. "Bifurcate dilemma," a phrase used by a noted social reformer, shows rather command of epithets than understanding of the meanings of words. Whoever says "dilemma," says with the same breath bifurcate, two-tined; for the dilemma is "an argument in which the adversary is held between two difficulties."

48. The author of "bifurcate dilemma" is sponsor for the phrase Political Policy, in which both words are debased to their lowest meanings — political there signifying what pertains to the "practical politician," and policy denoting the low tricks and devices of

such politicians. How shall the serious-minded reformer of civic life ever be able to inspire men with ideas of political virtue if the very terms he has to use in discourse are in advance emptied of all significance save of what is vile and mean?

49. Place (v.) means, literally, to put in a place; figuratively, it is used in an analogous sense. But in whatever sense it is used, there must always be some thing which toward another thing shall stand in a relation more or less like the relation of a place to an object existing there. Hence, place (v.) is not at all points the same in denotation as put or set. We may "put" a telegraph line in operation; by giving a swing to the pendulum we may set a clock going: we cannot "place" the telegraph line in operation; we cannot "place" the clock agoing. But the tendency is to substitute "place" for put and set in all meanings. We "place" confidence in a man; we "place" bait in a trap; "place" the thread in the needle's eye; one actually "places" his hand upon his heart, instead of laying. Not improbably we may give as reason for the supplanting of "put" and "set," the impression that many persons somehow have received that "put" is vulgar or low, as the same sort of persons suspect the respectability of little and big, for which they always use small and large. Another reason, or a contributory reason, for the avoidance of set and put is possibly this: It is known that many persons have no sure grasp on the difference between "set" and "sit;" and such folk very often by strict attention to business accumulate much money, which lifts them into the higher walks of "society." Society knows precisely the difference between those two

monosyllables, and they are one of the shibboleths of society. If a man offends when tested by one of these shibboleths, the steely stare of society calls him to order on the spot, and he becomes exceedingly nervous. To escape this ordeal, he wisely discards both "set" and "put," and here "place" is the all-sufficient substitute. He no longer, in his story-telling, says he set the hen, nor the hen sat, nor the eggs were set; but he places the hen, and the hen places herself, and the eggs are placed; and the place of that man in society is placed in security.

50. Blackmail, though it originally meant rent paid in kind and not in money (*i. e.*, in silver, white specie), but in farm products, cattle, etc., has long been used only in the sense of money exacted on threat of defamation; "mail" is the ancient name of a small silver coin in English and French. To threaten a person with exposure of secrets that would bring him into disrepute is to attempt blackmailing; actually to extort money by such means is to levy blackmail. The threat of the exposure of the secrets is justly compared to holding a club over a man's head to enforce compliance with a demand; but Blackmail is not in any figurative sense a club; hence, in the following passage from the speech of a noted political leader, the term is used in a sense that has no sanction in etymology or in right usage: "Trusts confer valuable favors on officials and legislators, and hold such secret dealings as Blackmail over the heads of their beneficiaries, to make them their bondservants forever."

51. Within the last few years, the word Compensation has assumed a new meaning. Till that time com-

pensation was the satisfaction given by a debtor or a wrongdoer for debt incurred or injury done. The new additional meaning is, enforced surrender, by one who has been robbed by one highwayman, of an equal proportion of his property to each of the robber's associates; such is the meaning of compensation now in the language of diplomacy, when the great Christian powers deal with the benighted heathen world.

52. In right usage, the word Mutual has the definite meaning of reciprocal, from one to other. It is a useful word, when rightly employed. But very often, indeed, it is wrongly employed, ignorantly employed to signify not reciprocation, but community. And when a dictionary comes to be compiled, the abusive employment is treated with deference, because "it is sanctioned by high authority" — and the authority cited is Dickens. This is as though a toper, being exhorted to refrain from his vicious indulgence, should excuse himself by alleging that he once saw the most highly respected character in the village sip wine. But no matter who it is that does violence to the proprieties of speech, or the precepts of morality, his example is only a proof of human infirmity, not a precedent to be followed; a sensitive grammatical conscience will not, any more than a sensitive moral conscience, accept as authority vicious examples, even though set by the best of men. An instance of the vicious use of the word mutual is had in an official report of a high military commander, where a joint attack upon the Spaniards at Manila by American troops and Filipinos is called a mutual attack.

53. Exhaustive knowledge of China and the Chinese is a phrase that does not offend the ear nor the rules of grammar; but it offers mortal insult to the understanding! What is it to exhaust? To drain to the bottom, in the physical sense, to pump dry. In the figurative sense, it means, to leave unexplained no feature of a matter of study or research. The phrase is a wild exaggeration.

54. If a corporation, so called, denies a petition of its employees, its act is the corporation's refusal; but it is not a "corporate refusal." When a candle goes out, and it is lighted again, there is nothing done that could justify the phrase "The flame is re-ignited." A reduction of the number of trains daily running on the railroads of England is called in a cable telegram from London a diminution of trains, though in fact the trains were probably made larger or longer.

55. In the same telegram from London, we have an example of false use of the verb foreshadow: The presidents of railway companies foreshadow an era of depression — meaning that they foresee it; but that is not the signification of foreshadow.

56. In the same telegram also, in passing, we may note the misuse of the word Era. Unless the railroad presidents thought that a period was about to arrive, a period in some sense comparable, in duration and in the changes by which it was to be differentiated, to the Christian Era, or the Modern Era, or the Era of Representative Government, the word era is employed abusively. It is not probable that they foresaw anything more serious than a temporary depression in their business — a falling-off of dividends for four or five years perhaps; but eras are

not so common that a new one opens whenever railroad stocks drop or droop. Such a use of the stately term Æra deserves a place among hystericisms of speech. Exercise all proper efforts, is a faulty phrase: in effort, we exercise our powers, call them into action to make the effort; but the effort is not exercised.

57. In advocating before a certain State legislature the cause of a water-supply company, counsel for the company opposed the rescinding of its charter, alleged to have been procured by fraud and bribery; he defied the other side to prove the charges of profligacy or fraud. But it was not likely that the first part of his challenge would be taken up; fraud, bribery, plundering under legal forms are wicked enough, but they have no taint of profligacy, *i. e.*, shameless dissipation.

58. Though since history began no record exists of the wife stipulating in the marriage contract that the man have a dower, it is entered in a newspaper to the credit of one woman that she married the man of her choice "though he lacked dower."

59. Accident is chance occurrence, and casual is accidental; hence, the expression casual accidents is flagrantly tautological; it occurs in a masterly hostile review of Jefferson's political career (anonymous, two vols., 1808). The same author has the phrase penurious emoluments. Penurious is predicable, in prose writing, only of persons, as Webster's list of its synonyms proves: avaricious, parsimonious, covetous, miserly, niggardly; by the anonymous author, it is used in the sense of scanty.

60. The phrase "inured to habits" would seem to be tautological. Etymologically, inure is of about the

same meaning as exercise, but with an end or aim implied, that of forming a habit; its French equivalent is *accoutumer*, to accustom, to habituate; hence, to inure to habits is to habituate to habits.

61. Nearly all the figurative uses of the verb Invest that are now current — literal meanings it now has none — have their ground in the investment of money; that ground gives rather insecure foundation to the phrase "to invest energy;" energy is expended and applied. The wind is not invested in the sails of a ship; its energy is expended on them, its force applied to them.

62. To condone is to pardon, forgive. If a semi-civilized people plunder and massacre Europeans and Americans, merchants, missionaries, or legationers, the man who writes the history of those outrages may, if he will, cite facts to prove that those deeds were not done without provocation, and that responsibility for unchaining Apollyon rests not on the barbarous homelings alone, but partly also on the foreigners; but in so doing he is not condoning the offences of the barbarians; it is not for him to forgive; but a magazine writer in the opening of his account of the troubles in China expressly declares that his "object is not to condone the offences of Chinese mobs."

63. A hen Broods, sitting on her eggs; the poet can use the word in an apt figure, "broods the twilight;" and the attitude of deep meditation is well likened to brooding; but what analogy is there between solitude and the sitting hen that can justify the phrase "brooding solitude"? The phrase is taken from the foremost literary weekly of the United States.

64. Discipline is from the Latin *disco*, to learn, *discipulus*, learner, *disciplina*, the process of learning, but also of teaching. For time immemorial and down to our own day, discipline has been maintained in schools, the "school of the soldier" included, by the use of the rod and the scourge. Perfect discipline has, for its essential note, rigor, inflexibility; and indiscipline means laxity, looseness. No one ever heard of lax discipline being called lukewarm discipline, nor of rigid discipline called hot; hence the phrase used by an eminent churchman, "tepid discipline" must be rejected as inapt.

65. We have used the phrase Hystericisms of Speech: foremost among phenomena of that class stands the use of the grand and impressive word Tremendous, the introduction of which into the language of the common people was, there can hardly be a doubt, due to frequent chanting, in the church's funeral service, of the Dies Irae with its *Rex tremendae majestatis*, words which, for perhaps three hundred years, sounded in the ear of every Englishman many scores of times, and that amid the most solemn and impressive surroundings. Like many another grand word hallowed by religious associations, it has been vulgarized, till now the cheering done by a little band of soldiers in the open air is tremendous; that is to say, according to Webster's definition, "fitted to excite fear or terror; such as may astonish or terrify by its magnitude, force, or violence; terrible; dreadful." Webster gives no hint of any use inconsistent with this definition. He gives, as synonyms, terrible, dreadful, frightful, terrific, horrible, awful. Stupendous is a word

of a like weighty import, and it suffers a similar degradation.

66. Consternation is another word of weighty import; and it is one of the very, very few words in the language which have not been invested with a multitude of significations departing more or less from the etymological sense. It has never had in our language more than the one sense, that of such a combination of "surprise, wonder, and terror as literally or figuratively to prostrate the individual thus affected." — "Cassell's Encyclopædic Dictionary." Webster's definition is to the same effect: "Amazement or horror that confounds the faculties and incapacitates for consideration; excessive terror, wonder, or surprise; dismay." With these definitions of consternation before his eyes, one can measure how accordant with correct usage, to say nothing of probability, was the cable message from Dublin in January, 1901, which reported that city as hearing of Queen Victoria's death with "a feeling of consternation." A message from the gay city on the Danube reported "consternation" as reigning also in Vienna. The "London Times," of about the same date as the telegrams from Vienna and Dublin, noted a "spontaneous yearning of the universal human heart" toward the dead woman.

67. Very impressive is the prase, For all time; but there are few occasions in the life of man to employ it. Why, we begin to suspect the very sun of a certain tendency to extinction within a period of calculable length; yet you shall hear and read the phrase every day, Not for all time: "We are in those island possessions not provisionally, not temporarily but for all time."

68. Thaw out the cold: thus does a versifier translate Horace's *dissolve frigus;* the Latin poet's trope has its ground in the action of heat rays upon a frosty atmosphere, or the rigors of Winter: "dissipate the frost." But thaw (transitive) means and means only to reduce to liquidity, or to make less rigid, whether in a literal or a tropical sense; now cold or frost, though it may rightly be said to be *rigorous*, yet is never *rigid*, and therefore cannot be thawed.

69. For a similar reason — incongruity of subject and predicate — the expression "dense silence" is to be condemned. Unless a thing is in some conceivable sense, whether literal or tropical, thick, or crass and lumpish, as in "dense ignorance," it cannot rightly be said to be dense; now silence, when it is deepest, is comparable rather to vacuum than to pleroma.

70. What a ludicrous mixing of metaphors do we find in the phrase, "In the metropolis, the very *heart* of the *seat* of government."

71. The verb Refrain is from the Latin *refrenare*, to bridle, to curb, seems to have no noun from the same root as itself, except the discredited form refrainment. The word refrain, meaning the burden of a song, has no discoverable relation to the verb refrain. A correspondent of a certain journal which has the credit of being watchful over the style of communications printed in it, through ignorance of the two facts just mentioned, employs the word refrain as though it expressed the action denoted by the verb: "The entire refrain of the people from participation." An error of like character with this, is deportment written instead of deportation. This Mrs. Parting-

tonism is to be credited to the "Gentleman's Magazine" of London.

72. Books are made in great numbers, but the demand for them is limited, writes a "staff correspondent" of a great newspaper. Now what is there in the universe that is not limited? and whether or no the universe itself is limited, is unknowable. "The demand is limited," is the language of chapmen, and is a phrase that should not come from the pen of any man who cares for the essential content of books.

73. There is no doubt that the word supplant came into our language from the history of the patriarch Jacob, and that its meaning was fixed and defined by the two passages, Gen. xxv. 26, and xxvii. 36. Esau was choused of his inheritance and of the paternal blessing by his twin brother, who, even before birth, held him by the heels, thus foretokening the later device by which Jacob was to be made the heir. Supplantation, therefore, involves the upsetting of one person, or of one person's plans, by another who advantages by his rival's fall. Yet the respectable authority of the "Westminster Review" (January, 1901) can be cited for the glaring solecism found in the expression, "His place was supplanted" by another.

Section X.

SOME POINTS OF SYNTAX AND THE LAWS OF EXPRESSION.

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1. In the collocation of words in a clause very little is left to the choice of writer or speaker of English. For example, the qualifying adverb "only" has its post very strictly assigned by the laws of expression, and its due place is easily found on analyzing the clause in which the word occurs. A distinguished author begins a sentence thus: "The drama, upon which the curtain had only fallen a short time since." The "only" is misplaced; as it stands, it qualifies "had fallen," making it "had fallen only," but not been thrown down, or been rent, etc. The only was designed to qualify "a short time," only a short time, not a long time, minutes, not hours. Such misplacing of only is extremely common. The same author has "dishonorably treated him in return," the qualifying adverb again misplaced; its right place is after "him." *Obiter*, be it noted that here the word "dishonorably" is at best ambiguous, for the dishonorableness may attach to those who so used the person concerned, *i.e.*, in a way unworthy of men of honor; or it may mean "with contumely," undeserved contumely. Then it is doubtful if the latter sense belongs in right usage to the word. *Obiter*, also, we may note the in-

correct use — a rather common use and misuse — of since instead of before. Though "since" is often employed in the sense of "ago" (before now), as

> "Twelve years since
> Thy father was the Duke of Milan;"

it has not at all the meaning of "before then," "before that time." It is well to keep these distinctions of even comparatively unimportant words alive and in force. By misplacing of words the following sentence is rendered ambiguous: "This made valid claims originally invalid." The writer of the sentence might have avoided the ambiguity by inserting a comma after valid; but a better way would have been had he written "made claims valid that were originally invalid."

2. Sometimes through fear of falling into a syntactical error, one will use an adverb where the laws of grammar call for an adjective; conversely, one who has neither fear nor knowledge of grammatical authorities, will use adjectives for adverbs: "He worked the trick fine," "she sails beautiful." The substitution of adverb for adjective is seen in such phrases as, "he feels contemptuously," meaning contemptuous; "he feels miserably;" "it looks gloomily for John." In such phrases the contemptuousness, the miserableness, the gloominess belongs to the subject of the verb, not to the verb itself. In "he looks poorly," "he looks sickly," the "poorly" and "sickly" are adjectives, not adverbs.

3. There are many phrases approved by the best usage in which the adjective form is employed where the received rule would seem to call for the adverbial.

Such are "high-strung," "dealing fair," "feeding long, and fat," "lying soft," "seeing clear." In some phrases of this class the adverbial form can be substituted for adjectival, "clearly," for example, for "clear;" but the adjectival form is so fixed by usage in the rest, that to employ the adverbial "ly" would be a solecism. The distinction of adjective and adverb was not noted in the primitive language; and the usage shown in these phrases persisted after the line of discrimination was drawn.

4. The "to" which we use as an essential and inseparable part of the infinitive form of verbs, is the preposition "to," but the etymological signification or office of it is no longer perceived, and "to" is a particle and a grammatical element comparable to the terminations "-ing," and "-ation." No author who uses English with propriety and regard for established correct usage, ever separates the particle from the verbal word by interposition even of a monosyllable, by writing, *e.g.*, "to so direct;" the correct form is either "so to direct," or "to direct so." But quite intolerable is the phrase, used by an eminent jurist, "A purpose to in some way use the grand jury." One might almost as well say "contro stoutly verting," or "contra flatly dicting," or "per insensibly meating" for controverting, contradicting, permeating; for the "to" is as inseparable from the verb form as "contro" from "verting."

5. A very usual but highly ungrammatical formula of resigning an office fixes the date of the resignation going into effect in this wise: "I, A. B., do resign such or such an office, to take effect at such a date." The thing that is to take effect is of course the resig-

coron, or rather the resignation notice; then why not sir so?

6. I am escaped by the skin of my teeth, is a phrase which the most ingenious commentators of the book of Job confess is very difficult to expound; in other words, either the passage so translated in the English Bible involves a mystery, or its text is corrupt, — at all events, to say the least, it yields no obvious sense. Good reason that, why the passage should not be used, as quotations are supposed always to be used, as a means of giving force and clearness to discourse. When a thief just foils the hot pursuit of the police, he escapes by the skin of his teeth; why not by the skin of his toe nails, or the skin of his eyelashes? In short, the simile implied in the use of the phrase is in every conceivable case absurd.

7. In the phrase "ubiquitously to condemn," the adverb is used in the sense of everywhere, and that is the word that the occasion called for: "to condemn ubiquitously" implies omnipresence, ubiquity in the one who condemns. The use of such a monstrosity of a word as ubiquitously is an unpardonable offence against the laws of expression.

8. A well-weighed and discriminating tribute to the memory of Chief-Justice John Marshall, in a New York newspaper, on the occasion of the centenary anniversary of Marshall's installation in the chief-justiceship, contained the expression, "He bore himself so greatly." The meaning intended to be expressed by greatly must be, "with great dignity and courage, unquestioned integrity," and so forth. But it is doubtful that greatly is the fit word; at least grandly is more fit and fittest.

9. Not only in conversation or in hurried writing, but often in deliberate literary composition, a slovenly phrase is employed, like, "of the sixty-three years of her reign, thirty-seven of them were years of war." So frequent, especially in British usage, but of late also in this country, is the employment of Very as adverbial qualifier of past participles, Very dissatisfied, very rejoiced, that it will probably before long be recognized as legitimate and an "idiom." A similar false use is seen in the phrase, Far more entitled, instead of better entitled; it is used in the preface of one of the great modern dictionaries. There may be degrees of strength or weakness in claims to title, degrees of more or less; but in strictness there are no degrees in the right to title.

10. British usage has latterly favored the construction different to, instead of different from, as logic and analogy would seem to require. The Latin verb *differre*, whence different, has the meanings to carry away from, to come apart, to separate, and the expression of that idea requires "from." No one would say divergent to, dissident to. Different has also been, in good authors, construed with than; but no authority of writers can give the hallmark to so vicious a use. Nevertheless, in the editorial page of one of the leading journals of New York recently appeared the phrase, A different interpretation than that given by Wu Ting Fong.

11. In the following sentence, the intention of the speaker must decide whether "or" or "nor" shall be used between "papers" and "documents." The author from whom the passage is taken uses "or," though almost for a certainty his intention demanded

" nor ": " We have no papers or documents in regard to this line." If " papers " here means anything different from " documents," " nor " must be used; if the two terms are identical in sense, " or " is the proper conjunction to use.

12. " We was," " you was," " they was," *i. e.*, the use of " was " as plural of the past indefinite tense of the verb " to be," once had the sanction of the best usage; but now the plural of that tense of the substantive verb is " were," and " was " is a vulgarism when coupled with a plural subject. The phrase " had ought," as " he had ought to come," for " he ought to come," or " he ought to have come," is a vulgarism comparable to " had went." It is a vulgarism to use " as " instead of " that," or " whether " in such a phrase as " I don't know as I will."

13. Despite its plural-like form, " three and a half feet of water " is a singular concept, and is to be construed singular: " There is ten feet of water ": " foot " in such use would be better than " feet," and the ancient usage was always to say, for no matter how many such units, always " foot " — " ten foot," as also " ten pound," " ten ton," as we may also still say " ten ton " and " twenty horsepower." And as " ten feet of water " is construed singular, so is such an expression as $3,500, " three thousand five hundred dollars is due; " or " between three hundred and three hundred and fifty dollars is payable " : it is the sum, not the individual dollars, that is due or payable. For a similar reason, " an ironworks," " a barracks," are legitimate expressions. When we speak of the United States as a nation, or as a federal union of states, we have in mind a singular concept,

and it is to be construed as of the singular number. Scissors, nippers, tweezers, etc., are to be construed in the same way. All or nearly all the names of sciences, as Physics, Mathematics, Metaphysics, Politics (which, too, was once the name of a science), are singular in import, plural in form.

14. But what is the import of "every one"? Is it not "all persons," and not one person after another? If its import is plural, why may we not construe it as plural as well as singular, and say "every one brought their provisions." Say the same of "no one" — "no one thinks of themselves." In having but one form to express our "his," "her," "its," French has in some respects an advantage over English. Whether the subject of a sentence is man, or woman, or baby, the knife of any one of them is "*son* couteau." We are required by the received usage to say "his" where we mean "his or hers" — "one loses his presence of mind;" and for such situations it has been seriously proposed to coin a new compound possessive, hiser (his-her, pronounced hizzer). But a heroic way out is that taken, or we might say broken, by John Ruskin, who, in defiance of the grammaticasters boldly uses the plural *their* and *them* after "one," "any one," "every one," "no one," etc. Go thou and do likewise.

15. When addition of the inflexion s for the possessive case produces an unpleasant succession of hissing or hizzing sounds, the rule that the grammarians graciously allow for plural possessives ought to apply; when the plural form of a noun ends with s, no s is added: "Their Highnesses' Serenities." Euphony decides that question; let euphony decide

also the form of the possessive case in "Demosthenes' oration on the Crown," "Moses' breeches," "Xerxes' expedition;" our forefathers used to say, "for Jesu's love."

16. Near (prep. and adv.) is to be preferred to "nearly," except where the "near" will not express the intended meaning. "John is near fifty years old" is better than "nearly fifty years;" did any one ever think of saying "aboutly fifty years"? In "about in his eightieth year," the "in" is superfluous. Write "near undone" rather than "nearly;" in "had nearly lost their lives" the form in "ly" is indispensable; while "were nearly losing" should be "near losing." In the phrases following, the words between curves can with advantage be dropped: "infringe (on) the royal prerogative," "approve (of) the policy," "do away (with) an abuse": these are types of many other phrases that might be mended by a like surgery. "A year ago" means, not the twelve months just elapsed, but a point of time immediately prior to that twelvemonth: hence the phrase "within a year ago" is incorrect; to convey the notion intended one must say "within a year," or better, "within the year," or "within the past year." Such phrases as "going on ten years," "he had no end of trouble," "it cost me no end of anxiety," are homely phrases, and all the better for being that same; they are perfectly idiomatic, and therefore perfectly legitimate, and are not to be put out of honest folks' mouth in obedience to the rulings of grammaticasters.

17. "Enough," in the phrase "curiously enough," is an impertinence and a superfluity; the phrase is of

the class of "precious" forms of expression which comprises "more than pleased," "only too glad." No one thinks of beginning a sentence or clause with "curiously," but he claps on at once "enough;" well, but would n't the writer like sometimes to see just the least little mite less or more of the curiousness? That "enough" is tribute paid to use and want. Such phrases as "in the event that," in the sense of "if," and in a sense differing not by the weight of an atom of hydrogen from the sense of "if," and its sidepartner, "if by any chawnce," are much used as a means of making an impression on the vulgar; but they are hollow shams, pedantisms, and affectations that an honest man should scorn to employ. Such phrases doubtless are inventions of scriveners, designed to swell their charges for drawing up legal papers.

18. "Grammar," "grammatical," "ungrammatical," are commonly employed in a sense which implies that syntax is the whole of grammar. If one says "I is," or "we has," he is said to break the laws of grammar; the same is not said of a misspelling, though misspelling is also a violation of the laws of grammar, viz., the laws of orthography, one of the departments of grammar. Whoever uses words in senses not justified either by etymology or right usage, also violates the laws of grammar; but if they only avoid breaking the syntactic laws, their offence is not regarded as against grammar. Grammar, the grammar of a language, in the true and worthy sense of grammar, is the sum of the laws which govern its processes; it is both the anatomy and the physiology of the language: as veritable an anatomy and physi-

ology as the anatomy of the dissecting amphitheatre or the physiology of the human organism. Lindley Murray did n't live up to his definition of grammar as "the art of speaking and writing a language correctly," and the claim that grammar is such art has been scouted, because Murray did not, nor perhaps his successors, teach his pupils even the elements of the art. The definition is rigorously exact; but who shall profess to teach that art? No man learns that art under any master's teaching; but whoever does learn it, possesses an art and a science too that holds no mean rank among sciences and arts. Yet a writer on English words and their uses has a chapter, not the least elaborate chapter of his book, entitled "The Grammarless Language." A grammarless language is unthinkable.

19. In the Constitution of the United States, the federal legislature is always styled "the Congress." In that instrument, "the Congress" is the absolutely precise, exact, and correct expression; simply "Congress" would not be so. But in the Amendments to the Constitution proposed by "the Congress" spoken of in the body of the instrument, the no less precise, exact, and correct expression "Congress" is employed. That legislative body was yet unborn when the Constitution was framed, and so it was "the Congress" that was yet to be; just as the baby that is expected may be spoken of as "the baby," but when born, it is, for a time at least, "Baby" *simpliciter*. When the Amendments were appended to the Constitution, it was the federal legislative body that drew them up; but "the Congress" of the Constitution was no longer a thing in the womb of time, but an

actual existence under this sun: it was a fact, it was "Congress" *simpliciter*. And "Congress" it was in its self-consciousness, not "the Congress" any more. Hence, in all the Amendments, except once in the 14th, and once in the 15th, it styles itself "Congress" *simpliciter*. This is the style in the 1st Amendment; the word does not recur till the 13th Amendment; there again the style is "Congress" *simpliciter*. The 14th has four times "Congress" *simpliciter*, and once "the Congress." In the 15th, the word occurs only once, and then with the definite article. To use the form "the Congress," save in quoting the Constitution itself, or the 14th, or the 15th Amendment, is an affectation. Outside of the United States, mention of "Congress" rightly takes the form "the Congress," "the Congress of the United States." President Cleveland in his Messages used the style of the Constitution; for him Congress was always "the Congress." Very many writers and speakers have, since Cleveland's day, acknowledged him their master of English and American style by adopting his phrase.

20. In Britain, the head of the state and fountain of honor is always "the King" (or "the Queen"), and by that phrase no other monarch is understood throughout the British dominions, as by "Parliament," the British Parliament alone is designated. But in the United States, in the public press and in conversation, "Parliament" is a very usual designation of the British legislative body, and during Victoria's reign, the British monarch was in this country designated "the Queen": as though those institutions of our kin oversea appertained to them alone.

Ignorance and thoughtlessness alone are answerable for such use of the terms "Parliament" and "the Queen" in the United States; the proper forms are "the British Parliament," "the British Queen," or "the Queen of Great Britain." In this country, the phrase "the President," unaccompanied by mention of functions or relations that might serve to denote some functionary other than the executive head of the United States government, is understood of the President of the United States. Say the same of "the Constitution," "the Secretary of State," "the government," "the Treasury," "the army." A journal published in Britain would no more express the notion "President of the United States" by "the President," than, in mentioning in a detached paragraph the Emperor of Russia, it would style him simply "His Majesty," or "The Emperor;" and that is correct usage; only in Russia is Nicholas II. "his Majesty" unambiguously; only in Germany is William II. "his Majesty." It is an ignorantism for a person who writes in America for Americans, to speak of Europe as "the Continent;" in this western hemisphere, "the Continent" is this American continent, or the northern or the southern moiety of it. So "the continental sabbath" is a just phrase in the mouth of British canters; in the mouth of our canters, it is a solecism and an ignorantism — doubly solecistic, doubly ignorantistic. Another current ignorantism is the phrase the "Royal Navy," when the "British navy" is meant; for there are other royal navies besides the British. Catnip tea brewed by Grimalkin Brothers, purveyors to His Majesty, their Royal Highnesses and their Imperial Transparencies, passes

rexcellent in virtue of the survival of ancesarity and provincialism.

message of a president of the United States Congress" on the necessity of providing a f gold in the Treasury contains the follownce written, as is plain to see, by his own In the judgment of those especially charged responsibility, the business situation is so id the legislative situation is so unpromising, mission thus far on the part of the Congress ially enlarge the powers of the Secretary of ry in the premises, as to enjoin immediately action with the facilities at hand." To say such phrases as, "the legislative situation," lly enlarge" (in the otherwise faulty phrase ially enlarge"), "in the premises," "facil- d" (meaning powers given by law), or the ambiguous word "enjoin," which means e done or forbidding to be done; or of the hich "with" ("with the omission") est ween what precedes and what follows: the if it can be called a sentence — is a non no meaning, affirms or denies nothing. The as uncommonly brief, and the passage quc small fractional part of it; our sentendes, or was intended to be, a very imp of it. Hence this part being so dea and null, we should not say with John hat the message is "a clear and well- ment": it is neither; but it could not without being the other; nor with Mr. man prominent among bankers in the ~ie of America, that in that message

"the President puts the question in a nutshell," even were we disposed to make use of that outworn metaphor. In the same message, its author writes of the terms of a contract between the Treasury and certain bankers, that by it "the privilege is especially" (note here the second time how the author favors "especial" above "special") "reserved to the government" to make slightly different terms for obtaining the needed gold. That is an abuse of the term "privilege." It is not a privilege, it is a right, that both parties to a contract shall be perfectly free to define the conditions upon which they will contract. Another phrase in the same surprisingly brief message is "other bonds in terms payable in gold": what the author of the message meant to say, was what in English is expressed by bonds payable in gold.

22. A judge, in rendering decision of a very celebrated case, spoke of the three respondents or defendants (they were executors of a last will disposing of many millions worth of property) as "trustees *ex maleficio*." Then, lest the three inculpated trustees should regard the phrase, without quite understanding it, the Latin technical words, as imputing to them dishonest dealing, he said: "I do not mean to be understood as saying that *either* one of said defendants [they were three] committed any actual fraud. There is nothing in the evidence showing that all Mr. R——'s acts [he was one of the three] were free from fraud." Doubtless the judge's intention was to acquit the trustees of even the shadow of suspicion of dishonesty; but professional vanity dictated the Latin technical phrase, and that — though it hit

ugly look — had to be put in the first place: it is a mouth-filling phrase, trustees *ex maleficio;* and its ugliness could afterwards be smoothed away. But see how the smooth-stroking is done. The defendants "had not committed any *actual* fraud;" why the men had not committed any fraud at all, neither actual, nor virtual; was it even "constructive"? They had not committed any fraud whatever as laymen understand the term; and as the incidental explanation of thingumbobical *ex maleficio* was addressed to laymen, the language ought to have been such as laymen could understand aright. The court's intention to declare the three men free from all suspicion of fraud was thwarted by the judge's vanity to the end. He no doubt wished, as far as his vanity would permit, to declare the acts of Mr. R—— in particular to be without any faintest suspicion of fraud; but see how he does it. Why does he not say straightforward that "the evidence shows all Mr. R——'s acts to be free from fraud." Instead of that he says, "There is nothing to prove that all Mr. R——'s acts were not free from fraud;" the import of which cannot be got at without analysis of the clause; and one is left in doubt whether *some* of Mr. R——'s acts were not tainted by fraud. It was a mystifying phrase comparable to the old jingle, "tobacco hic, tobacco hic, will make you well if you are sick, tobacco hic, tobacco hic, if you are well will make you sick."

23. Peculiarly and particularly. Perhaps a humorist is not held by the ordinary laws of language; if that is so, it were best (for the English language) that he were read only by the well-educated, by those who are likely to discern just wherein, for his humoristic

ends, he uses the humorist's license, and who, therefore, will not make the mistake of accepting his words and phrases as grammatically lawful. Less instructed readers will not separate the licentious from the legitimate, and will import into their language of conversation, and so into the body of the language, solecisms and wilfulnesses of speech, uttered in play, taken in earnest. Such abnormities are readily taken up by the "bright young fellows" of the daily newspapers, who put them in print, heedlesss of the effect of them on the purity and integrity of their mother tongue. Once these words and phrases are in print, the competing word bookmakers shovel them into their omniumgatherums: thenceforth forever they have right of citizenship in the English language, and schoolmasters will be giving to their scholars tasks of "English composition" to make the young idea acquainted with the true meanings and uses of these language-sports. Many of the faulty phrases censured in these notes are from the writings of one of the great American humorists, but none from his professedly "humoristic" performances. Only when he doffs motley and assumes the air of a sober instructor of the people does his use of the people's language become subject of serious criticism. It was while enacting that rôle that he wrote of some one that "he is peculiarly and particularly himself." If that phrase has any meaning, it must be this, that the person "is in his properties (or characteristics), and in his individuality, himself." In all probability it means nothing more than "he is himself;" there you have perfect identity between subject and predicate: "he" is "himself;" "himself" is "he." In no peculiarity,

in no particularity can he be other than himself. The "peculiar" and the "particular" are humoristical; but why should the editor of a respectable review permit such outrages on the language?

24. One exhibits great poverty of expression whose one formula of assent or approval is "all right;" it is a much overworked phrase. "Real good" is a vulgarization of a phrase which, correctly expressed and employed where occasion calls for it, is both temperate and emphatic, — really good as opposed to make-beliefly good. "Every time" is not an improvement of "always." When two acts are of equal facility, or equal difficulty in the doing, it suffices usually to say that one is as easy or as difficult as the other; but not content with thus accurately, adequately, and temperately expressing the equality, common usage asserts of them exact equality: one is "just" as easy as the other. No one any more says simply this is "as easy" as that; it is always "just" as easy. A similar exaggeration is seen in the common phrase, "I am deathly sick," meaning only that the person is suffering nausea. So, too, a cold is always a "bad" cold. Such phrases are current everywhere, and they know no distinctions of age or sex; but there are similar hystericisms of speech that are peculiar to one or other of the sexes; it would be endless to recount them. Perhaps it is not superfluous to brand as slang the phrase, "he made himself solid with the Boss." The figure called by rhetoricians aposiopesis is highly effective when used discreetly; but its force is quite worn away when it is made the most familiar figure in ordinary conversation: "We had *such* a good time;" "I was *so*

pleased." "Going to go" is plainly inelegant; "going to come" offends common sense: such phrases are intended to express future action, and the future tense of the verb does that most acceptably: I shall (or will) go; shall or will come; shall or will be there.

25. Only too willing. This affected phrase is supplanting the simple word "Willing," and it is the model of a multitude of similar phrases. These are varied by substitution now and then of "more than willing," "more than happy," "more than gratified." These phrases all express a disposition of mind or will that finds adequate, apt, and forcible expression in "I am glad," "I am pleased," "I should like well," "it would please me," or "delight me." But the "precious" formulas have crowded all these out of use.

26. "In brief," "briefly," "in few words," might be used with advantage now and then, instead of "in a nutshell." That phrase is strained unduly when employed as equivalent to "in sum;" "in a nutshell the lecturer said—" so does a journalist introduce his brief report of a speech; was the speaker in a nutshell?

27. As if by magic. If ever the comparison was just between sudden and unforeseen changes and the effects of magic art, so called, the time of it is long gone by. We no longer believe in magic. If we still believed in miracle, a very true and forcible phrase might be used in the same sense — "as if by miracle." But as the modern world believes in neither magic nor miracle, it will be best to let the old and worn-out comparison go, and say nothing more about it. "Sud-

denly" or "unexpectedly" will fill its room very acceptably. There are signs of this phrase becoming too stale for use, at least in journals of the higher class. Hence the first year of the twentieth century saw the re-birth of the formula, as thus: "The strike subsided almost by magic." But the metamorphosis works no improvement; indeed it makes the case worse. By an exercise of imagination we can form an idea of what is meant when actual occurrences are likened to magical operations; but what is that potency which comes so near to magic art that its effects are *almost* magical? What is the hitherto unknown, unnamed, unheard-of power which, though not magical, is *almost* magic? In this tentative phrase we see what the higher-class journalism has been able to do toward ejecting the old formula. Another attempt is made by a newspaper whose literary standard is considered to be more accommodating than that of its esteemed contemporary; its preferred phrase is "almost miraculous." The two minds glide in one groove, and they reach the same destination. Their proposed amendments must be rejected.

28. *Facile princeps.* This phrase, meaning "easily first," will not serve, in the hands of one who is not schooled in Latin, as a safe model for use in constructing analogous phrases. A noted advocate of municipal reform and purification of politics has, in one of his manifestoes, the expression "easily entitled to the prize." It comes pat to say, "he won the prize easily," or "he reached the head of his class easily," that is, without much labor or straining. But "easily entitled" does not fit. The ease or difficulty of awarding a prize touches the judges of the award, not the prize-

winner; he may win first place in the competition easily, but the judges may have much perplexity in making the award; and "easily entitled" may be said of the competitor who labored hardest to win; his performance may have been so much better than that of the others that the judges had no need to deliberate, — to give him the prize was easy for them. But he who is *facile princeps* reaches the first place without effort to that end. Such phrases as "easily greatest," "easily the best-beloved," "easily the most popular" are legitimate; not so, "easily reputed greatest."

29. "Dear," when said of selling or buying, is an adverb, and to use "dearly" in such meaning is a solecism. Cheap is primarily an adverb, and that form should be used always both adjectively and adverbially, except where the ear calls for "cheaply." Things are bought cheap, not cheaply; they are also sold cheap, not cheaply. But as a prefixed adverb the ear seems to call for "cheaply;" "so great a victory as this is cheaply bought;" but the "victory is bought cheap." "Dearly" is governed by the same rule. The French *bon-marché* is used in that language in precisely the same sense as our word "cheap;" like cheap, it is both adjective and adverb. Our "cheap," as currently used, is of comparatively recent origin; formerly it was "good cheap," that is, "good market," in the sense of good for the buyer. Cheap is chap, chaffer, etc.; hence good cheap is not only in sense but in form the same as French *bon-marché*.

30. In "At a dear cost," dear is used illegitimately. That which is got at a high price may be said to be dear, being costly. But the price is not dear, nor is the cost dear. Price is high or low, and so

too is cost. Price is, both for buyer and seller, the assumed equivalent of the article bought and sold; but cost is the price the buyer pays, and the cost regards the buyer only; it is price from the buyer's side, but not from the seller's as seller. And though one may make many purchases of many sellers, when he pays, he pays the "cost" of them, not the "costs"; the plural form costs is used only of the charges incurred by a party to a suit at law. Unless the several items of a gross sum expended are specified as to dates and amounts, it is more correct to say "expenditure," than "expenditures."

31. Some persons of scrupulous grammatical conscience painfully avoid the use of the verb to ride, in the sense of being carried in a vehicle; if they are carried in a vehicle, they always drive, though they occupy the rearmost seat inside of a hackney coach. Even Baby drives, when taken out in the family coach for an airing. The scruple deserves to be strangled, like scruples of every kind. If Joseph could ride in Pharaoh's chariot, so may we, if we get the chance.

32. Many persons are vexed by doubts suggested to them by a false grammatical conscience regarding the propriety of the expression "spoonfuls," thinking that grammatical propriety exacts "spoonsful." A moment's thought would grind the scruple to powder. For when the Doctor prescribes for Baby medicine to be administered by the spoonful, he surely does not mean that if three such quantities are to be given, three spoons must be employed; and if there are not three spoons, how can there be three spoons whether full or empty? Or consider what is to be done if Doctor prescribes three half-teaspoonfuls;

must Baby's nurse razee three teaspoons to half-capacity? The expressions spoonful, spoonfuls, bucketful, bucketfuls, hatful, houseful, pocketful, are quite above reproach or censure, and to nurse scruples about them is to borrow trouble at an exorbitant rate of interest.

33. A like scrupulosity is seen when people boggle at such a phrase as "any one else's business." They are anxious and troubled in their grammatical false conscience, for they are persuaded in their minds that the right phrasing is "any one's else business." The argument by which they defend "any one's else" would make it consequent for them to say "his father's-in-law property," or "the commander's-in-chief orders," or "the attorney's-general directions." Doubtless their "first line of defence" would be a distinction between the forms of the two phrases, "any one else," and "commander in chief;" but there is no distinction between the forms of the two, except that one is hyphened, the other not. With or without hyphen — and the use of hyphen is purely conventional and without ground in spoken language — commander in chief expresses one notion, and the sign of the possessive case belongs at the end of it. "Any one else" is to be treated in the same way.

34. Some grammarians, troubled with scruples, think "every other day" an illegitimate phrase, and that literally and strictly it means "all other days." The proper phrase, say they, for expressing the notion intended to be signified by the inculpated expression, is "every second day" or "alternate days." But those Latinish words "second" and "alternate" are etymological counterparts of "every other." In Latin *alter*

is "[illegible]vice of delicate[illegible]m this *alter* comes *alternus*, one afte[illegible]hough effeminac[illegible]d from that is your "alternate." "S[illegible]cultivated and [illegible]tin ordinal number *secundus*. But in L[illegible] for to see? [illegible]usual, in enumerating a series of vol[illegible]nold, they whic[illegible] on history, for example, to say *tom*[illegible] delicately are[illegible]me first, *tomus alter* (instead of *secur*[illegible]46. Neither in [illegible]cond, *tomus tertius*, volume third, anc[illegible] Latin does the [illegible]hen the work has only two volumes, the[illegible]er primarily o[illegible] always *tomus prior*, the second *tomu*[illegible] or defect[illegible]f the scruple of the grammarians is of any [illegible] convers[illegible]ainst "every other day," it has the same w[illegible]ood whe[illegible]ainst "every second day" and "on alternat[illegible]y: hence In fact, if in Latin one wished to say pre[illegible]ly what "every second day" and "every other day" denote, he would have no choice but to use a formula [illegible]" all points identical with our "every other day;" he must say *altero quoque die;* but the plural form is both better and shorter, *alternis diebus*. N.

35. The phrase "he was given leave of absence," "he was granted a respite," may be said to have acquired rights of citizenship in the language. There is a perfect analogy between it and such phrases as "possessed of wealth," "I am told," "I am told a story," "he was taught grammar," "he was dispossessed." There is very clear evidence in Latin of verbs like "give" being used in the same way; but the Latins slightly modified the form of the original verb to fit the new situation. The Latin for "I give" is *do;* the Latin verb to express "I am given," in the sense here spoken of, is *donor*. The strictest purist will hardly condemn the expression, "I am given to understand." Of phrases like this Professor Marsh

cites instances from the best wr[illegible]e teaspoons to [illegible]sent day and of earlier times; of their [illegible]nful, spoonfuls, bu[illegible]the spoken language even of the mos[illegible] pocketful, are q[illegible]ons there was never any question. [illegible]d to nurse scrup

36. "Popular with the people" [illegible]e at an exorbit[illegible]f a person is popular, or a cause po[illegible]ry force of the term, and on penalty of[illegible]when people bogg[illegible]ar at all, the popularity has to be with[illegible]s business." Th[illegible]he president of one of our greatest ed[illegible] grammatical fatutions uses, in a public document[illegible]d in their [illegible] "a popular vote of the people." [illegible]'s else bu.

37. The phrase "That depends" i[illegible]nd "anyly just, and is not elliptical; it is not an aposi[illegible]em to sa"That depends" means that the validity of a [illegible]concandion, for example, is contingent, is undecided, literally, "hangs suspended." "The man was hanged," needless to add, "from a gallows." "That depends," needless to say, "on the proofs yet to be brought forward," or, "on this or that contingency."

38. When we say, "That is an exp[illegible]oded fallacy," the exploding is metaphorical; but the metaphor is not the more obvious one suggested by the doings of villain saltpetre, but by those of an audience in the theatre. There the people express satisfaction or approval by plaudits, — handclapping, stamping with the feet, etc., and our word "plaudits" is from the Latin verb *plaudo*, to make such noises. That verb, compounded with *ex*, out, and the diphthong *au* changed to *o*, gives *explodo*, to "plaudit out," or off the stage, to cry down, to drive the actors off the stage by noisy demonstrations of dissatisfaction. Despite the etymology, there is no doubt that the other metaphorical sense will yet prevail in the

strict vice of delicateness; and lies, *e. g.*, "campaign lies though effeminacy tically exploded by means of a me cultivated and h nite cartridge exploded under the for to see? A hem to flinders.

hold, they which a word that it behoves to handle wi delicately are n, it is *obnoxius*, formed from *ob*, to 46. Neither in o *ra*, harm, and means etymologi- ca Latin does the v shment. But its derivative mean- ing er primarily or very numerous, and not always cons or defect. e etymology. The *noxius* in the compo conversa ause of most of the erroneous uses of the wood whe en we speak of obnoxious stenches,— better y: hence sive. The word is used with strict propri in the Helvetic confession of faith, when it says, "man, because of original sin, became *damnationi obnoxius*," subject to damnation. There is a neat example of the correct use in Fuller's "Worthies," when of the religion of Queen Mary he says it was "obnoxious to exception," *i. e.*, open to; also in Milton: "obnoxious to any private purse," dependent on, indebted to. But because "obnoxious" to obnoxious to misunderstanding, it would perhaps be best to drop it out of use, substituting in the cases cited above the terms there given as equivalent.

40. The phrase Initiative and Referendum requires for completeness the qualifying adjective popular. What distinguishes the legislative method of the Swiss republic and the Swiss cantons is not that there is an initiative of legislation in Switzerland, nor that there is reference of proposed legislative measures to the citizens. Every secular legislative body possesses, of course, with or without restrictions, the

right to propose bills; and tha[illegible] teaspoons to hser[illegible] initiative of legislation that is p[illegible]ful, spoonfuls, buc[illegible]ss republic, and specially to some d[illegible]pocketful, are qui[illegible]the people's initiative,— the constitu[illegible] to nurse scrupl[illegible] the people to propose measures o[illegible] at an exorbita[illegible]ich the law-makers are obliged to v[illegible]ng or rejecting. Referendum (Lat.) [illegible]hen people bogg[illegible]at which "must be carried back" t[illegible] business." The[illegible]as we say, referred to the people for[illegible] grammatical fa[illegible] In some of the cantons, all bills mus[illegible]l in their [illegible]med before they become law. In ot[illegible]s else bus[illegible]s, bills are referred to the people on certain[illegible]d "any[illegible]ns, *e. g.*, on demand made by a given propo[illegible]em to sa[illegible]he citizenship. When a draft of a constitution [illegible] amendments to a constitution are submitted to popul[illegible]ar vote, to be approved or rejected, as a whole or in parts, such submission is a referendum. In the United States, there is no popular initiative of legislation, except in the assemblies known as town meetings.

41. The phrase Human Docume[illegible], much affected by French "realist" writers, sounds odd; it brings before the eyes of the imagination some such figure as a man with writing tattooed on his back. Nevertheless, it is in the strictest sense consistent with the etymology of the word "document;" for even in English document was not always a record or an instrument in writing; whatever material thing serves as a means of teaching or of proving may fitly be called a document. In Latin, document (*documentum*) has about the same meaning as monument (*monumentum*); etymologically they signify literally that which is a means of teaching (*doceo*, to teach) and that which calls to mind (*moneo*, allied to *mens*, mind).

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42. conversatio one of the words that are over-
worke ood when s from the Latin adjective *securus*,
our E y: hence, it ve secure, which means primarily
free fro nxiety. Hence, the first meaning
of the verb would be "to make safe," as from danger to life, or against theft, etc. Derivative uses are, "to make fast" so that a thing shall not fall out of its place; to put beyond doubt; to give warranty of the safety of a loan for the payment of a debt; to insure the restoration of a thing if lost or destroyed; finally, by a process of thought not easily traceable, it gets the meaning "to get possession," to obtain. It is in this last sense that the word is overworked. We no longer get, or obtain, or come into possession of, or procure; we nowadays "secure" a situation, secure a bargain, a meal, a theatre ticket, a match to light our pipe; nay, even we "secure securities" — the phrase is taken from a newspaper.

43. Any one who stops to think will see that Feeling, the verb to feel, is overworked. Examples gathered in one half-column of a newspaper: "As a democrat I feel ashamed;" "I feel convinced" (twice); "I feel ashamed." Is not "I am ashamed"

far better and stronger, and [illegible] teaspoons to [illegible] felt? That one "feels" cor[illegible]ful, spoonfuls, bu[illegible]quence to anybody but himse[illegible] pocketful, are qu[illegible] may be of some interest. T[illegible] to nurse scrup[illegible] one of these instances of "[illegible] at an exorbit[illegible] thus: "I feel convinced tha[illegible] have been concerned in a trans[illegible] when people bogg[illegible] etc. Probably the writer intended [illegible] business." Th[illegible] what ought to have been ex[illegible] grammatical fa[illegible]." If he meant "would," then he [illegible] in their [illegible] written "concerned myself with," instead [illegible] else bu[illegible]ncerned in." Our concerning ourselves [illegible] "any[illegible]bject to our will: not so our being concer[illegible] to sa[illegible]

44. The same journal which [illegible] these examples of the use of "feeling," had in the same issue a telegram from London reporting the doings of the British Parliament. Sir Somebody asked if the motion was "contemplated" [illegible] the standing orders. The speaker ruled that [illegible] motion was "within the spirit" of the stand[illegible] orders. The phrases between inverted commas are instances of inaccurate use of language. Standing orders do not "contemplate;" they may "cover" a motion, or "justify" it: for "spirit" read "intent."

45. What a miserable missnancy of a word is Indelicate. In that natural language of Stoic virtue, the Latin *delicatus*, delicate, was always a word of utter contempt when spoken of a man: luxurious, voluptuous, soft, dainty, effeminate, fastidious, foppish. In the Hebrew and Christian sacred writings, Delicate and Delicacy are never predicated of Men save as terms of reproach. But in our English language of to-day, the word which expresses the absence of

that vice of delicateness is used as a term of reproach, as though effeminacy and daintiness were qualities to be cultivated and held in honor. But what went ye out for to see? A man clothed in soft raiment? Behold, they which are gorgeously apparelled and live delicately are in kings' courts.

46. Neither in our own language does Vice, nor in Latin does the word from which it comes, *vitium*, either primarily or exclusively denote moral flaw or blemish or defect. This is true of Literature, not of usage in conversation. In common use, vice is hardly understood when said of a thing not of the ethical category: hence, it is a mild surprise that the dictionarians do not brand all non-ethic significations of the word "obsolete." And in fact it does not clearly appear from the five definitions of vice given in Cassell's "Encyclopædic Dictionary" that the word has any significations that are not ethical, though an exception is made in favor of the horse: a bad habit or trick of the horse is allowed to be a vice; but plainly the dictionarian here views the habits and ways of the horse from the standpoint of human conduct. Webster shall help us to two or three phrases which exemplify the use of the word for which we are contending: "Vices of a political constitution;" "vices of the procedure" — in logic presumably, for the phrase is quoted from Sir William Hamilton and likely has reference to a vicious circle of reasoning. Then there is the familiar phrase, "vices of the blood," meaning, not transmitted or inherited vicious propensities, but such conditions as poverty of blood, paucity of red corpuscles, etc.; it is a vice in a watch that it stops, or goes too fast or too slow; solecisms,

ignorantisms, and vulgarisms are vices of language; stuttering is a vice of the enunciation, dropping the h is another: all these things are, by universal consent, vicious habits, whether of blood, watches, utterance, or what not, and they have no relation to moral conduct.

47. The old cant "Getting religion" will probably, before long, be changed to the form "securing religion." It has made one step toward the suggested new form, a man in New Jersey having declared that he had "received religion;" another step already made is, "he took religion," modelled on "he took scarlet fever."

48. If the weather in Germany in the winter of 1894–95 was, as the newspapers reported, "terrifically severe," it would seem quite superfluous to add to terrifically "unusually," — "unusually and terrifically severe." Under terrifically severe winters, if they were usual, there could be no Germany; Germany would be Greenland or Iceland.

49. In a testimonial address to a man who had deserved well of his fellow-citizens was this sentence: "Your praise shall find room in the eyes of all posterity." It was an absurd expression, an incongruous figure of speech. For the organ of sense that takes cognizance of praise, as of fame, is the ear, not the eye. And then, find "room" in the eye, — that organ so sensitive that the minutest mote that finds lodgment in it causes distress ever till it is dislodged. In short, the metaphor, or whatever the figure of speech may be called, is quite incongruous. Nevertheless the passage is from Shakespere's Sonnet LV.

50. "To the contrary" is an elliptical phrase and

needs to be completed with "notwithstanding;" the essential word of that phrase, though it is commonly omitted, is Notwithstanding; this is not to be omitted, the other words are not essential at all, and will not be missed if left out. The meaning of the complete phrase is, "though this thing or that withstands, and favors the opposite view;" its origin is, in the ancient language of the law, ***quibuscumque in contrarium statutis consuetudinibusve non obstantibus***, — all statutes or usages to the contrary constituting no bar. "To the contrary" is very often used improperly for "on the contrary": "to the contrary, my opinion is," etc.

51. Doubtless the proverbial phrase, "Leave no stone unturned" was originally an exhortation to diligent search for things hidden. The use of it commonly leads to a ludicrous mixing of metaphors, as when George Washington writes, "No stone has been left unturned that could impress on the minds of the people," etc.

52. Through the ironical use of the phrase "esteemed contemporary" and "esteemed correspondent," the editors of newspapers have made it impossible for themselves to employ that most apt designation in a courteous or civil sense. And from the newspapers the sarcastic implication has passed into the common speech.

53. In the phrase "mitigating the lives of the poor," the verb mitigate is used illegitimately by a prominent moral and social reformer. Neither in English nor in Latin is mitigate (*mitigo*, to milden), nor its derivatives, employed save in the sense of abating severity or hardship or the like. The lives

of the poor might be made more tolerable by mitigating their sufferings. A converse abuse of terms is seen in the phrase, "ameliorating the hardships of farmers." Hardships may be lessened, they may be mitigated; to ameliorate them is to make them "better hardships."

54. The adjective Strenuous, with its adverb, like its Latin original *strenuus*, has this singularity, that though it denotes vigor, activity, forcefulness, physical, mental, and moral, it applies only to man and man's doings, never to things, never to animals. Further, in the best days of Latinity, *strenuus* was a word of honor, *c. g.*, *miles strenuus*, a gallant soldier. In the decline of Latinity, *strenuus* first came to be used in a "bad" sense: thus Tacitus has *mali et strenui*, bad, bold men; but still the epithet was applied only to man. In English, as already remarked, the same restriction of use generally obtains; nor is that restriction broken through by Milton in the noble verses: —

> "Nations grown corrupt
> Love bondage more than liberty;
> Bondage with ease than strenuous liberty —"

where the epithet clearly means "ready to do and dare;" liberty achieved and defended by the sword, if need be. But one of the prime favorites of the reading public of the United States, a world-famed humorist writes, "It was a note from a foghorn for strenuousness." Even the dictionaries, receptacles of all sorts of words and meanings legitimate, illegitimate, good, bad, worst, give no warrant for such use of the word. One of the voluminous latterday English lexicons gives only these meanings of Stren-

uousness: eagerness, zeal, earnestness, enthusiasm, ardor, vigor; which one of these expresses the tone-character of the foghorn? The co-radical Greek word *strenes*; strong, hard, harsh, has no such restriction put upon it as is put upon *strenuus;* indeed it is used specially to denote harshness of sounds; and though the Hellenes knew not the foghorn (more the pity of them), and so could not speak of its *strenos* (power and hoarseness), they did know the trumpet and its hoarse blaring (*strenes phthengesthai*).

55. A group of slovenly phrases: In "must have a place equally as good," the "as" is superfluous; "equally good" expresses the thought fully. "Going to go" is plainly inelegant and almost fatuous, however idiomatic or customary it may be; but the use of "I am going to" do this or that, as an habitual mode of expressing purpose to perform an action, is almost as objectionable. Say "I intend," or "purpose," or "mean," or "design," or "I am to," or "I will," or "shall;" not banning the phrase, "I am going" utterly, but not overworking it. Some speakers never "decide," or "conclude," or "determine" to do this or that; they always "make up their mind." Others, after "making up their mind" to act, as a preliminary, go about some imaginary sort of "work," as though "to get their hand in;" then they are ready for action. Here is a section of a conversation overheard on a railroad car; it suggested the present note, and the ink of the note was hardly dry before a still more striking example of the same kind of "work" was given in conversation by one whose mother tongue was not English, but French: "I told him I was n't going to work to pay him the bill; if

he 'd go to work and give me credit for my extra hours, why I 'd go to work and settle the whole thing right away. But what did he say? Why he went to work and began to," etc. The president of one of our foremost seats of learning is author of this sentence: "The Commission is at liberty to, and it purposes to, enlarge the facilities," etc. If that commission had been disinclined to, and refused to, "enlarge the facilities," the reason doubtless would have been given in elegant form, by saying it does not "feel like" enlarging them. It does not make a man "feel good" to notice such slovenliness in a document written by the head of a great and aspiring university.

56. More of the same kind: "The school of horticulture *turned out* a branch of a huge pension" (French for boarding-school, boarding-house). — "It is *probably certain* that Cæsar Augustus did send an embassy into Scotland." — "Enchaining the perfume by means of fat." — "Some flowers are *macerated* in fat." — "Take up odors in *an intense degree*." — "In *appropriate* proportions." — "Monument *completely finished*." (The foregoing examples are taken from two London newspapers, "Pall-Mall Gazette" and "Mail," and from a Manchester journal.) The following are from New York newspapers for the most part: "Bowing *profusely* to the audience." — "The surplus that —— [a deceased millionaire] *purported* to leave." — "The change of system is considered *fortuitous* [fortunate] at this time." — "Spain has ever *commisserated* [*sic*] the fact" (that republican government exists). — "He *extenuated* his *privacy*" (explained his reticence). — "Clearing my son of the horrible implication *cast* upon him." — "The fight

[controversy] reached an *acute stage.*" — "Americans used to be very much *in evidence in the flesh* in the Elysian Fields," in Paris. — "The ground *where* I am most familiar." — "A man *placed* under arrest." — "*Places* on him the onus." — "Almost *insurmountable* stumbling-blocks." — "Might cost the Liberals *power.*" — "The Governor never had any *notion* of calling an extra session." — "He was *prone* upon his back." — "*Reticence* to discuss election returns." — "The selling of beer freed from the *thrall* of the excise laws." — "Boys engaged in their usual *mission* of clubbing the peach-tree." — "The mayor will persuade him to take a *vigorous* view of his duty." — "A *rigid* inquiry" (into a railroad wreck). — "Consul X. condemned under French *auspices.*" — "Is *Civil Service* a failure." — "Republican majorities depleted." — "*Colossal* pools." — "A *flagrant* Tammany man." — "The District Attorney struck terror *at the root of the matter.*" — "A bitter [comma] sectarian fight." — "A plea for government [comma] postal and telegraph service." — "The woman *whom* witness supposed was his wife." — "Woman *abrogating* her womanliness." — "Compelled to make a *harsh* bargain." — "Sit on *self-constructed* thrones." — "Consider what may be done *in that direction.*" — "I'll *venture* that X. is *prominently identified* with the X. Congregational Church." — "Plentitude." — "Embalmed beef has *diseased* the soldiers." — "You went into the war *desperately* against your will." — "*Conservatism* in judging new gold mines." — "A *ribald* scene" (of drunken men). — "*Suffuse* the future historican with reverential awe." — "It deserved *intensely* the medal." — "Free baths a *tremendous* fac-

tor of health and morals." — "*Assume* a most vigorous campaign." — "The story as told, yachting trips and all, seems like a very *informal period* in the life of a rather unconventional young woman" (*obiter*, we never more say talk, but hold an *informal conversation*). — "A *foreign presence* [a needle] in the muscular tissue." — "Billiard-room emptied *as if by magic*." — "Cardinal X. was present and *asked for grace*." — "The *fervid* attention of the crowd in court." — "Repugnance which that church *engenders* against divorce." — "To *place* a price upon the blood that will be shed." — "The Philippines would *furnish homes* for Americans." — "Sidewalk *full of electric shocks*." — "Kilts *depraved* and improper; the *indelicacy* of kilts." — "Taking *rigid* measures." — "The beef-packers were *conniving* and manipulating things so as to deceive." — "Would leave *no stone unturned* to compel the railroads, etc.; not a *stone is left unturned* to get out of a carcass every cent's worth of value." — "The beef-packers have *envenomed* whole armies of innocent mortals." — "We can *withstand* the loss." — "Gave *just* offence to Great Britain" (meaning just cause of offence). — "The edict of the emperor fully complies with the *punishments* demanded" (demand for punishments). — "*Enlist* men in the best *phases* of Democracy."

57. Slang differs from Cant chiefly in its intent, which usually is humorous, and in its tone, which is nearly always low and mostly flippant; while Cant is at the opposite pole to that of humor and is always dignified, solemn, and starched. We laugh at Cant, but we laugh with slang. Cant uses genuine words of the

language, but in a professional, sectarian, or other partylike sense; slang, though its chief fount is in low life, is much affected by lads at school and other respectable classes. While it is fresh from the mint, slang circulates with marvellous rapidity; but like silvered brass coins it quickly loses currency. Nevertheless the words are numerous which have worked their way into honorable place — and won the promotion fairly — out of the purlieus of slang. Slang is not a mock language or lingo, nor a jargon; but in most of the civilized countries thieves and other elements of the Residuum of society have always had a more or less complete lingo of their own, and from that source the vocabulary of slang is largely recruited.

58. Cant, as a trick or habit in the use of language, comes in all probability from Latin *cantus*, a song, singing, and denotes primarily a sing-song mode of enunciation, like the litanies that beggars pronounce in asking for alms or in blessing their benefactors. Religious comeouters and neophytes in the days of their first fervor are wont to extol in fixed formulas the distinguishing doctrines of their sect, and by oft repeating their message to the unregenerate, fall into the habit of pronouncing the formulas in the manner of one who "renders a piece;" hence the phrase "canting hypocrites," all new-light folk being in the estimation of the orthodox and "the world" hypocrites. Another kind of Cant is the habitual use of outlandish words and the technical terms of arts and sciences on all occasions, instead of the homely words of the common people: "succedaneum" for substitute; "arachnid" for spider; "etiology" for causes; "trachea" for windpipe; "exegesis" for explanation;

"sodium chloride" for salt. A pretty safe rule with regard to Canters of this class would be to rate them as ignoramuses in their several arts or professions; they are vainglorious of their knowledge of the terminology, the A B C; would they be so if they were masters of the principles and processes?

Section XI.

SOME FAULTS AND EXCELLENCIES OF ENGLISH.

The Singular Power of the Definite Article.
Some Capital Disabilities of English.

Section XI.

SOME FAULTS AND EXCELLENCIES OF ENGLISH.

1. THE illustrations here to be given of faults and excellencies of the mother tongue are such as presented themselves casually while material was collecting for this book. The singular power of the definite article (see next paragraph) in polarizing the elements of a sentence, and fixing their several values and their mutual relations, came into view fortuitously and was a grateful surprise. One need not be ashamed to record that when first aware of this phenomenon, he joyed in the pride of new discovery. It was indeed a discovery, though doubtless the *speciosum miraculum* is for deeper students of the mother tongue a commonplace. At first, too, this truly marvellous power of the article was taken to be a peculiarity of English; it is not altogether so; but still it stands out with special distinctness in our language. In any case, the phenomenon, when first recognized, will not fail to excite admiration and to awaken curiosity regarding the wonderful mechanism of language.

THE SINGULAR POWER OF THE DEFINITE ARTICLE.

2. The definite article has in English better title to its name than in the other European languages; in English it does, as a rule, always distinguish the noun

to which it is prefixed, makes it definite. The article is seldom used in English save to mark distinction; while in other languages its use is imperative even where no distinction between one notion and another is thought of. In English we speak of philosophy, but the German and the Frenchman say in their languages "the philosophy," though they have in mind, not this or that philosophical system, but all philosophy. So when the German or the Frenchman speaks of "man" or "mankind," he must say, "the man," "the mankind," — "the man is mortal." We say, with marked difference of meaning, "hast thou faith" and "hast thou the faith;" in German and in the Latinish languages to use the word for "faith" without the definite article would be a solecism comparable to "he went to the Switzerland." And as the use of the article, in those languages, with such words as "rain," for example, is imperative, the English phrases, "rain makes the crops grow," "the rain was very refreshing," could not be translated into them literally, and convey the same meaning as in English. In those languages, the article must be used with height, depth, love, hate, water, bread, reading, writing, — all abstract and general terms; while we, by the English use of the article, are able to distinguish between the universal and the particular significations of such terms: "reading is irksome," "the reading was irksome."

3. The defining power of the article can be shown by experiment. In the following sentence all is indefinite; it is in form a universal proposition, holding good for any time or any place: "The governor ought to be strengthened and encouraged by manifestations of public approval." Now insert the article

before "manifestations," and note what follows. The effect of that apparently insignificant element is instantly felt by every considerable word in the sentence, and the universal proposition becomes particular. In the sentence as it stands, without the determining article "the," "the governor" may mean any holder of the office of governor, or any one who ever held that office: in short, it is of indefinite comprehension, as when we say, "the duty of the schoolmaster is to teach." The word "ought," until its import is decided, may imply moral obligation, or at least a certain moral congruity on the part of the governor, — it is right that he should feel strengthened and encouraged when good men approve his conduct; or it may signify a moral obligation on the part of the citizens or subjects (it being their duty to sustain the governor); or it may denote only a sort of logical necessity, as in the phrase, "the nourishment ought to give the patient strength," or "must give him strength." Thus does the sentence hang suspended between three or four different meanings. But insert the definite article, and "manifestations" at once becomes individual, differentiated from all other manifestations; "the" manifestations are not manifestations of public approval in general, but specific acts. And as specific manifestations of approval are not addressed to a governor in the abstract, and cannot be, "the governor" becomes a definite governor, the governor actually in office. And the "ought" is now, and not till now, seen to be used in the sense of "must needs" (logical necessity), without any implication of moral necessity on the part of governor or citizens.

4. When the lecturer on chemistry lets fall a drop of one colorless liquid into a beaker of another colorless liquid, and straightway the content of the beaker assumes a deep blue or other tint, or begins to fume or to boil or to crystallize, that phenomenon is no whit more striking nor more interesting nor more worthy of study than this polarization of the elements of a sentence when that particle is dropped into it. And he who studies the process of the "lines of force" in a sentence is engaged in a Natural-Science study every whit as truly, and we will add as profitably, as the one who studies the phenomena of magnetism. Yet you will see in the programmes of educational institutions their promise to give instruction in History, Geography, Language, Grammar; also, "in the sciences," or "the natural sciences," as though philology and linguistics were not sciences, nor grammar a science. If grammar is not a science, it is a futility; if it is a science, it is surely nothing short of a natural science: for grammar too is part and parcel of nature.

5. A few more instances may be given to show the extraordinary definiteness of meaning given to words by the use of the article "the." When we say, "the hair turns gray," or "the hair falls," we have in mind the hairs of the head of man, not, for example, the hairs on the hide of a camel. So when we say, "the skin," we mean not the skin or integument of all animals, but of human creatures only. The distinction between "skin" and "the skin," "hair" and "the hair," it is impossible to make so succinctly in the other languages of culture. So when we say, "the country," we mean our own country; and when we say "the

language," we mean our kindly mother tongue. On the other hand, we can say, "patriotism," "love," "money," "man" without having to prefix the article, — in such cases miscalled definite or definitive, being pure surplusage and defining nothing, distinguishing nothing from anything else; the Frenchman must say, "the patriotism" ("*le* patriotisme"), "the love" ("*l'*amour"), and so on; and no more can the German drop the article before the equivalents of those words in his language. Hardly less curious is the dropping of the definite article in cases where it is intended to make perfectly individual a word more or less general in its signification. When we say, "Congress," we mean the legislative assembly of the United States; a social-science congress, or a congress of a South American Republic, is not for us "Congress," but either "the congress" or "a congress." The same happens in the use of "Presbytery," "Convocation," "Parliament." But as a person writing in Europe and for Europeans would speak of our national legislature as "the congress," so Americans would, using strict propriety of language, speak of the British legislature as "the parliament;" and "convocation" and "presbytery" are for outsiders properly, "the convocation," "the presbytery."

6. The definite article, however, is used in English in some situations where the genius of the language would seem to require its elimination. The law of English seems to be that the definite article has for its office to give definiteness and distinction; where it does not serve that end, it is superfluous. Why, then, should we say, "the" pursuit of a runaway,

"the" study of Greek; and why should the definite article be used in such a phrase as "The pursuit of criminals is one of the duties of a constable," while it is dropped in, "The constable went in pursuit of the criminal"? Why should we not say "engaged in study of antiquities," as we say, "engaged in study;" in other languages, the definite article would be obligatory in both cases; in English it is not really obligatory in either; but in the first one its use is nearly universal.

7. The use of the definite article in such phrases as, "it is for the physician to prescribe," when no individual physician is meant, seems to be a departure from the rule; so, too, the expressions, "the" diamond, "the" lodestone, "the" topaz, etc., are hardly in accord with the natural law of the definite article; the same is to be said of "the" cholera, "the" influenza, but not perhaps of "the" plague, for any violent and fatal epidemic is a plague; one epidemic disease is called "the" plague *par excellence.*

8. There is a grammarian-made law that while "granting a license" is a correct phrase, "the granting a license" is wrong; it must be "the granting *of* a license." But the form condemned by the grammarians is in itself fully approved by the genius of the language, and the grammarians' rule may be disregarded. Grammarians have made a distinction between granting in one instance, and granting in the other. In the first phrase, say they, granting is both in form and in regimen a participle; while in the other it is a noun in participial form and got from a participle, but which has lost the regimen of the participle and the verb. Not so; in both cases the

word is an infinitive or "supine" form of the verb; it is the ancient infinitive mode, now become a noun, but retaining the regimen of the verb. All that can be conceded to the grammarians is that usage has given sanction to this "law;" but the earlier law is not thereby abrogated. A very interesting grammatical regimen of this kind is seen in the Latin comic poets, but hardly elsewhere in Latin. Thus Plautus gives to mere nouns derived from verbs the same regimen which the verbs possess from which they come; that is, such nouns "govern" other nouns as a verb "governs" a noun in the "objective," or "accusative" case. Instances of this peculiar usage are: *fugitivum captio*, the taking (*captio*) a runaway; *donum datio*, the giving (*datio*) a present,—*fugitivum* and *donum* being in the objective case; the regular grammatical construction requires the possessive.

9. The effect of the "indefinite" article is often to define. Thus, when we say, "he was helped a little," we define the amount of help received to be somewhat greater than when we say, "he was helped little." Often, on the other hand, strength is gained by the omission of the indefinite article: "Impelled by desire of study," is a finer expression than "Impelled by *a* desire." English is perhaps singular in saying, "a hundred," "a thousand," instead of simply "hundred," "thousand."

SOME CAPITAL DISABILITIES OF ENGLISH.

10. A very remarkable defect of the English language, though the same defect is seen in French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, is that it has no vocable

signifying simply and unequivocally "human being," an individual member of the human race, as such, without regard to age, sex, or condition. It is possible in Greek, Latin, and German to say in that sense, "a man is born to us," — *anthropos*, *homo*, *Mensch*, — though the babe might be a girl; but in English! Fox, squirrel, elephant, camel, rhinoceros, monkey denote individuals, male or female, old or young, of the several species to which they belong. When we would speak of a member of the human species (irrespective of sex or age) without ambiguity, we are compelled to use the clumsy phrase, "human being," or the like, unless the context of our discourse clearly shows that in saying Man, we mean also woman and babe. Often the employment of "man" as equivalent to those Greek, Latin, and German vocables produces ludicrous effects. Once a person was asked to suggest a Greek motto for a class in a young women's college. It occurred to him that possibly among the apophthegms of the Seven Wisemen of Greece might be found a pithy saying that would serve well the purpose. Either among the Saws of the Seven, or among those of some other ancient Grecian was found this: *Deinon ti anthropos*, Man is something to inspire awe. But first and foremost there is that word awe; and it was seen that the vulgar would at once say, "Man is something awful," — for no word, however sacred, is safe from profanation. The old Wiseman meant only to say what Shakespere said afterward, that man is "fearfully and wonderfully made." It is a grand sentence; but because of this "awful," but more because of the ambiguity of the word "Man," it was not to be thought of. How could a class

of young ladies ever march under a banner with that "strange device," "Man is something awful"? So the two termini of the motto being rejected, remained only the *ti*, "something," and that was now nothing.

11. The derivatives of Man in English are very few, and they were all in use before the language lost its species name for the human individual: they are formed from Man or Mann, the word meaning male human individual, and hence are rightly applicable only to the male individual, his characters, his works; these derivates are manly, manlike, manful, manhood, the verb to man, and the participle form, unmanned. But there was once in the language of the people, and still is in the language of poets, a word which answered well to *Mensch*, *homo*, *anthropos*. That word is Wight. But the comic poets have made "wight" their exclusive property, so that even the phrase, "luckless wight," *i. e.*, a human creature in misfortune, no longer suggests to us compassion, fellow-feeling, but mild contempt at best. We have already seen in the course of these studies of English words many instances of this "weathering," or "degradation" of words. When English-speaking men suffered the very name of the human species to become extinct, — a word more or less identical with German *Mensch* (we still have it, of course distorted and dishonored, in "wench"), — and then let the same fate overtake the name that in process of time was substituted in its place, they may be pardoned for allowing other good words to be vulgarized and degraded.

12. Another serious deficiency of the English language, and probably this is unique, is the absence

the infinitive form and other use-forms of the verb "can;" can is one of the "defective" verbs. But once upon a time "can" was no more "defective" than the verb by which the reach of "can" is best measured, the verb "do." The language once had the infinitive form of "can;" but that most generalized and most abstract expression of man's power, of man's might both physical and mental, was by inconceivable heedlessness suffered to go into obsoletion. Hence in English we have no form, except "to be able" (able, a Latinish word), for expression of the idea which perhaps all other languages express in one word, *posse*, *dynasthai*, *können*, *pouvoir*, *poder*, etc. That, except perhaps *können*, these infinitives are themselves compound words made up of equivalents of "be" and "able" (Latin *posse*, equal to *potis esse*), is not even a fair *tu quoque;* for the defect of English is that it has no one word, whether simple or compound, to express this master idea.

13. That this thing should befall the language of the English people, which is the language of the whole Anglic people, is unaccountable. For whatever other races and other peoples may think of the characters that are distinctively or markedly either English or Anglic, whether as lovely or unlovely, noble or base, that people's energy, will-force, conscious ability to do, have never been denied nor even disputed; that people are what they are because they "can," because they "are able," have ability. The abstract expression of this in a verb is possible perhaps in all languages except English. We can so express the abstract idea of what we do when we it read, write, eat, think, pray, pay, build, kill, in the

words, "killing," "eating," "thinking," etc., which are infinitive forms of their respective verbs; or we may use the other infinitive forms "to write," "to read," etc. But the infinitive forms "to can" and "canning" are appropriated by a cookery operation that came but yesterday into use. And not only have we parted with the abstract expression of the verb "can;" we have also passed a self-denying ordinance under which the straight expression of "being able" in the future tense is also banned and unlawful. The Latin says *potero*, the Greek *dynesomai*, the French *je pourrai*, the German *ich werde können*: but English has only "I shall be able." If the question is put, "Do you go to town to-day?" the answer may be either, "I shall," or "I shall not." Let the question be, "Can you do this," and the answer may be, "I can;" but suppose it cannot be done to-day, then the answer is no longer can or cannot, but "I shall not be able till to-morrow." It is passing strange.

14. What a poor excuse for a word to express the chief "ills that flesh is heir to" we have in "Disease," literally only ill-ease or lack of ease, equal to French *malaise*, which is used to signify only minor illnesses at most. Wiclif and other writers of the fourteenth century employ the word Disease exclusively in the sense of discomfort; using "sickness" to denote all manner of disease, and "sick" for its adjective, as we on this side of the Atlantic; and this far the larger moiety of the Anglic people still do and rightly do, though the English seek to restrict the meaning of "sickness" to nausea. Herein the finical English connoisseurs of the language are at variance with the usage of their own best authors. Even for those

afflicted with mental ailments, the older English language had a word compounded of "mind" and "sick." The Anglic people in their several divisions are really or virtually autonomous, as regards their use of the language, and they are not subject to the language-laws that may be enacted in the isle oversea.

15. How may we account for the rejection by our Anglic "forefathers after the tongue," of both the Norman-French and the Saxon words signifying the action of the gustatory organs in deciding the quality, as bitter, sour, sweet, of substances taken into the mouth? There was in old-French the word goust, goût, and in the Saxon, either a word allied to the German *Schmecken*, or to some other Germanic or Gothic root: indeed such a word still visibly subsists in the language, both as verb and noun, "smack," but its meaning is both broadened and narrowed for us, so that it is no longer the synonym of French *goût, goûter*, German *Schmecken, Geschmack*. True, we have in English the word "gust," from the same Latin word *gustus*, whence comes French *goût*, and this word is also both noun and verb; but again there is a change of import, so that "gust" does not mean the same as *gustus, goût*, or "taste;" its meaning is narrower; the word denotes not taste in general, or the faculty of perceiving the various qualities of bitter, sweet, pungent, etc., but only of discerning a pleasant taste, or, in general, a gratified sense. Instead of adopting any one of the three or more words that were ready to their hand, our Anglic forefathers did precisely what primitive man has everywhere done, and what doubtless the men did who first spoke the language which in aftertime was called Latin: they

took the word expressing a simpler and a more general sensation, the most general sensation of all — that of touch (Latin, *tactus*, from which is *tacto*, and from that the French *tâter*, to touch, grope, feel) — and restricted its meaning to the sensations of the gustatory nerves. Afterward, like the French *goût* and analogous words in all culture languages, Taste acquired the meaning of intellectual relish, nice appreciation of excellence in art, literature, etc.

16. In disusing what is called the subjunctive mood of verbs, the English language lost the power of "oblique narration," *oratio obliqua*, or that of determining simply by the mood of the verb the authority upon which a proposition is stated. Here is an example of the advantage possessed by many other languages in the use of "oblique narration," to make it plain to whom of many persons spoken of in a sentence or paragraph statements made therein are to be referred. In a newspaper account of the doings of a society of incendiaries in New York, we read: "The witness" — he was one of the gang who had turned witness for the state — "admitted that he knew all the principals in the Canal Street fire. He was in a store on the opposite side of the street. The firemarshal and a detective were with him." Now the question arises, on whose authority have we the assertion that the witness was on the opposite side of the street, and that he was in the company of the firemarshal? The context does not give the answer; yet on the answer to that question, or a like question, much might depend, if not in this case, then in some other. Is the reporter the authority, or is the witness? If the reporter had narrated the facts in Latin

or in German or in French or in Greek, he would of necessity have indicated, by the "mood" of the verb "was" and "were," the authority on which the facts are given: if the authority was that of the reporter, he would use the indicative mood, if that of the witness, the subjunctive (in Greek the mood called "optative").

17. In eliminating grammatical gender, and in giving to the definite article its singular power, the English language took two long steps toward perfecting itself: for the article as the English language got it had no such power; and earliest English had grammatical gender like all or nearly all the other languages at least of Europe. If in other directions this effort toward betterment had not been checked by sinister influences, English might have become a consummate instrument of expression and of logical thinking. The simplicity of forms which it acquired by dropping all or nearly all grammatical accidence is a priceless gain; but the senseless and systemless orthography, the scoliography rather ("orthos," straight, "skolios," crooked) with which the language has been saddled, is a heavy offset to the advantage derived from those other reforms.

Section XII.

ORTHOGRAPHY, PUNCTUATION, PRONUNCIATION.

OUR SENSELESS ORTHOGRAPHY.
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ORTHOGRAPHY, PUNCTUATION, PRONUNCIATION.

OUR SENSELESS ORTHOGRAPHY.

1. TILL comparatively recent times there was no law and no usage having force of law regulating the spelling of words in English. And this is true not only with regard to the domestic employment, so to speak, of the language in epistolary correspondence and the like, but also with regard to literature proper, works of poetry, history, scholarship, etc., published to the world. Not only was no law of orthography recognized by authors as imposed upon them, they made no orthographic law for themselves; they had no care to be consistent with themselves. For example, on the same page of their writing you might find the word which in Latin is written *auctor* spelled first authour, next auctour, and again, aucthoure. Or a writer would in one place put almesse, but the next time he would make it aulmes. Or such variants as these would occur in the compass of a few pages: aneynst, anenst, aneinst, and even anempst. What is most surprising is that words taken from the Latin are disfigured out of all resemblance to their originals by men who read and wrote and spoke Latin as fluently

as the mother tongue, and whose orthography in Latin was faultless. Plainly they cared nothing for what we call English orthography. And would that we of this day cared nothing, or at least cared very much less than we do about the thing called English orthography; or, rather, would that we were not compelled by — by what? to act as if we had a profound regard for the insensate body of rules (if rules they can be called) which require that we shall spell "tisis" phthisis, "flem" phlegm, "diafram" diaphragm, "ruf" rough, "thoro" thorough, "kof" cough, and similarly disguise "enuf," "apothem," — here a sort of indulgence is allowed us to write apothegm instead of apophthegm; in short, for every three or four characters that are really concerned in the matter, we have to write at least one that serves no good purpose. Some one has said that he would not condescend to spell English words "orthographically;" all the same, if ever he wrote anything for publication — anything that the public will read or that publishers will accept — he would have to give up his nonconformism and put on the strait-waistcoat of orthography. And the monstrosities just mentioned form but a small portion of the anomalies of English spelling.

2. The cure of this evil of "orthography" is exceedingly simple. It involves, perhaps, the addition of a few new characters to our alphabet and a fixing of the values of those we have. Such an alphabet might easily be mastered, for reading and writing, by an average adult person in half a day, so that he might read and write with unfailing accuracy; and a pupil in the infant class might acquire the use of such

an alphabet in two or three weeks, so as to be able in that time to spell correctly (and it would be hardly possible then to spell incorrectly) any word whatsoever, — "apothem," for example, — on hearing it pronounced. The child's spelling would show no such monstrosities as phthisis, apophthegm; but the sounded words "tisis," "apothem," would be there on the blackboard. The only defence of the forms apophthegm, diaphragm, paradigm, phlegm, etc., is that they show the derivation of the words. To whom? Only to the learned, that is, only to those who have no need to be told of it. To all others, they are stumblingblocks; they are the cause, for example, why people say, "naptha" for naftha, "diptheria" for diftheria.

3. So here we are keeping up from age to age, at great expense, a long line of milestones which cannot be read by the common wayfarer, and which are of no use to the uncommon wayfarer, whose chariot wheel carries an odometer (rather "hodometer" should it be, to show that the word comes from Greek *hodos*, way, *metron*, measure). There may be in these United States 100,000, or it may be 500,000 persons who when at school learned that in Greek *hodos* means way and *metron*, measure; how many of them have since quitting school lost that modicum of Hellenic scholarship? Names of graduates of our highest universities can be given who, to-day, in middle career of life, can hardly read the word *hodos* written in Greek characters. Men of "classical education" who have sat in high and easy editorial chairs cannot tell the "case" of *equum*, nor "decline" the Greek article. Hence, of all the persons in the United States who are presumed to see

in the "dead letters" of phthisis, apophthegm, and the like, the ancestral line of the English words sounded "tisis," "apothem," only a very small number do see it; and if they are able to see it, that is because they do not need to be advertised of it.

4. Then why perpetuate this carrying about with us the cast-off clothing of our forbears and the contents of ancient lumber-rooms? Needless to say, the cast-off garments of our Teutonic, Scandinavian, and other glossic ancestry is of as little use to us as the lumber of our Grecian and Roman forefathers in the spirit. In "daughter," the gh is a reminiscence of a guttural aspirate sound in the word as pronounced by our Germanic speech-ancestors; the same is to be said of might, night, plight, brought, high, etc. That is bad enough; we do worse when we gratuitously bring in a gh to take the place of a "lost" guttural aspirate which never was lost, because it never existed, *e.g.*, the gh in sprightly, a word formed from Latin *spiritus;* such summoning of ghosts that never tenanted flesh has numerous illustrations in the language.

5. In short, the spelling of English is anomalous and absurd throughout. Many an earnest effort has been made to mend it, but without any hope of success. Even Noah Webster's very moderate reforms in spelling do not "hold their own." What is the reason? Use and wont; pedantism of educated men; timidity of owners of printing presses, — a timidity fully justified by facts, and to be called therefore prudence; the schoolmaster and the schoolmistress who "teach by the book;" but a generation of schoolmasters who really desired to do away this stupid

asystemism could insure the triumph of spelling reform. The words of the late Dr. Thomas Hill, once president of Harvard College, are worthy of serious consideration.

6. "Learning to read, being an attempt to accomplish an impossible thing, is the most difficult task undertaken by an English [meaning an Anglic] child. A tough constitution resists a great deal of hardship and abuse; a vigorous intellect frequently survives the labor of learning to spell in the ordinary mode. A man who has lived through a course of bad diet, and inattention to the laws of health, is apt to regard attention to such matters as a mark of effeminacy; and, in like manner, those whose love of literature has not been quenched, and whose power to see truth has not been wholly blinded, by the ordinary mode of learning to read, suppose that there is no urgent need for improvement. He who will reflect, however, seriously upon the absurdities of English orthography and upon the gravity with which those absurdities are usually introduced to the child as reasonable things, must perceive that such instruction has an injurious effect upon the child's mental powers, and upon his love of truth. The boy may survive it as he survived in olden days compression of swathing bands, drenching with herb-teas, and drugging with cordials; I will even allow that, in the case of great native vigor of mind, the injurious effect may be small; but it is always pernicious, and in the case of persons of small intellectual ability disastrous. The child is told to spell a word and then expected to pronounce it, as though the spelling were a guide to the pronunciation. I remember hearing a

schoolfellow hesitate when he came to the word 'business.' Spell it! said the teacher. Be you ess eye n e ess, — double ess, replied the boy. Well, and what does that spell? asked the teacher. As he paused for a reply to this unanswerable question, he espied a larger boy doing something wrong, and looking sternly at him, uttered his name in tones of reproof, — *Christopher Frazer!* The little fellow thought this was the pronunciation of his 'be you ess eye,' etc., and meekly repeated, Christopher Frazer. We laughed, — and yet that jumble of names of the letters sounds as much like Christopher Frazer as it does like business" ("True Order of Studies," p. 107).

7. Dr. Hill touches here specially the difficulties the child meets in learning the values of the alphabetic characters; but, to imitate Horace's phrase, the story is told of the whole practice of what is called orthography. Is not that word "orthography," as applied to current spelling of English, a pat illustration of the derivation *lucus a non lucendo:* this "graphy" is *orthos*, straight or true, because it is as crooked as it can be made.

8. No man will say that the retention of these survivals of old time orthographies and ancient etymologies is required for *his* admonition, to remind *him* of the origins of words; one wishes them retained for the sake of the less educated. Just so men who are themselves unbelievers are very instant for retention of belief in Hell for the repression of vicious and criminal propensities in the lower classes, — though, indeed, the lowest classes are the most steadfast believers in the "fiery floods" and the "thrilling regions of thick-ribb'd ice." On the whole there is little pros-

pect of an orthographical reform to be brought about, — far less prospect than of a radical and fundamental change of the entire order of society. "Never to remove an anomaly merely because it is an anomaly:" that, Macaulay says, is characteristic of the people of Britain; and the whole Anglic world is more or less likeminded. Hence, since the *gravamen* of the existing orthography is solely its anomaly, the outlook for the cause of the reform is not cheering. But let the effort for spelling reform go on; and as the most practical measure, let its advocates strive to win to the cause the teachers of the rising generation in the elementary schools.

PUNCTUATION.

9. The only use of Punctuation marks is to make sentences perspicuous. There is no law of punctuation but the law implied in that definition of its use. If a sentence, however long, can be throughout perspicuous without punctuation marks, no one need insert punctuation marks. If one finds and proves that with the comma and the point he is able to give all possible perspicuity to his sentences, there is no reason why he should use in addition the semicolon, colon, dash, or exclamation sign; but he will probably find that those other signs serve the cause of perspicuity. There is, therefore, no fashion in punctuating that a writer is under obligation to pay any respect to — in his "private practice," that is to say; for when he comes to write for the public in types, he will find that in becoming an author he must consent to see his copy subjected to the conventional laws of the printing office. A man, for

example, writes his name W J Soandso, but when he sees the printer's proof he finds a point after the names W. and J., and strikes the points out. They have no right after my names, he says; W and J stand for the sounds, dubleyu and jay, which are my forenames. In vain. The law of the publisher's printing office allows no exceptions, and the points are restored. This is not an imagined case; it is a true story. W and J are the forenames of a man of some scientific distinction at Washington, and he had precisely the experience here narrated when he contributed to one of the reviews an article which he wrote at the editor's request.

10. In drafting statutes, experience in the courts, which interpret the statutes, has proved that perspicuity and unambiguousness are better attained by parsimony than by liberality in the matter of punctuating; better even by total abstention, than by the most sparing use. Latterly the newspapers, or some of the greater newspapers, have favored parsimony of punctuation without impairing perspicuity. But one cannot look with confidence to newspapers, rushed with breakneck speed to and through the press, for anything like precision in the use of punctuation marks. The following example of faulty punctuation, though taken from a newspaper, is not given as a specimen of newspaper punctuation, but as an illustration of a very common misuse of the comma; it is seen that here the comma, so far from making the sentence perspicuous, perverts the sense: "A big, popular loan." Without the comma, the phrase would say, "a big loan that is to be advanced by the people;" with the comma, it means "a big loan

that is in favor with the people," — a considerable difference. Macaulay is a model of consistent use of punctuation marks, and parsimony in the employment of them.[1]

PRONUNCIATION.

11. Errors or faults of Pronunciation spring either from defects or malformations of the organs of speech, or from defective or faulty training, or from carelessness and slovenliness, or finally from ignorance. Faults of the first kind, those proceeding from malformation or other defect of the organs of speech, can be wholly or at least in part corrected by diligent effort. Every one has heard of the method said to have been used to this end by the Athenian orator Demosthenes; he used to go down to the seashore, and on the strand, with two or three pebbles in his mouth, would declaim to the obstreperous winds and waves as though he were addressing the no less obstreperous *mobile vulgus* of Athens in the popular assembly. The pebbles made the effort for distinctness of utterance more difficult than it was by nature; but Demosthenes knew that if, thus "handicapped,"

[1] Before punctuation marks came into use, there was a very obvious "previous question," — that of spacing off the words in a sentence; and it is a very curious fact that through all the ages of Greek and Roman classic antiquity, and into the fifth century of our era, words were written without interspaces. The foregoing few lines, printed without spaces, initial capitals, and punctuation marks, wear this puzzling aspect: —

Beforepunctuationmarkscameintousetherewasaveryobviousprevious questionthatofspacingoffthewordsinasentenceanditisaverycuriousfact thatthroughalltheagesofgreekandromanclassicantiquityandintothefifth centuryofourerawordswerewrittenwithoutinterspaces

by striving hour after hour, day after day, he could attain even the average degree of distinctness of enunciation, then without the handicap he would easily surmount all difficulties. For clearness and exactitude of enunciation, a certain degree of pliancy and facility of movement of tongue, lips, etc., — a thing which is not always given by nature, — is required, and this end can perhaps be gained as well by Demosthenes' simple method as by any other. When one has disciplined himself to perform any task under hard conditions, the same task will be easily performed after the conditions are mitigated.

12. Some persons are unable to sound the letter r, either with the very faint trill commonly given it by those who speak only the English language, or with the very marked trill it gets in the mouth of Frenchmen, Italians, or Spaniards. Instead of the trill — an effect produced by vibration of the tip of the tongue — they produce a sort of guttural sound by vibration of the uvula. This latter defect is exceedingly rare among persons whose mother tongue is English. The editor (deceased) of one of the foremost of American monthly periodicals always sounded the r with this guttural vibration, so that "tariff," as pronounced by him, became "taghiff," the gh being the same (though not aspirated) as the guttural in "loch" as pronounced by an Erse-speaking Scotch highlander. The editor made no effort to abate this vicious mode of utterance till a year or two before his death, when a mild political ambition led him to attempt public speaking. He then daily, for two or three weeks before his first appearance on the stage

political, practised diligently certain exercises prescribed to him for correction of the fault. Whether because the instructor was incompetent or the scholar inveterate in his vicious habit, and therefore incurable, at all events, no cure was effected, even no beginning of a cure; never once was the trill sounded with the tongue, and the orator had to announce the subject-matter of his maiden speech to be "the taghiff."

13. Probably for cure of this special defect a partial imitation of the method of teaching vocal utterance to deaf mutes would be effectual. For the rest, this letter r seems to present peculiar difficulty to whole nations. Assuming the proper sound to be the trill as given by Frenchmen, and men of certain other nationalities, as already mentioned, then the French and those others sound the r with greatest purity and distinctness. There is less of the pure trill and more of the guttural character in the sound given to the letter by the Germans. The Anglic nations give it a very faint trill indeed, and for no inconsiderable proportion of those whose mother tongue is English, the r has not even the faintest trill, being changed to something like w. In earlier times the English probably sounded r as "rollingly" as the Frenchman or the Corkagian; if not, how comes Ben Jonson to call r "the dog's letter," which "burreth in the sound, the tongue," as he says, "striking the inner palate with a trembling about the teeth. It is sounded firm," he goes on, "in the beginning of words, and more liquid in the middle and end, as *rarer, riper.*" In calling r "the dog's letter," Jonson adopts the Roman phrase, *littera canina*, dog's letter,

growling letter. The inability of the Chinese to "trill" is well known; and Marsh ("Lectures on the English Language") says that the r, as pronounced by the native Hawaiians, "is scarcely distinguishable from l." This substitution of l instead of r had a distinctive name among the ancient Greeks — *lambdakismos* — "favoring the lambda," or letter l. And the converse is of course also seen, favoring r for l. Thus, in Attic Greek, the word *kephalalgia*, headache, was quite commonly pronounced, and very often spelled, *kephalargia*.

14. Carlyle tells of a vice of utterance to which Coleridge, the Old Man Eloquent, was prone. He used to pronounce "subject," "object," sum-m-ject, om-m-ject. Perhaps some of those who learn with surprise from Carlyle of such a corruption of the sound of b will on attending to their own way of uttering similar combinations detect a like degradation of the b.

15. K (including c hard) when followed in the same syllable by certain consonants presents insuperable difficulty to Anglic vocal organs, and it is dropped in speech, though retained with scrupulous care in what is called orthography: *e. g.*, in knave, knob, knell, knoll, knead, knuckle, know, knit, knot; and probably it has often been blunderingly imported into words that had it not originally, to serve as the ghost of a suppositious letter that never existed. This was written as a bare conjecture; a glance at the long list of words beginning kn made conjecture certainty; the genuine and original word Nib became "knib." The nine words above beginning with "kn" are household words that must have been in daily

and hourly use always in English; and at one time the k in every one of them was distinctly sounded. How came they, and when, to lose the sound of the k? Was the power of pronouncing "kn" lost in one day as by "a visitation of God," or by a Babel miracle? Does the pronunciation of that ghostly k linger in any remote corner of provincial England? Do the Saxons north of Tweed pronounce it? Other combinations with initial k or its equivalents are equally unpronounceable for us, *e. g.*, Ctesiphon, Xerxes, as are also such combinations as we see in Ptolemy bdellium, pnyx.

16. There was a time when the inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula could not pronounce words beginning with s followed by a consonant; they had, so to speak, to "take a run at it," before they could jump the difficulty; as thus: species, take a run at "sp," and you get "esp," and so "especies;" do the same for "specimen," especimen; "studio," estudio; "schola," escuela; "smaragdon," esmeralda; our own word especial and the French *espèce*, with hundreds of similar formations in both languages, are instances of the same fact. The contrary is also seen, as where a word that begins with a labial consonant gets a prefixed s. But this line of remark has no end, and must be dropped here.

17. Very curious is the instinct (or how shall it be named?) by which speakers of English, whether learned or simple, living outside of England proper, are guarded safe against the English vice of dropping the aspiration where it is due, as in "hand," 'and, "hash," 'ash, and putting it where it belongs not, as "open," hopen, "anarchy," hanarchy. Englishmen,

and not Cockneys alone, or Londoners, but natives of the "provinces," suffer much worry of mind from apprehension of being taken in the commission of these offences; and in their effort to do full justice to the aspiration, they sound it wherever the letter h is written as the initial letter of a word; *e. g.*, "honor," hhonor. Charles Dickens is probably to be credited with the aspiration now commonly give to "humble;" there can hardly be a doubt that in this word the correct usage down to Dickens's day suppressed the aspiration; and the same is to be said of "humor." On this point the usage of the Irish province of the English language is of weight, for confessedly the Irish pronunciation preserves the values of vowels and consonants as they were in early times better than the English pronunciation; now in the Irish pronunciation of "humble" and "humor," there is no aspiration. For the rest, the Irish speaker of English never trips on the aspirates. In some parts, at least, of the United States the aspiration in wheat, whence, whither, what, why, whelp, is not given.

18. The faults of enunciation we have been so far considering are such as attach to whole nations or provinces; those next to be noted are more the results of ignorance or of slovenliness of utterance in the individual; of these usual mispronunciations, a small number of typical examples must suffice. The worst mispronunciations are those in which vowels and consonants are slurred; less serious are those in which wrong values are given to elements, or accents are misplaced. And it is far more difficult to conquer the former bad habit than the latter. The person who pronounces "connoisseur," connowzer (fact!), or

in the Irish way, connoshoor'; who makes "Achilles," atsh'iles (and so it is pronounced by a very prominent editor), or "Ulysses," yul'ysses, or "thought," thort, can with a little study break up the bad habit; but when not individual words, but all vocalizations are mispronounced, reformation is almost hopeless. One has to be ever on the watch lest he clip "contain" to c'ntain, "promote" to pr'mote, "pronounce" to pr'nounce; or degrade "was" to wuz, "practical" to practukl, "of" to uv, "there are" to thur'r.

19. Only when we hear the English language spoken *ore rotundo* — and it is an exceedingly rare experience, and fated to be ever rarer as our life grows more rapid — by some master of the art of elocution — and that is a fine art truly — can one be sensible of the richness and sweetness of its tones, the gravity and majesty with which it can invest noble and solemn themes, or its graceful unbending in the Lydian mode. The common schools might make a beginning toward the formation of correct habits of utterance. The phrase *ore rotundo* has been used; it will profit to define its meaning. *Ore rotundo* (Latin, with the mouth round), or orotund, is "a mode of intonation directly from the larynx, having a fulness, clearness, strength, and smoothness, and having the rich and musical quality which forms the highest perfection of the human voice" ("Cassell's Encyclopædic Dictionary"). The present writer has had the fortune to hear English words enunciated *ore rotundo* once by a street ballad singer near the Fishambles in the city of Cork, and often by a man of Spanish birth in the city of New York; it was a

delight of the ear to learn from them the beauty and richness of intonation of which the English language is capable.

20. Here are a few specimens of usual mispronunciation: "Abigul" (for abigāil), "Baroosh" (Baruch, pronounced baruk), "Cincinnata," "Mississippa," "Mizzura;" but "Iowa," being spelled *quasi* phonetically, is properly pronounced ioway, and "Piqua," pickway; compare "Pickaway," name of a county in the same state (Ohio), which is the same word differently spelled. "Daniel" becomes dan'l; "spaniel," span'l; "Amanda," amandy, or amanday, or amander; "Maria," marier; "opera," operer; "diphtheria" is changed to diptheria, "diphthong" to dipthong; "naphtha" is both pronounced and spelled often naptha; "oleomargarine" is pronounced oleomarjerine; "Italian" becomes eyetalyan; "influence," infloo'ence; "candelabrum," candel'abrum; "vehement," vehe'ment; "yeast," eest (the earlier correct pronunciation was yest). Two or three vulgarisms of pronunciation that seem peculiar to New York City, are "toowun'ny" (twenty), "pŭh'ee-ul" (pearl), "pawhty" (party); the mispronunciations "lor" (law), "sor" (saw), are more widely distributed. In some localities "wound" is pronounced in rhyme with found; this was a quite usual pronunciation in England in former times. "Auge'an," "Bere'an," "Empyre'an," "Lethe'an," "peritone'um," "albu'men," are very commonly misaccented, the stress being laid on the syllable before the one accented here. The accent on "towards" or "toward" is in some localities wrongly laid on the last syllable. If in "Viking" the first syllable were made vĭk, the

chief cause of a general misapprehension of the word's meaning would be done away; "viking" has no more etymological relation to kingship than has sea-rover, which is about its equivalent in English. "Semi" is rightly pronounced semmy; it means half or halfway; and a word of that signification is most fittingly enunciated in the less open vowel sounds: "semeye" has sufficient fulness of intonation to denote universality. Incidentally be it remarked that the personal pronoun nominative singular for the first person in English is the most arrogant pronoun perhaps in any language; little wonder that persons who are disposed to live and let live use that columnar I sparingly; we could pardon the man who writes it with a little i.

21. To make amends for their own and others' offences in slurring the elements of words, some folk of the scrupulous sort, and especially those who are shaky in their orthography, sound consonants that are "dead letters" indeed, *e. g.*, al-mond, oft-en, extra-ordinary; even the l in should, would; or elements are added that do not exist in the word as written, as alapaca for alpaca; in this way Henry becomes henery, and the family name McEnery is doubtless McHenry. Or, in the effort not to pronounce after the fashion of "the uneducated," — a class of our fellow-citizens more frequently singled out for remark by the half-taught than by the really well-educated, — people will become more foreign than foreigners: *e. g.*, because the vulgar pronunciation of "depot" is deep'o, they will make it day'po, thus sinning at the opposite extreme; a little learning is so dangerous a thing. The word prestige is

usually pronounced in the French fashion (approximately), and, as we have seen, is used in a special French meaning.

22. Dooty, tootor, toobercle, toobular, are Americanisms and vulgarisms, — apparently, if not really, the result of an inability of the inhabitants of some parts of the United States at some time in the past to pronounce "tu," "du," and the like combinations pure; they had to change the diphthongal English u to the simple vowel sound oo. Another evidence of this inability is seen in the vulgar pronunciation of the word "Sioux," viz., soo, instead of seoo. The disability for pronunciation of the combinations "du," "tu," attaches to the speech organs of the Irish people also, but they evade it in a different way. The Irishman says jooty, tshootor, edjoocate, tshoobercle. Not every English-speaking person, even among the fairly well educated, will pronounce shrine, shrive, aright. The difficulty presented by the combination "su" in "sure" has been met by the whole Anglic world in the Irish way, *i. e.*, by pronouncing it shu; hence, quite unnecessarily do those humorists who rashly venture to transliterate Irish peculiarities of pronunciation write "shure," "shurely," "shoorty" (for sure, surely, surety). Incidentally be it noted that the word of strong assent much used now in New York, *sure!* is not borrowed from Irish speech, but from the broken English of German immigrants, who by that word translate their own *gewiss*. A very unusual thing is seen in the pronunciation of "sugar," the shortening of diphthongal u and the changing of s to sh. But not all the substitutions of "soo" for the pure su are censurable as violations of correct

pronunciation; there are very many words beginning "su" (u long and classed in dictionaries as diphthongal u), which we all, learned and simple alike, at least on this side the Atlantic, pronounce according to the formula, "siou," soo. Dictionaries to the contrary notwithstanding, no one ever attempts to give the "precious" sound "seu" to su in "sudorific," "sue," "suicide," "suit."

23. U after l also seems to present much difficulty to cisatlantic speech organs. We say, "looce," "loocernal," "Loocina," "loocio," etc., whereas the English pronounce those words as they are spelled: lūce, lūcernal, etc., giving to the u the same value as in the word "use." But herein the English are inconsistent with themselves, for without any reason they pronounce as "we other Anglics" do, the "u" oo in "lubricant," "lucifer," and a host of other words. This disability for enunciation of diphthongal u after l did not exist for the English of earlier times, as is evidenced by the universal prevalence of the pronunciation of the u pure after l in Ireland, where the ancient values of words, vowels, and consonants in the English speech are in very many cases more faithfully preserved than in the home of that speech. It is highly probable that formerly Anglic organs of utterance possessed the faculty of pronouncing the diphthongal u even after r, as in "rheumatism," "rule;" in New England this power is retained as shown in the Yankee pronunciation of "rue" (approximately rew). But dictionarians gracefully acknowledge the impossibility of retaining the old pronunciation, and direct words of the class "ru" and "lu," to be pronounced as if the "u" were oo.

24. Dictionarians insist that in such combinations as "eng," whenever the g belongs to the succeeding syllable, the "en" must be pronounced pure and not nasal, *e.g.*, "en-grave," instead of eng-grave. But there is reason to believe that here the dictionarians are striving against the inevitable, against human nature, and against the natural law of utterance. This insistence on the pure n in such situations is pedantism; it is prompted by considerations of orthography and etymology, — considerations of the same order as those which in our spelling of "phthisis," for example, would dictate retention of three ghost-letters simply to show etymology. But etymology must look out for itself; the utterance of words by the organs of speech has an economy of its own and laws of its own, and it is not to be unduly trammelled by etymologies. The ancient Greeks showed a fine common-sense in their way of resolving such questions: when two consonants came together, whether in compounding a word or inflecting it, or even when two consonants came in juxtaposition, one ending a word, the other beginning the next word, the first was made to adapt itself to the second: thus if n came before g (hard), ch (hard) or k, it had to transform itself into the nasal equivalent of "ng": thus "*en-kaustos*, became both in spelling and in sound *egkaustos*, the g in that situation being always nasal. Similarly, b before p became p, and p before m was changed to m. In our word (from Greek) "dilemma" that first m represents a "b" in the radical from which "dilemma" is formed. The Scotch pronounce "Ambrose" aumrose, and they change Chambers to chalmers; if a word was to be

formed from "am" and "rose," an ancient Hellene would make it "ambrose." Illiterate and old-fashioned people in Ireland pronounce "Limerick" limbrick. These facts indicate the law and economy of vocal articulation, and that law and economy are not subject to etymologists' rules. Hence people who are not troubled by the scruples dropped into their minds by etymologists, will continue to say "eng-grave," "eng-caustic."

25. But this subject of pronounciation and enunciation is infinite; largely to it is "a local issue" and a matter of taste; besides, it is a subject that does not lend itself kindly to discussion in writing, vocalizations being of an order of things that cannot be rendered with anything like accuracy by our alphabetical signs. The most essential point of enunciation is distinctness of utterance, giving due value to every actual element of a word, yet without pedantic scruples.

26. Doubtless computations have been made by orthoepists of the number of different sounds and shade differences of sound represented by the vowels and consonants of our language, and doubtless also the results have been duly tabulated. No such tabulation or computation being at hand, it occurred to the present writer, while jotting these notes, to reckon the number of sounds and shades of difference of sounds for which the vowels stand in written English. The result was surprising; for though many of the shades of sound may have been overlooked, the total values of the vowels, including diphthongs and triphthongs was found to be 58, while the values of the same vowels and combinations of vowels in German ap-

peared to be 20, in Latin 14, in French 23, total for these three languages 57, or one less than for English alone; the values for the vowel letter a, in English, are 21, while the values of all the simple vowels in French and German together are but 22. Unquestionably the pronunciation of English is far more difficult to master than the pronunciation of the three languages named.

Section XIII.

FOREIGN WORDS IN ENGLISH.



Section XIII.

FOREIGN WORDS IN ENGLISH.

1. ENGLISH being a highly composite language, with a vocabulary made up of contributions from many different tongues, is hospitable to every stranger-word that presents even only plausible or colorable credentials; though the dictionaries are bursting with the good measure of words pressed down, shaken together, running over, that they try to hold between their boards, there is ever room and a welcome for more. Had English in the past suffered the greenhorn words, as it suffers them to-day, to retain their outlandish garb of inflectional forms, the Anglic tongue would be incomparably more anomalous even than it is. There are in use among us a considerable number of words which not only are permitted to wear their garb of outlandish accidence, but which are actually protected by customary law in persevering in their foreign ways, nay, are even compelled to retain their foreign exterior. The French language adopts a word from German or from English, and the next day no German, no Anglic, will recognize the whilom Anglic or German word. Does the Frenchman say or write "beefsteak," "bulldog," "knife," "riding coat"? Not he; he spik no Ingles; French is his language. His beefsteak is *bifstek*, his bulldog

is *dogue*, his penknife is *canif*, his (or his wife's) riding coat is *redingote*. And German treats in like manner the words it takes from foreign sources.

2. But nowadays a word newly adopted from Latin retains in English its Latin accidence in great measure; and the same is true of words derived from German, French, Italian, etc. Because the Latin has *bacillus*, singular, *bacilli*, plural, every writer of English who has occasion to use the word, must, on pain of being writ down an ignorant person, say one "bacillus," two "bacilli;" it is a mercy that we are indulgenced to say "of three bacilli," instead of *trium bacillorum*. So too we must, under the same penalty, say "bacterium," "a mass of bacteria." In the usage of German or French, the Latin terminations are lopped off like the tail of a fish before it is served. But because we do not order things in that common-sense way in English, such of us as are not conversant in all the languages and dialects under this sun, have painfully to learn the laws of grammatical accidence that obtain in each. Fain would one abstain from all such words, which are stumblingblocks and stones of offence, yes, and which cause us shame and confusion of face when we venture to pronounce one of them in the hearing of the knowing ones who got their larnin' in college. But we cannot abstain, cannot refrain. The sanitary plumber and the doctor of medicine have "got us on the run" with the bacteria scare and the ptomaine scare, and we cannot help thinking, awake or asleep, of *bacilli*, *bacteria*, *schizomycetae*, *micrococci*, *spirillae* and what not.

3. Perhaps some guidance may be found in the following little code of rules for determining the in-

flections of Latin (and incidentally of Greek) words which retain their outlandish accidence in English.

A. In words derived (that is, lifted) from Latin which have in the singular the termination um, the plural form ends in a; animalculum, animalcula. Very few writers, indeed, write the plural of this word as it ought to be and as given here; almost universally it is written animalculæ. Candelabrum, candelabra; it is a vulgarism to say candelabras (plur.); observe *obiter*, that the accent is on the syllable next the last, the penultima; Datum, data; from which it is seen that data is plural; it is sometimes ignorantly — that is to say, by those who don't know Latin — taken to be singular. Say the same of memoranda, dicta, impedimenta, strata. Treat as if they were Latin all Greek words that are spelled in Latin with termination um. Ditto, all Greek neuter words ending on, but neuters only. It might be necessary to go to college to learn to distinguish at sight those "English" words which are Greek neuters from those other "English" words which are Greek masculines. When one knows that an English Greek word in 'on,' is not neuter, usually he makes it plural by adding tes. As, fortunately, nearly all the English words in on from Greek are neuters, this first rule in the code may be said to have no exceptions; always um or on has the plural a. We have reason to be thankful that the Greek word horizon left its accidence outside when it came into English; else we should have to say, plural, horizontes.

B. As a general rule (with exceptions) Latin words (or Greek words Latinized) in us, and Greek words in their own termination os, change the

us or os of the singular to the plural i: radius, radii; bacillus, bacilli; astragalus, astragali. But there are very many exceptions: *e.g.*, if one has been to college he will have learnt that in Greek there is "os" and "os," fagots and fagots, and that one "os" has little "o" (the learned call it omicron): that is the Greek "os" that comes under this rule B; the other Greek (that is to say, the other English) "os" has the big "o" (omega); "os" of the big "o" will usually (but there are exceptions) have the plural "otes," if the noun is masculine: rhinoceros, rhinocerotes; if it is neuter, it will have "ota." The exceptions for "English" words in "us" (sing.) are rather numerous. If you know they are neuter, you make the plural thus: genus, genera; viscus, viscera (but there is another viscus, which has plural visci). If they are masculine, they follow this general rule B: Bacillus, bacilli. But if they happen to belong to the Fourth Declension (instead of the Second or the Third) of "English" nouns and adjectives, they will have singular and plural alike: apparatus, apparatus.

C. A Latin noun singular, masculine or feminine, ending in a, or a Greek noun feminine, ending in "e" (changed often to Latin termination a), or a Greek noun masculine in es, has the plural ae; formula, formulæ, hoplites, hoplitæ. If the word singular is neuter, the plural is "ata": poema, poemata; miasma, miasmata; stigma, stigmata.

D. Other words of our English language not coming under the simple rules of our code so far enunciated belong, whether Latin or Greek, to what is called the third or the fifth of the five Latin or last of the three Greek declensions of nouns so happily

incorporated in our English speech. To give anything like safe rules for declension of them would take perhaps three or four pages; when they occur, a Greek or Latin lexicon can be consulted. Such dictionary is an indispensable *vade mecum*.

4. There are in English many words ending "us" which we take from Latin without any change or modification, and use for nouns in the singular number, but which in Latin are not nouns at all, but perhaps verbs, or perhaps adjectives in an oblique plural case: such are the English nouns "mandamus," "ignoramus," which are pure Latin, though not Latin nouns, but verbs in the present tense, indicative mood, first person plural, and mean "we command," "we know not" (in English used also to signify "we ignore"). The English word "omnibus" is in Latin what is called the dative (it is also the ablative) case plural of *omnis*, all, and means "for all." Now many persons, editors of powerful organs of public opinion, and believed to be college-bred, bewray the rustiness, not to say the reduction to cinder and *caput mortuum* of their college learning, by treating words of this class according to Rule B of the Code. Thus in the editorial page of the "Cincinnati Commercial" a good many years ago "ignoramus" was pluraled ignorami.

5. The Code and the remarks appended to it are not designed for lessons in Latin to enable a non-Latinist to handle Latin words in singular and plural correctly; they are not rules for Latin at all, but for English, and they are as essentially a part of the mere English grammar as any equal number of rules in Murray's English grammar. In sad, sober truth, it

is regrettable that a language so eminently commonsensical in shedding the native inflections of nouns and conjugations of verbs, in disusing the definite article where it was superfluous, and in many other regards, should burden itself with these, to us, perfectly useless niceties of Greek, Latin, French, etc. But any one who has the courage can emancipate himself; let him treat those foreign words as if they were to the Anglic manner born, and form their plural as if they were strictly English words; to do that without any risk of error, one would have to know only that the word he is about to pluralize is not already plural: thus, species is already plural as well as singular, so apparatus; candelabra is plural; so is viscera. But change bacillus to bacilluses, bacterium to bacteriums, stigma to stigmas, micrococcus to micrococcuses, schizomycetes to schizomyceteses (or even let the plural be the same as the singular).

6. The word Bravo has been fully naturalized in English, and one would be justly regarded as finical who should condemn the use of it in that form in expressing admiration for the performance of a female artist on the stage; an Italian or a Spaniard would, in such case, say Brava, and Bravo would in their mouth be a solecism. But it is otherwise with Virtuoso: that is not naturalized and wears its foreign garb; its plural form masculine is virtuosi; its feminine form singular, is virtuosa, plural virtuose. Incognito, unknown, *i. e.*, not known for what you are in social rank, is sufficiently Englished to disregard the Italian inflection; and we can say that "The Countess Dash travels incognito," "their Majesties the King and Queen of Barataria are slumming incog-

nito." "Dilettante" has but one form for both genders; the plural is "dilettanti."

7. Phrases from foreign languages should never be ventured by any one who does not know, either from acquaintance with the languages they belong to, or *aliunde*, just what they mean. That word "aliunde" means "from other quarters," otherwhence, or from other sides or other sources, and a lawyer knowing nothing of Latin would, of necessity, know the precise import of "aliunde" from seeing it used daily in decisions of courts, arguments of counsel, and treatises on testimony. Hence, a lawyer may use that word fearlessly; it is not safe for one unfamiliar with Latin or with lawyers' use to employ it at all; and so of all phrases from foreign languages. But suppose a person has in either of these ways got a sure grasp on the meaning of such word or phrase, and the same expresses an idea more precisely, more neatly, more happily than the same idea can be expressed in English, save in a roundabout way (as exemplified in "aliunde"), then, provided the person addressed also knows the exact import of the foreign phrase, such phrase may be preferred to the less perfect English phrase; but unless this proviso is fulfilled, the employment of the foreign phrases is most offensive Cant, arrant Humbuggery, and linguistic Pharisaism. Suppose that neither to yourself, O user of foreign phrases, nor to the persons you address, a jury of twelve average citizens, for example, the Justinian definition of Justice, "*constans et perpetua voluntas*," etc., conveys no such clear and definite idea of what justice is as Noah Webster's definition, why should you tone forth that sonorous Latin, — all Greek to

them and Greek perhaps to yourself, — and then give them a translation of it? It is no uncharitable judgment to say of the man who ejects Greek and Latin phrases in season, out of season, that he is drawing very high-figured checks against a very light balance at bank.

8. But it is not always free to us to decline utterance of foreign phrases; so many such phrases are current in newspapers and everywhere that, understanding them rightly or not, we must use them, or act as if we understood them. There is the Italian phrase "in petto;" everybody uses it, and so everybody must pretend to know what it means; and indeed many of those who use it do understand its meaning — as many as one per centum, or at least one tenth of one per centum. It is a sort of technical phrase of the court of Rome; literally, it means "in the breast;" a nomination to the Red Hat is held "in petto," not divulged, not published for a while; it is the Pope's secret. "Coup de soleil" down to a comparatively recent date was a current expression for what had already the better English name of "sunstroke." Of course, there being chance of mispronunciation, "soleil" was mispronounced "soliel." Who is there that has missed of seeing even in print such a use of the French word *née* as this from a newspaper: "The Marquis of Lorne, née Campbell," "née" being taken to signify "family name," whereas it is past participle, singular, feminine of a verb meaning "to be born." Though the expression would be unusual, it would be perhaps good enough French to say, "Marquis of Lorne né Campbell," or the Dukes of Argyle "nés Campbell." But why should we use

such foreignism at all? Why not say Araminta Featherstonhaugh, born Muggins?

9. That the prophecy might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Irish patriot when the price of her that was priced was passing from the treasury to the pockets of the jobbers, — fulfilled, but by other agents than his eye descried, by honest men, not by rogues, — the Irish party in the British parliament some years ago made the transaction of public business by that body for a time impossible, under the ancient rules of procedure, by their obstructive tactics. When these were countered by the introduction of the rule of the "Previous Question," by what name was the new engine for limiting debate to be called? Why not call it "Closure," a good word? So "closure" became the name of it, in this spelling, "clôture;" the pronunciation of it may be learned in one term in a young ladies' select academy or in a college.

10. The expression "In partibus infidelium," like "In petto," is used by everybody and understood by everybody except nine hundred and ninety-nine in the thousand. The general understanding of "bishop in partibus infidelium," is that it denotes an overseer whose actual field of superintendence is in a "heathen," an "infidel," or an "heretical" country, as among Kaffirs, or Mohammedans, or Protestants, or at least among the first of these three classes of stray sheep. But the "bishop in partibus infidelium" may have his residence at Rome, Madrid, Berlin, or Washington; he not improbably sometimes could not locate the place of his "see" on a map of the world within five hundred miles of the true place; perhaps not one in a thousand such overseers ever saw the field of his

paper jurisdiction; as for living at his paper see, he prefers Rome or any other city; in short, his title, *e.g.*, "Bishop of Curium in partibus infidelium" is a brevet title, and his titular see is a castle in Spain. As matter of fact, the "partes infidelium" are the countries, once Roman and Christian, which in the break-up of the Byzantine Empire fell into the hands of the Saracens and Turks; the "infidels" are not the heathen, not the Protestants, but the Mohammedans.

11. How ought the names of Germans, Frenchmen, Russians, Spaniards, and so forth to be pronounced by English-speaking persons — Anglo-glossic persons? It is no affectation of superior knowledge if one studies to pronounce "half aright" such names as Rothschild (rote-sheelt), Barnabò (bar-na-bó), Sadi-Carnot (sah-dee-car-no). But what about the pronunciation of the name of the famous Field-Marshal von Blücher? One inclines to side with the partisans of "blootsher;" they have been in possession now well on to one hundred years; they have tradition on their side, and almost universal usage of the common people, and they have Magna Tsharta. It is too late to get the doughty field-marshal's name even half-right; on the field of Waterloo he was Blootsher, and what he was on that day, that he shall be now and evermore. And the renowned Baron Muntshawsen is in the same boat; it would be insufferable finicality to call him as the Germans call him. But in the case of contemporary men whose names are "foreign," the effort should be made to pronounce such names about "half right."

12. The reader may have noticed in the foregoing paragraph two different solutions of the problem, How to express briefly the notion of a personal or a family

name "originating in a language foreign to us." In the first sentence, it is solved by use of a periphrasis, "names of Germans, Frenchmen, . . . and so forth." In the last sentence, it is solved by calling such names "foreign" between quotation marks. It is ridiculous to say in these United States of America that La Fayette, or O'Brien, or Sullivan, or Pulaski, or Steuben, or Gherardi, or Farragut is a "foreign" name; they are no more foreign than Franklin, Washington, Lincoln, Adams; the inverted commas are used to signify that "foreign" is used not in an accepted or acceptable sense. But as the problem was one that might arise again and again, and it would be extremely inconvenient to use the long periphrasis every time, and the use of the other way was a concession to a Vulgar Error, and as both were a confession of impotence in the English language to express that notion in a single word, it was seen that one had to give thought and make the needed word.

13. Could the word be compounded from elements already in the language? Probably not; and the effort to make a compound of Anglic elements was not made. The word to be made, it was decided, must be compounded of Greek elements, not of Latin elements, for they are more refractory even than English; German is not inferior to Greek in the agglutinativeness of its elements; but a word compacted of German elements would be German still. What was the idea to be expressed? That of "belonging to another tongue." Another tongue? The Greek for other or another is *allos*, and the Greek for tongue is *glossa;* put the two together and they stick fast; add an adjective termination, and the result is "Alloglossic." There was the word already made: yes,

truly, "already made," for on consulting the Greek lexicon to see whether perchance somebody else had ever solved the problem in the same way, there was found *alloglossos* credited to the very respectable name of the Father of History.

14. Why should a person writing or speaking English consider it incumbent on him when naming a Frenchman to style him Monsieur (abbreviated M.) Soanseau, and Monsieur's wife Madame, and their daughter Mademoiselle? When any sound reason is assigned for that practice, the further question demands an answer, why style Russians, Germans, Swedes, Norwegians, in the same way? — M. de Nesselrode; M. de Bismarck (before the great chancellor became prince). Usually in the newspapers Italians of any note are Signori, their wives Signore; Spaniards are Señores, Portuguese, Senhores, and so on. This is ridiculous; they manage this thing better in France. In France every man who cares to set up for what is called respectability is Monsieur, his wife Madame, and so on. In France the English and American Mister and Mrs. are also Monsieur, Madame. So the German Herr, and the Dutch Mynheer, and the Russian, Dane, Swede, man and wife, are Messieurs and Mesdames. French, the French believe, is a good enough language for anybody. When a sprig of foreign nobility, or a scion of royalty goes to Paris, he is not there "his lordship," "your lordship," "his highness," "your highness;" he is "Monsieur le Comte," or "M. le prince," and so forth. Even great ecclesiastical bigwigs may be addressed quite acceptably, "M. le cardinal," "M. l'archevêque," Mr. Cardinal, Mr. Archbishop.

15. That is sound good sense. To practise with entire consistency the ridiculous Anglic usage, a person must be acquainted with the equivalents of Mr., Mrs., and Miss (these three as the most absolute minimum) in the language of the person addressed; and that may easily involve the necessity of being acquainted with these niceties in thirty or forty languages and dialects. And not only must we have these three poor mere elements pat, if we wish to acquit ourselves duly in greeting noble personages, we must know who is who and what, in the British Peerage and in the Almanach de Gotha. Are we quite sure whether the nobleman we have the honor to address is an Earl, or a Marquis, or a Viscount? One might make a fatal slip by calling an Earl a Baron. Who knows but that we commit an unpardonable sin against the proprieties of ambassadorial etiquette when we style a Russian nobleman of a rank unknown to Anglic heralds' colleges, Comte de Cassini, whereas we give to a German noble the style he wears on his native soil, Graf von Waldersee? These considerations should give us pause, and send us to our polyglot dictionaries.

16. Tourist visitors to the chief city of France, on their return home will be heard to pronounce its name Paree, and the names of other French places also with an attempt at imitation of the French manner. It is not easy to draw the line in this matter of the pronunciation of the names of foreign places, and to decide what is ridiculous affectation, and what is laudable desire for correctness; the question covers other names and words and phrases, as well as names of towns, and other countries as well as France; but let



Appendix.

JOHN RUSKIN ON THE STUDY OF WORDS.
HOMELY ENGLISH AND LATIN-ENGLISH.
WORDS AND PHRASES DEGRADED.
SHALL AND WILL.

Appendix.

I.

JOHN RUSKIN ON THE STUDY OF WORDS.

"I TELL you earnestly and authoritatively (I *know* I am right in this), you must get into the habit of looking intensely at words, and assuring yourself of their meaning, syllable by syllable — nay, letter by letter. . . . If you read ten pages of a good book, letter by letter — that is to say, with real accuracy — you are for evermore in some measure an educated person. The entire difference between education and non-education (as regards the merely intellectual part of it) consists in this accuracy. A well-educated gentleman, . . . whatever language he knows, he knows precisely; whatever word he pronounces he pronounces rightly: above all he is learned in the *peerage* of words; knows the words of true descent and ancient blood, at a glance, from words of modern canaille; remembers all their ancestry — their intermarriages, distantest relationships, and the extent to which they were admitted, and offices they held, among the national noblesse of words at any time, and in any country. But an uneducated person may know by memory any number of languages, and talk them all, and yet truly know not a word of any — not a word even of his own. . . .

"A few words well chosen and well distinguished will do work that a thousand cannot, when every one is acting, equivocally, in the function of another. Yes; and words, if they are not watched, will do deadly work sometimes. There are masked words droning and skulking about us . . . which nobody understands, but which everybody uses, and most people will fight for, live for, or even die for, fancying they mean this, or that, or the other, of things dear to them. . . . There were never creatures of prey so mischievous, never diplomatists so cunning, never poisoners so deadly, as these masked words; they are the unjust stewards of all men's ideas. . . . And in languages so mongrel in breed as the English, there is a fatal power of equivocation put into men's hands, almost whether they will or no, in being able to use Greek or Latin forms for a word when they want it to be respectable, and Saxon or otherwise common forms when they want to discredit it." — "Sesame and Lilies," 15 *et seqq.*

II.

HOMELY ENGLISH AND LATIN-ENGLISH.

THE words of our vocabulary that are of Saxon origin are more homely, more natural, so to speak, for us than those derived from the Latin; for us the Saxon words are almost or quite as readily understood without schooling as are the words of the German vocabulary for a German child. Herbert Spencer, in his masterly essay on "The Philosophy of Style," shows clearly on psychophysiological grounds the reasons of the greater forcibleness of Saxon English, or rather of non-Latin English.

"THE several special reasons assignable for this may all be reduced to the general reason — economy. The most important of them is early association. A child's vocabulary is almost wholly Saxon. He says, *I have*, not *I possess;* he does not *reflect*, he *thinks;* he does not beg for *amusement*, but for *play;* he calls things *nice* or *nasty*, not *pleasant* or *disagreeable.* The synonyms which he learns in after years never become so closely, so organically, connected with the ideas signified as do these original words used in childhood; and hence the association remains less strong. But in what does a strong association between a word and an idea differ from a weak one? Simply in the greater ease and rapidity of the suggestive action. It can be in nothing else. Both of two words, if they be strictly synonymous, eventually call up the same image. The expression, It is *acid*, must, in the end, give rise to the same thought as It is *sour;* but because the term *acid* was learnt later in life, and has not been so often followed by the thought symbolized, it does not so readily arouse that thought as the term *sour*. If we remember how slowly and with what labor the appropriate ideas follow unfamiliar words in another language, and how increasing familiarity with such words brings greater rapidity and ease of comprehension; and if we consider that the same process must have gone on with the words of our mother tongue from childhood upward, we shall clearly see that the earliest learned and the oftenest used words will, other things equal, call up images with less loss of time and energy than their later learnt synonyms."

III.

WORDS AND PHRASES DEGRADED.

(From George P. Marsh's "Lectures on the English Language," first series, 4th ed., page 647 et seq.)

"No man doubts that certain species or families of animals, man himself included, become, by change of climate, or of other natural conditions, physically inferior to what they have been in former and different circumstances, and there is unhappily equally irresistible evidence of the moral and intellectual deterioration of nations. When, then, a people, once great in mind, great in virtue, powerful in material energy, becomes enfeebled in intellect, depraved in heart, and effeminate in action, and their language drops the words belonging especially to the higher faculties and perceptions, or perverts them to sensuous, base, earthly uses, and is no longer capable of the expression of lofty conceptions, generous emotions, or virtuous resolves, are we not to say that their language is corrupted? So far as respects the needs and conveniences of material life, it may perhaps be true that one form of it is as expressive and appropriate as another, but the theory which I am combatting [Latham's, that 'in language whatever is is right'] forgets that language is not a tool, or even a machine, but is of itself an informing vital agency, and that, so truly as *language* is what man has made it, just so truly *man* is what language has made him. The depravation of a language is not merely a token or an effect of the corruption of a people, but cor-

ruption is accelerated, if not caused by the perversion and degradation of its consecrated vocabulary; for every human speech has its hallowed dialect, its nomenclature appropriated to the service of sacred things, the conscience, the generous affections, the elevated aspirations, without which humanity is not a community of speaking men, but a herd of roaring brutes. When, therefore, popular writers in vulgar irony apply to vicious and depraved objects, names or epithets set apart by the common consent of society to designate the qualities or the acts which constitute man's only claim to reverence and affection, they both corrupt the speech, and administer to the nation a poison more subtile and more dangerous, because less obvious, than the bitterest venom with which the destructive philosophy has ever assailed the moral or the spiritual interests of humanity."

IV.

SHALL AND WILL.

PROFESSOR GEORGE P. MARSH, in his "Lectures on the English Language," calls the distinction drawn between Shall and Will, as used with different personal pronouns, a "grammatical subtlety" and a "verbal quibble," and says that it has no logical value or significance whatever. "I *shall*, you *will*, and he *will*," says Professor Marsh, "are generally simply futures, predictions; and *will* and *shall* are true auxiliaries. I *will*, you *shall*, and he *shall* are expressions of determination; and *will* and *shall* are not true auxiliaries. No very satisfactory explanation

of a distinction apparently so arbitrary has been given, though some ingenious suggestions as to the origin of it have been offered; but whatever foundation may once have existed for this nicety, it now answers no intellectual purpose. In Scotland, and in many parts of the United States, *will* and *shall* are confounded, or at least not employed according to the established English usage. There is little risk in predicting that at no distant day this verbal quibble will disappear, and that one of the auxiliaries will be employed with all persons of the nominative, exclusively as the sign of the future, and the other only as an expression of purpose or authority. To persons accustomed to be scrupulous in the use of these words the confusion or irregular employment of them is one of the most disagreeable of all departures from the English idiom; but as the subtlety in question serves no end but to embarrass, the rejection of it, accompanied with a constant distinction in *meaning* between the two words, must be deemed not a corruption but a rational improvement."

For Richard Grant White, all this is grammatical nihilism and rank blasphemy against one of the dearest halidoms of English speech, and much to be regretted. A verbal quibble? Then "so, and even much more, is the distinction between *be*, *am*, *art*, *is*, and *are*, a quibble." And then Richard Grant White proceeds to show the foundation of the distinction in the radical significations of the words themselves, illustrating it by an ingenious dialogue. He writes ("Words and their Uses"): —

"The radical signification of *will* (Anglo-Saxon *willan*) is purpose, intention, determination; that of *shall* (Anglo-

Saxon *sceal*, ought) is obligation. *I will do* means, I purpose doing, I am determined to do. *I shall do* means, radically, I ought to do; and as a man is supposed to do what he sees he ought to do, *I shall do* came to mean, I am about doing — to be, in fact, a mere announcement of future action more or less remote. But so *you shall do* means, radically, you ought to do; and therefore unless we mean to impose an obligation or to announce an action on the part of another person, over whom we claim some control, *shall*, in speaking of the mere future voluntary action of another person, is inappropriate; and we therefore say *you will*, assuming that it is the volition of the other person to do thus or so. Hence, in merely announcing future action, we say, I or we *shall*, you, he, or they *will*; and, in declaring purpose on our own part, or on the part of another, obligation, or inevitable action, which we mean to control, we say, I or we *will*, you, he, or they *shall*. Official orders, which are in the form *you will*, are but a seeming exception to this rule of speech, which they, in fact, illustrate. For in them the courtesy of superior to subordinate, carried to the extreme even in giving command, avoids the semblance of compulsion, while it assumes obedience in its very language. *Should* and *would* follow, of course, the fortunes of shall and will; and in the following short dialogue, I have given, I believe, easily-apprehended examples of all the proper uses of these words, the discrimination of which is found by some persons so difficult. A husband is supposed to be trying to induce his reluctant wife to go from their suburban home to town for a day or two.

"*He.* I shall go to town to-morrow. Of course you will?

"*She.* No, thanks. I shall not go. I shall wait for better weather, if that will ever come. When shall we have three fair days together again?

"*He.* Don't mind that, you should go. I should like to have you hear Ronconi.

"*She.* No, no; I will not go.

"*He* [*to himself*]. But you shall go, in spite of the weather and of yourself. [*To her.*] Well, remember, if you should change your mind, I should be very happy to have your company. Do come; you will enjoy the opera; and you shall have the nicest possible supper at Delmonico's.

"*She.* No; I should not enjoy the opera. There are no singers worth listening to; and I would n't walk to the end of the drive for the best supper Delmonico will ever cook. A man seems to think that any human creature would do anything for something good to eat.

"*He.* Most human creatures will.

"*She.* I shall stay at home, and you shall have your opera and your supper all to yourself.

"*He.* Well, if you will stay at home, you shall. And if you wont have the supper, you shan't. But my trip shall be dull without you. I shall be bored to death — that is, unless, indeed, your friend Mrs. Dashatt Mann should go to town to-morrow, as she said she thought she would; then, perhaps, we shall meet at the opera, and she and her nieces will sup with me.

"*She* [*to herself*]. My dear friend, Mrs. Dashatt Mann! And so that woman will be at her old tricks with my husband again. But she shall find that I am mistress of this situation, in spite of her big black eyes and her big white shoulders. [*To him.*] John, why should you waste yourself upon those ugly, giggling girls? To be sure, *she* 's a fine woman enough; that is, if you *will* buy beauty by the pound; but they!

"*He.* O, think what I will do about that, I must take them for politeness' sake; and, indeed, though the lady is a matron, it would n't be quite proper to take her alone — would it? What should you say?

"*She.* Well, not exactly, perhaps. But it does n't much matter; she can take care of herself, I should think. She 's no chicken; she 'll never see thirty-five again. But it 's too bad you should be bored with her nieces — and since *you* 're bent on having me go with you — and — after all, I

should like to hear Ronconi — and — you shan't be going about with those cackling girls — well, John, dear, I 'll go."

The following passage is quoted by Grant White from a newspaper as an instance of the distinction between *shall* and *will* "unsurpassed in delicacy and exactness, and consequent effect;" the occasion of the passage is the assassination of Abraham Lincoln:

"It justly fastened itself upon the rebellion, and demanded new and severer punishment of the rebels, instead of the magnanimous reconciliation which the beloved president, of whom [the nation] had been bereaved, had recommended. Who will say that this sentiment was unnatural? Who shall say that it is even unjust?"

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

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

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